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Gill v. Whitford 
16-1161 
Ruling Below: Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837 (W.D.Wis., 2016) 
Democratic voters filed § 1983 action against members of Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
claiming that redistricting plan drafted and enacted by Republican-controlled Wisconsin 
legislature was unconstitutional partisan gerrymander that systematically diluted voting strength 
of Democratic voters statewide based on their political beliefs, in violation of Equal Protection 
Clause and First Amendment rights of association and free speech, by two gerrymandering 
techniques known as “cracking,” or dividing party's supporters among multiple districts so they 
fell short of majority in each one, and “packing,” or concentrating one party's backers in few 
districts that they won by overwhelming margins. The District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin held that the plan was intended to burden representational rights of Democratic voters 
throughout decennial period; the plan had its intended discriminatory effect; the discriminatory 
effect was not justified such that plan constituted unconstitutional political gerrymander; and the 
Democratic voters had standing. 
Question Presented: Whether the district court violated Vieth v. Jubelirer when it held that it 
had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge to Wisconsin's redistricting plan, instead of 
requiring a district-by-district analysis;  
Whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin's redistricting plan was an 
impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was undisputed that the plan complies with 
traditional redistricting principles;  
Whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the partisan-
gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in Davis v. Bandemer;  
Whether the defendants are entitled, at a minimum, to present additional evidence showing that 
they would have prevailed under the district court's test, which the court announced only after 
the record had closed;  
Whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 
 
William WHITFORD, Roger Anclaim, Emily Bunting, Mary Lunne Donohue, Helen 
Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, Allison Seaton, James Seaton, 
Jerome Wallace and Donald Winter, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Beverly R. GILL, Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King, Don Millis, and Mark L. 
Thomsen, Defendants. 
 
United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin 
Decided on November 21, 2016 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. 
The plaintiffs have brought this action 
alleging that Act 43, the redistricting plan 
enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature in 
2011, constitutes an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander. Specifically, they maintain that 
the Republican-controlled legislature drafted 
and enacted a redistricting plan that 
systematically dilutes the voting strength of 
Democratic voters statewide. We find that 
Act 43 was intended to burden the 
representational rights of Democratic voters 
throughout the decennial period by impeding 
their ability to translate their votes into 
legislative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated 
by the results of the 2012 and 2014 elections, 
among other evidence, we conclude that Act 
43 has had its intended effect. Finally, we 
find that the discriminatory effect is not 
explained by the political geography of 
Wisconsin nor is it justified by a legitimate 
state interest. Consequently, Act 43 
constitutes an unconstitutional political 
gerrymander. This opinion constitutes our 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a)(1). 
I 
BACKGROUND 
We begin our consideration of the plaintiffs' 
claims by examining Wisconsin's statutory  
requirements for redistricting as well as its 
recent redistricting history. 
A. Reapportionment in Wisconsin 
1. The State's constitutional and statutory 
framework 
Reapportionment of state legislative districts 
is a responsibility constitutionally vested in 
the state government. Although some states 
have chosen to avoid the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering by vesting this power in a 
neutral body designed specifically to perform 
that delicate function, the people of 
Wisconsin have so far chosen to rely on its 
legislature to reapportion its districts after the 
decennial census. They have vested 
responsibility in the bicameral legislature 
composed of the Wisconsin State Senate and 
the Wisconsin State Assembly. Wis. Const. 
art. IV, §§ 1, 3. According to Wisconsin law, 
“[t]he state is divided into 33 senate districts, 
each composed of 3 assembly districts. Each 
senate district shall be entitled to elect one 
member of the senate. Each assembly district 
shall be entitled to elect one representative to 
the assembly.” 
The Wisconsin Constitution directs the 
Wisconsin legislature, “[a]t its first session 
after each enumeration made by the authority 
of the United States,” to “apportion and 
district anew the members of the senate and 
assembly, according to the number of 
inhabitants.” The Wisconsin Constitution 
also imposes specific requirements for 
reapportionment plans. Assembly districts 
are “to be bounded by county, precinct, town 
or ward lines, to consist of contiguous 
territory and be in as compact form as 
practicable.” With respect to political 
subdivisions, a prior federal district court 
observed that, “[a]lthough avoiding the 
division of counties is no longer an inviolable 
principle, respect for the prerogatives of the 
Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards 
and municipalities be kept whole where 
possible.” The Wisconsin Constitution 
further requires that “no assembly district 
shall be divided in the formation of a senate 
district.”  
In addition to the state constitutional 
requirements, the Wisconsin legislature must 
comply with federal law when redistricting. 
In particular, state legislatures must ensure 
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that districts are approximately equal in 
population, so that they do not violate the 
“one-person, one-vote” principle embedded 
in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. ( “[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause requires that the seats in 
both houses of a bicameral state legislature 
must be apportioned on a population basis.”); 
(holding “that an apportionment plan with a 
maximum population deviation under 10%” 
is presumptively constitutional, while a 
population deviation larger than 10% must be 
justified by the state). Further, states also 
must comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, which focuses on preserving the 
voting power of minority groups. 
Redistricting laws in Wisconsin are enacted, 
in large measure, in the same manner as other 
legislation, specifically, by way of bills 
originating in either house of the legislature. 
Tad Ottman, aide to the Senate Majority 
Leader, explained in some detail this 
legislative process: 
[L]egislators will work either on their own or 
with drafters or with a small group of people 
to develop legislation. Usually it's developed 
among members of your own party, if not just 
the individual legislator. They create a 
proposal with the assistance of the 
Legislative Reference Bureau. At that point, 
the bill is often, but not always, circulated 
among other legislators to see if anybody else 
would want to sign on .... 
The bill is then circulated. At some point it is 
introduced.... And then once they are 
introduced, they are assigned to a committee. 
The committee chairman or chairwoman can 
choose to hold a public hearing on that piece 
of legislation. Most of the time a public 
hearing is held.... And then that legislation is 
forwarded to the full body, either the Senate 
or the Assembly, for debate and then it is 
passed over to the other House where a 
similar process occurs. 
A bill must then “be presented to the 
governor,” who can sign or veto the bill.  
The caucus system plays a significant role in 
the legislative process. Caucus meetings are 
held in the morning prior to the legislative 
session to vet legislation internally before a 
vote on the floor. Professor William 
Whitford, a named plaintiff and retired 
professor of law from the University of 
Wisconsin, testified that important “debate 
and discussion,” as well as the “vote[ ] that 
matters,” occur within the caucus meetings. 
“Once the party caucuses come to a majority 
result, the other members of the party are 
expected to follow the party line ....” Thus, it 
is “extremely difficult” to pass legislation 
through a bipartisan coalition. 
2. The modern history of reapportionment 
in Wisconsin 
In the wake of the 1980 census, the plan that 
had been enacted in 1972 could no longer 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
“one-person one-vote.” In response to these 
changes in population, a redistricting plan 
was drafted and enacted by the Wisconsin 
legislature, which had a Democratic majority, 
but it was vetoed by the Republican 
governor. Consequently, a federal district 
court was asked to devise a remedy. Upon 
reviewing several plans submitted by 
legislators and  interest groups, the court 
“reluctantly concluded” that it could “be 
more faithful to the goals of 
reapportionment” by drafting its own plan. In 
doing so, the court focused on ensuring 
population equality, avoiding the dilution of 
racial minority voting strength, and keeping 
communities of interest together. This 
“AFL–CIO Plan” remained in effect for one 
election in 1982. As a result of that election, 
the Democratic Party held control of both 
houses of the Wisconsin legislature and also 
gained the governor's office. The legislature 
passed, and the governor signed, a new 
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apportionment plan that lasted for the rest of 
the decennial period.  
Following the 1990 election, the Wisconsin 
government again was divided between two 
political parties. The Democratic Party 
controlled both houses of the Wisconsin 
legislature while the governor was a 
Republican. “For that or other reasons, no bill 
to reapportion the legislature had been 
enacted into law” by January 1992, leading 
several Republican legislators to challenge 
the existing apportionment plan “as 
unconstitutional and violative of the Voting 
Rights Act.” As a result, the federal court was 
asked to draft a new plan. 
In an attempt to play a more limited role in 
the redistricting process, the court “asked the 
parties at the outset whether they had any 
objection ... to [the court's] selecting the best 
of the submitted plans rather than trying to 
create [its] own plan.” Upon receiving these 
submissions, however, the court determined 
that the plans bore “the marks of their 
partisan origins.” It therefore used parts of 
one Republican plan and one Democratic 
plan. The court plan preserved the strengths 
of the partisan plans, “primarily population 
equality and contiguity and compactness,” 
while “avoid[ing] their weaknesses.” The 
plan remained in effect through the 2000 
election. 
Following the 2000 census, a divided 
Wisconsin legislature again was unable to 
agree upon a redistricting plan. In an ensuing 
law suit, the federal district court determined 
that “the existing Wisconsin Assembly and 
Senate districts,” which had not been redrawn 
since 1992, were “violative of the ‘one 
person, one vote’ standard.” A new plan was 
therefore necessary. The court considered 
sixteen plans that had been submitted by 
legislators and other interest groups, but 
“found various unredeemable flaws” in all of 
them. The court therefore drew a plan “in the 
most neutral way it could conceive—by 
taking the 1992 reapportionment plan as a 
template and adjusting it for population 
deviations.” In making these changes, the 
court attempted to “maintain[ ] municipal 
boundaries and unit[e] communities of 
interest.” The “Baumgart Plan” was in effect 
from 2002 until 2010. 
B. Drafting of Act 43 
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, 
the voters of Wisconsin elected a Republican 
majority in the Assembly, a Republican 
majority in the Senate, and a Republican 
Governor. This uniformity in control led the 
Republican leadership to conclude that a 
legislatively enacted redistricting plan was 
possible. 
In January 2011, Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin 
Senate Majority Leader, and Jeff Fitzgerald, 
Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, retained 
attorney Eric McLeod and the law firm of 
Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, to assist with 
the reapportionment of the state legislative 
districts. The firm supervised the work of Tad 
Ottman, staff member to Senate Majority 
Leader Fitzgerald; Adam Foltz, staff member 
to Speaker Fitzgerald; and Joseph Handrick, 
a consultant with the law firm Reinhart 
Boerner Van Deuren s.c., in planning, 
drafting, and negotiating the new districting 
plan. Ottman, Foltz, and later Handrick, 
worked in a room located in the offices of 
Michael Best & Friedrich, which they 
referred to as the “map room.” 
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick also received 
assistance from Professor Ronald Keith 
Gaddie, a professor of political science at the 
University of Oklahoma. Michael Best & 
Friedrich had retained Professor Gaddie “as 
an independent advisor on the appropriate 
racial and/or political make-up of legislative 
and congressional districts in Wisconsin.” 
Professor Gaddie described his job as 
“devis[ing] measures and consult[ing] ... 
about measures” of partisanship, 
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compactness, “the integrity of counties, the 
integrity of city boundaries, the so-called 
good government principles of redistricting.” 
“Where [he] ... spent most of [his] time was 
trying to disentangle the performance of the 
majority/minority districts in Milwaukee 
County.” 
A “significant part” of his work was 
“building a regression model to be able to test 
the partisan makeup and performance of 
districts as they might be configured in 
different ways.” As explained by one of the 
plaintiffs' experts, Professor Kenneth Mayer, 
“[r]egression is a technique where we can 
seek to explain a dependent variable, the 
variable that we're trying to account for.... 
[W]e attempt to explain the values that a 
dependent variable take[s] with what are 
called independent variables or underlying 
causal variables.” In this instance, Professor 
Gaddie's dependent variable was the baseline 
partisanship of a unit of geography, which 
then could be aggregated into different 
configurations of Assembly districts. In this 
way, Professor Gaddie was able to assess the 
partisanship of the Assembly maps that the 
drafters passed on to him for analysis. 
Professor Mayer testified that “the political 
science literature is essentially unanimous” 
that the approach taken by Professor Gaddie 
is “the appropriate method,” and Professor 
Mayer used the same methodology to 
construct his Demonstration Plan. 
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick began drafting 
the map that would become Act 43 in April 
2011, after they received census data from the 
Legislative Technology Services Bureau 
(“LTSB”). The LTSB also had provided them 
with computers loaded with the redistricting 
software, autoBound. Ottman described in 
detail how the software was used: 
[Y]ou would open up a plan that you'd been 
working on or label a new plan and assign it 
the Assembly district that you wanted to 
work with and then you could also pick a 
color that you wanted that Assembly district 
to be. It's sort of like a color-by-number 
exercise. ... 
You also determine what other layers that 
you want to look at on the screen. There were 
a number of different overlays that you have, 
anywhere from existing Senate and 
Assembly districts, ... count[y] boundaries, 
municipal boundaries, ward boundaries all 
the way down to census block boundaries. As 
a practical matter what you tried to do is you 
would zoom in the region of your screen to 
the area that you're looking at to the smallest 
amount that you could see and then have kind 
of the fewest layers displayed that you would 
need because the more information that you 
were requiring it to display slows down the 
computer speed a lot and makes it really slow 
to render. 
.... 
And then what you would do is there were a 
couple different ways that you could add 
population to the district. 
Ottman further explained that, in more 
populated areas, the drafters worked more at 
the ward level: “So you would have the wards 
displayed and you would literally draw a 
circle, click on it, and it would assign it to the 
map and fill it in.” “In other parts of the state 
... you might do that at the county level 
because it's so sparsely populated so you'd 
grab three or four counties at [a] time.” 
When the drafters would increase the area 
size of the districts that they were drawing, 
autoBound provided demographic 
information for the area that the drafter had 
included, such as the number of people in the 
district, the deviation from the ideal 
population, voting-age population, and 
different minority group populations. It also 
allowed the user to include “customized ... 
demographic data.” 
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One piece of “customized demographic data” 
employed by the drafters was a composite 
partisan score. From the time that Ottman, 
Foltz, and Handrick received the census data 
from the LTSB, they worked to develop a 
composite partisan score that accurately 
reflected the political make-up of the 
population units. Having this measure was 
necessary so that, when they aggregated 
those units into new districts, they could 
assess the partisan make-up of the new 
district they had drawn. On April 19, 2011, 
they developed a composite of “all statewide 
races from [20]04 to 2010” that “seem[ed] to 
work well.” They sent this composite 
measure to Professor Gaddie, who tested it 
against his regression model. Professor 
Gaddie confirmed to Handrick that “the 
partisanship proxy you are using (all races) is 
an almost perfect proxy for the open seat 
vote, and the best proxy you'll come up with.” 
Once Professor Gaddie confirmed the 
usefulness of their composite measure, 
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick could “assess 
the partisan impact of the map[s] that [they] 
drew.” 
Although Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick 
worked in the same room at Michael Best & 
Friedrich, they worked independently on 
their own maps. They drew several statewide 
maps, and even more regional maps from 
which the legislative leadership eventually 
would choose. As they drew the maps, they 
would ensure that the districts were “close-
to-ideal population.” They did an “eyeball 
test” for “compactness and contiguousness.” 
They “looked at ... what the core of the 
existing district was compared to the new 
district,” “looked at municipalities that were 
split,” whether the new district had changed 
Senate districts, and “where incumbents 
lived.” 
The drafters were attentive to traditional 
districting criteria like population equality, 
compactness, and municipal splits 
throughout the drafting process. When the 
drafters had created a statewide map with 
which they were satisfied, they would export 
the district-by-district partisanship scores 
from autoBound into a spreadsheet for that 
“finalized” “statewide” plan. 
The drafters used their composite score to 
evaluate the statewide maps that they had 
drawn based on the level of partisan 
advantage that they provided to Republicans. 
In many instances, the names of the maps 
reflected the level of partisan advantage 
achieved by the districting plan; for instance, 
there are maps labeled “Assertive” and 
“Aggressive.” Foltz testified that 
“aggressive” in this context meant “probably 
that [the map] was a more aggressive map 
with regard to GOP leaning.” 
The drafters created spreadsheets which 
collected the partisan scores, by district, for 
each of the statewide map alternatives. Each 
spreadsheet included a corresponding table 
comparing the partisan performance of the 
draft plan to the prior map drawn by the 
Baumgart court, which they called the 
“Current Map.” These performance 
comparisons were made on the following 
criteria: “Safe” Republican seats, “Lean” 
Republican seats, “Swing” seats, “Safe” 
Democratic seats, and “Lean” Democratic 
seats. 
The process of drafting and evaluating these 
alternative district maps spanned several 
months. In early April 2011, the drafters 
produced a document comparing the partisan 
performance of the Current Map to two early 
draft maps: Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's 
Basemap Assertive. Under the Current Map, 
the drafters anticipated that the Republicans 
would win 49 Assembly seats. This number 
increased to 52 under the Joe's Basemap 
Basic map and to 56 under the Joe's Basemap 
Assertive map. The number of safe and 
leaning Republican seats increased from 40 
under the Current Map to 45 under the Joe's 
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Basemap Basic map and 49 under the Joe's 
Basemap Assertive map; the number of 
swing seats decreased from 19 to 14 to 12.42 
The number of safe and leaning Democratic 
seats, however, remained roughly the same 
under all three maps, hovering between 38 
and 40. 
The drafters prepared and evaluated the 
partisan performance of at least another six 
statewide alternative maps. Each of these 
maps improved upon the anticipated pro-
Republican advantage generated in the initial 
two draft plans. The total number of safe and 
leaning Republican seats now ranged 
between 51 and 54, and the number of swing 
seats was decreased to between 6 and 11. The 
number of safe and leaning Democratic seats 
again remained about the same under each 
draft map, ranging between 37 and 39. 
The drafters sent their completed draft maps 
to Professor Gaddie for further analysis. For 
each map, Professor Gaddie created an “S” 
curve—a “visual aide[ ] to demonstrate the 
partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.” 
These “S” curves show how each map would 
operate within an array of electoral outcomes. 
The “S” curves give a visual depiction of how 
each party's vote share (on the x axis), 
ranging from 40% to 60%, relates to the 
number of Assembly seats that party likely 
will secure (on the y axis). Democratic seats 
are depicted by shades of blue, and 
Republican seats by shades of red. To 
produce the “S” curves, Professor Gaddie 
first used his regression analysis to calculate 
the expected partisan vote shares for each 
new district. He then shifted the vote share of 
each district ten points in either direction, 
from 40% to 60%, and assigned a color to 
districts that “tend[ed]” towards, or were 
“safe” seats, for that party. The “S” curves—
at least some of which were printed in large 
format and kept in the map room—allowed a 
non-statistician, by mere visual inspection, to 
assess the partisan performance of a 
particular map under all likely electoral 
scenarios. On one occasion, Senator 
Fitzgerald came to the map room, and 
Professor Gaddie showed him one of the 
large printouts of the “S” curves and 
“basically explain[ed] how to interpret” 
them. 
Not long after Professor Gaddie had 
performed his analyses, the Republican 
legislative leadership contacted the drafters 
and indicated that they wanted to be prepared 
to act on a redistricting plan. Over several 
days in early June, the drafters presented a 
selection of regional maps drawn from their 
statewide drafts, approximately three to four 
per region, to the Republican leadership. 
Along with these regional alternatives, the 
leadership “saw the partisan scores for the 
maps that [the drafters] presented to them in 
those alternatives.” Foltz testified during his 
deposition that, although he could not recall 
a particular example, he was sure that he was 
asked by the leadership about the partisan 
performance of the various regional options. 
Following this meeting, the drafters 
amalgamated the regional alternatives chosen 
by the leadership. Foltz testified that “the 
draft map called team map emerged as a 
result of the ... leadership's choices at those 
meetings.” Under the Team Map, which was 
also referred to as the “Final Map,” the 
Republicans could expect to win 59 
Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican 
seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4 
leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic 
seats. In a document bearing the heading 
“Tale of the Tape,” the drafters, among other 
things, compared the partisan performance of 
the Team Map directly to the Current Map on 
each of these criteria. They highlighted 
specifically that under the Current Map, 49 
seats are “50% or better” for Republicans, but 
under the Team Map, “59 Assembly seats are 
50% or better.” 
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The Team Map underwent even more intense 
partisan scrutiny in a document identified as 
“summary.xlsx.” The drafters divided the 
new Team Map districts into six categories of 
partisan performance, listing beside each 
district its “new incumbent” and its 
Republican vote share under the Current Map 
and the Team Map. The drafters considered 
five districts to be “Statistical Pick Up[s],” 
meaning they were currently held by a 
Democratic incumbent but likely to become 
Republican; they grouped fourteen districts 
under the heading “GOP seats strengthened a 
lot”; they designated eleven districts “GOP 
seats strengthened a little”; they labeled three 
districts as “GOP seats weakened a little”; 
they considered another three GOP districts 
“likely lost”; and, finally, they identified four 
districts where the Democrats were 
“weakened.” The drafters also listed the 
twenty Republican Assembly members who, 
under the Team Map, could be considered 
“GOP Donors to the Team”: “Incumbents 
with numbers above 55% that donate[d] to 
the team.” These representatives stood in 
contrast to “GOP non-donors,” who were 
Republican incumbents with “over 55% who 
d[id] not donate points.” 
The Team Map was then sent to Professor 
Gaddie, who conducted an “S” curve 
analysis. The Team Map demonstrated that 
Republicans would maintain a majority under 
any likely voting scenario; indeed, they 
would maintain a 54 seat majority while 
garnering only 48% of the statewide vote. 
The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54% 
of the statewide vote to capture a majority. 
Once the map had been finalized, Foltz 
presented each Republican member of the 
Assembly with information on his or her new 
district. The memos prepared for the 
Assembly members informed them whether 
the district number had changed, whether 
adjustment to the district population was 
necessary based on the census numbers, and 
provided a “[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in 
the new district compared to the old. 
Specifically, the memorandum detailed what 
percentage of the population in the old and 
new districts voted for Republican candidates 
in representative statewide and national 
elections held since 2004. This information 
also was provided in terms of raw votes. The 
memoranda did not provide the individual 
legislators with any information about 
contiguity, compactness, or core population. 
Ottman engaged in a similar process with 
Republican members of the State Senate. For 
each meeting, he created a talking-points 
memo that included information about 
population, where changes in the district's 
population had occurred, and the geography 
of the new district. These also contained 
information on how the re-configured district 
had voted in national and statewide elections. 
Ottman also made a presentation to the 
Republican caucus. His notes for that 
meeting state: “The maps we pass will 
determine who's here 10 years from now,” 
and “[w]e have an opportunity and an 
obligation to draw these maps that 
Republicans haven't had in decades.” 
On July 11, 2011, the redistricting plan was 
introduced by the Committee on Senate 
Organization. On July 13, 2011, a public 
hearing was held, during which Ottman and 
Foltz presented the plan and fielded 
questions. The Senate and Assembly passed 
the bill on July 19, 2011, and July 20, 2011, 
respectively. The Governor signed the bill, 
and it was published as Wisconsin Act 43 on 
August 23, 2011. 
C. Prior Court Challenges to Act 43 
Even before Act 43 was passed, two actions 
were brought challenging the plan on 
constitutional and statutory grounds, 
including under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. The court consolidated the 
actions for decision and concluded that the 
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plan did not violate the “one-person, one-
vote” principle, nor did it violate the Equal 
Protection Clause by “disenfranchise[ing]” 
voters who were moved to a new Senate 
district and were unable to vote for their state 
senator for another two years. However, the 
court did find that the plaintiffs were entitled 
to relief on their claim that Act 43 violated 
the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting 
power of Latino voters in Milwaukee County, 
and it ordered the State to redraw these 
districts. The remainder of Act 43, however, 
remained intact and governed the 2012 and 
2014 Assembly elections. 
In 2012, the Republican Party received 
48.6% of the two-party statewide vote share 
for Assembly candidates and won 60 of the 
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly. In 2014, 
the Republican Party received 52% of the 
two-party statewide vote share and won 63 
assembly seats. 
II 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Allegations of the Complaint 
We now turn to the dispute before this court. 
Plaintiffs William Whitford, Roger Anclam, 
Emily Bunting, Mary Lynne Donohue, Helen 
Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson, 
Janet Mitchell, James Seaton, Allison Seaton, 
Jerome Wallace, and Don Winter are United 
States citizens registered to vote in 
Wisconsin. They reside in various counties 
and legislative districts throughout 
Wisconsin. All of them are “supporters of the 
Democratic party and of Democratic 
candidates and they almost always vote for 
Democratic candidates in Wisconsin 
elections.” Defendants are Beverly R. Gill, 
Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King, 
Don Millis, and Mark L. Thomsen, each in 
his or her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission. 
According to the plaintiffs, in drafting Act 
43, the Republicans employed two 
gerrymandering techniques: “cracking”—
“dividing a party's supporters among 
multiple districts so that they fall short of a 
majority in each one”—and “packing”—
“concentrating one party's backers in a few 
districts that they win by overwhelming 
margins,” in order to dilute the votes of 
Democrats statewide. This “cracking and 
packing result[ed] in ‘wasted’ votes: votes 
cast either for a losing candidate (in the case 
of cracking) or for a winning candidate but in 
excess of what he or she needs to prevail (in 
the case of packing).” They therefore urge the 
court to adopt a new measure for assessing 
the discriminatory effect of political 
gerrymanders—the efficiency gap (or “EG”). 
“The efficiency gap is the difference between 
the parties' respective wasted votes in an 
election, divided by the total number of votes 
cast.” When two parties waste votes at an 
identical rate, a plan's EG is equal to zero. An 
EG in favor of one party, however, means 
that the party wasted votes at a lower rate 
than the opposing party. It is in this sense that 
the EG arguably is a measure of efficiency: 
Because the party with a favorable EG 
wasted fewer votes than its opponent, it was 
able to translate, with greater ease, its share 
of the total votes cast in the election into 
legislative seats. In short, the complaint 
alleges that Act 43 purposely distributed the 
predicted Republican vote share with greater 
efficiency so that it translated into a greater 
number of seats, while purposely distributing 
the Democratic vote share with less 
efficiency so that it would translate into fewer 
seats. 
The plaintiffs' complaint incorporated the EG 
into a proposed three-part test for partisan 
gerrymandering. First, plaintiffs would have 
to establish that a State had an intent to 
gerrymander for partisan advantage. Second, 
the plaintiffs would need to prove a partisan 
effect, by proving that the EG for a plan 
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exceeds a certain numerical threshold (which 
the plaintiffs proposed, based on historical 
analysis, to be 7%). If a plan exceeds that 
threshold, the plaintiffs asserted that it should 
be presumptively unconstitutional. Third, 
and finally, the plaintiffs placed the burden 
on the defendants to rebut the presumption by 
showing that the plan “is the necessary result 
of a legitimate state policy, or inevitable 
given the state's underlying political 
geography.” If the state is unable to rebut the 
presumption, then the plan is 
unconstitutional. 
The plaintiffs alleged that they had satisfied 
all of these elements. According to the 
complaint, Act 43 “was drafted and enacted 
with the specific intent to maximize the 
electoral advantage of Republicans and harm 
Democrats to the greatest possible extent.” 
Additionally, Act 43 “produced a pro-
Republican efficiency gap of 13% in 2012 
and 10% in 2014.” They further claimed that 
this EG is unjustified because one of their 
experts, Professor Mayer, had crafted a 
“Demonstration Plan” with “an efficiency 
gap of just 2% in 2012,” which “perform[ed] 
at least as well as [Act 43] on every other 
relevant metric.” 
For these reasons, plaintiffs claimed that Act 
43 “treats voters unequally, diluting their 
voting power based on their political beliefs, 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of equal protection,” and 
“unreasonably burdens their First 
Amendment rights of association and free 
speech.” They requested a declaration that 
Act 43 is unconstitutional, an injunction 
prohibiting further elections under the map, 
and the drawing of a new redistricting map. 
B. Motion to Dismiss 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 
August 18, 2015, which contended that the 
court could not grant relief for three primary 
reasons. First, the defendants argued that the 
EG was directly analogous to the 
proportional-representation standard rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 
L.Ed.2d 546 (2004). Second, the defendants 
argued that the EG failed to account for the 
impact of traditional districting criteria like 
contiguity and compactness. Finally, the 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked 
the standing to challenge Act 43 on a 
statewide basis, and instead could only 
challenge their individual districts. 
In an order dated December 17, 2015, we 
denied defendants' motion to dismiss. We 
first noted that the claim was justiciable, and 
that, “[u]ntil a majority of the Supreme Court 
rules otherwise, lower courts must continue 
to search for a judicially manageable 
standard.” We acknowledged the defendants' 
argument that the EG was analogous to a 
proportionality standard, but noted that the 
plaintiffs' experts disagreed with the 
defendants' contention and that factfinding 
therefore was needed. We concluded that “[a] 
determination whether plaintiffs' proposed 
standard is judicially manageable relies at 
least in part on the validity of plaintiffs' 
expert opinions” and that a more developed 
record would be necessary to resolve that 
question. Finally, we concluded that the 
plaintiffs had standing, explaining that 
“[b]ecause plaintiffs' alleged injury in this 
case relates to their statewide representation, 
it follows that they should be permitted to 
bring a statewide claim.” We noted, however, 
that the defendants were “free to raise this 
issue again on a more developed record.” 
C. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for 
summary judgment, raising new challenges 
to the plaintiffs' claims. In the motion, the 
defendants argued that the EG metric was 
overinclusive and captured several plans—
including court-drawn plans in Wisconsin—
that were not drawn with any partisan intent. 
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Furthermore Democratic voters tended to live 
in cities, which created a “natural packing” 
effect and distorted the EG. 
The defendants acknowledged the plaintiffs' 
argument that a requirement of partisan intent 
could remedy this over-inclusivity problem, 
but noted that the intent element was not 
sufficiently demanding. The defendants 
contended that “[a]s long as redistricting is 
done by a legislature, it should not be very 
difficult to prove that the likely political 
consequences of the reapportionment were 
intended.” The intent element proposed by 
the plaintiffs was, therefore, “meaningless,” 
and the Supreme Court's decision in Vieth 
already had ruled out the more demanding 
standard of “predominant intent.”  
The defendants levied two additional 
criticisms of the plaintiffs' test. First, they 
noted that the plaintiffs' “Demonstration 
Plan” was based on a counterfactual scenario 
and therefore failed to address concerns 
raised by some Justices about a standard 
which dealt with a “hypothetical state of 
affairs.” Second, they alleged that the EG is 
highly sensitive to “vote-switchers” in swing 
districts. Had voters in close (or competitive) 
elections voted for the other party, and had a 
few candidates of the other party won those 
seats, then the EG might be dramatically 
different. In their view, a plan that included 
such competitive districts could be found 
unconstitutional under the plaintiffs' 
proposed standard. 
We denied the motion for summary 
judgment. We explained that judgment “as a 
matter of law would be premature because 
there [we]re factual disputes regarding the 
validity of plaintiffs' proposed 
measurement.” We also noted that there was 
conflicting evidence on the “natural packing” 
of Democrats in Wisconsin. We further 
observed that the defendants' arguments 
might serve as “a suggestion to alter the 
threshold of the plaintiffs' test and, perhaps, 
shift the burdens of production or proof.” In 
particular, we left open the question of the 
requisite level of intent and directed the 
plaintiffs to “be prepared to present the 
strongest evidence that they have on this 
issue ... in order to meet even the most 
demanding intent requirement.” We therefore 
set the case for trial. 
D. Witnesses Testifying at Trial 
During the four-day trial, from May 24, 2016, 
through May 28, 2016, the parties presented 
their cases through eight witnesses. Some of 
the testimony of the witnesses involved in the 
passage of Act 43 has been set forth above, 
so it is not necessary to summarize it again 
here. An overview of the remaining 
testimony is set forth below. 
1. William Whitford 
First to testify was William Whitford, one of 
the plaintiffs in this litigation and a resident 
of the 76th Assembly District. Professor 
Whitford testified to his long-time affiliation 
with the Democratic Party. He related that he 
consistently has voted for Democratic 
candidates, has made donations to 
Democratic Assembly candidates outside of 
his own district, has raised money on their 
behalf, and has donated to the Assembly 
Democratic Campaign Committee. 
According to Professor Whitford, given 
Wisconsin's caucus system, “[t]he only 
practical way to accomplish [his] policy 
objectives is to get a majority of the 
Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate,” 
which is “virtually impossible under this 
apportionment [plan].” 
2. Ronald Keith Gaddie 
Professor Gaddie was deposed by the 
plaintiffs on March 9, 2016, and a video of 
that deposition was admitted into evidence 
and played at trial. As explained in some 
detail above, Professor Gaddie testified that 
he was retained by Michael Best & Friedrich 
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on April 11, 2011, to “serv[e] as an 
independent advisor on the appropriate racial 
and/or political make-up of legislative and 
congressional districts in Wisconsin.” In 
particular, Professor Gaddie took “the 
electoral data ... and constructed a regression 
analysis ... in order to create an estimate of 
the vote performance of every district.” He 
explained that this analysis “could be used to 
create a set of visual aids to demonstrate the 
partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.” 
As noted above, Professor Gaddie's 
regression analysis was employed to confirm 
the validity of the composite measure 
developed by Foltz, Ottman, and Handrick. 
Professor Gaddie also used his regression 
analysis to assess each of the drafters' 
proposed maps and to create “S” curves to 
illustrate how the Republican seat share 
would change based on changes in the party's 
statewide vote share. In Professor Gaddie's 
words, the “S” curves were “designed to tease 
out a potential estimated vote for the 
legislator in the district and then allow you to 
also look at that and say, okay, what if the 
Democrats have a good year? What if the 
Republicans have a good year? How does it 
shift?” At least some of the “S” curves were 
printed and kept in the map room at Michael 
Best & Friedrich; in print form, the “S” 
curves were large enough to “cover half th[e] 
table.” 
3. Adam Foltz 
Foltz worked as a legislative aide for Speaker 
Fitzgerald and served as one of the primary 
drafters of Act 43. One additional aspect of 
Foltz's testimony at trial, however, is worthy 
of note. His testimony revealed a 
shortcoming in the drafters' composite 
partisan measure. Specifically, the composite 
score likely was skewed to show a greater 
Republican advantage because of an error in 
the data for the 2006 Governor's race (one of 
the components of the composite score). As a 
result of this error, the partisan estimates in 
the drafters' spreadsheets were distorted and 
differed from the estimates reached by 
Professor Gaddie in his “S” curves. Foltz 
testified that he had not noticed this 
discrepancy at the time of drafting. He 
explained that, at the time, he “didn't spend a 
whole lot of time with” Professor Gaddie so 
he “[did]n't really understand the nuts and 
bolts” of the “S” curves. 
4. Tad Ottman 
Ottman testified to his involvement in the 
drafting and passage of Act 43. 
5. Kenneth Mayer 
Kenneth Mayer, a professor of political 
science at the University of Wisconsin, 
served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. 
His ultimate goal was to design an alternative 
districting plan to Act 43 “that had an 
efficiency gap as low to zero as I could get it” 
while also complying with traditional 
districting criteria to the same extent as Act 
43. He first created a regression model that 
estimated partisanship for each geographic 
area, so that he could compare his plan to Act 
43. To ensure the model was accurate, 
Professor Mayer compared the predictions 
made by his regression model to the actual 
results in 2012. Once he was confident in his 
model, Professor Mayer “used a GIS 
redistricting program called Maptitude ... to 
... complete the task of actually drawing the 
Assembly district map.” 
Professor Mayer's alternative 
“Demonstration Plan” yields a 2.2% EG in 
favor of the Republicans, compared to an 
11.69% EG yielded by Act 43. According to 
Professor Mayer, “[o]n all constitutional 
requirements, the Demonstration Plan is 
comparable to Act 43.” On cross-
examination, however, the defendants 
pointed out that Professor Mayer did not take 
account of incumbents when drawing the 
plan. As a result, his plan paired a greater 
number of incumbents than Act 43, including 
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one pairing in a majority-minority district. 
Further, Professor Mayer had not drawn any 
Senate districts, and therefore had not taken 
account of disenfranchisement. 
In addition to discussing the Demonstration 
Plan, Professor Mayer responded to points 
made by the defendants' experts in their 
reports. Specifically, Professor Mayer 
testified that he had conducted a sensitivity 
analysis to address concerns about the effect 
of “wave” elections—elections that 
dramatically favor one party—on the EG 
calculations for both the Demonstration Plan 
and Act 43. He first looked over the last 
twenty years of elections in Wisconsin and 
found the greatest and smallest statewide 
vote shares for each party. Using these vote 
shares as the likely electoral spectrum, he 
performed a swing analysis where the 
Democrats received an additional 3% of the 
statewide vote (compared to their 2012 share) 
and the Republicans received an additional 
5% of the statewide vote (again compared to 
their 2012 share) “to see what effect that 
would have on [his] efficiency gap 
calculations for the Demonstration Plan.” 
Professor Mayer's analysis revealed that the 
Demonstration Plan's EG remained below 
4%, regardless of the swing. Act 43's EG, 
however, increased during a Democratic 
swing but significantly decreased during a 
Republican swing. Professor Mayer noted 
that this is because “we've swung the 
Republican vote percentage up to 54 percent” 
but “[t]he number of [Republican] seats 
doesn't change.” In Professor Mayer's view, 
the result “is a confirmation that the bias in 
Act 43 is about the maximum that you can 
get.” 
6. Simon Jackman 
Simon Jackman, a professor of political 
science and statistics at Stanford University, 
also served as an expert witness for the 
plaintiffs. Professor Jackman primarily 
testified about the reliability and 
practicability of the EG. He conducted a 
survey of 786 state legislative elections 
(under 206 different districting plans) in the 
United States between 1972 and the present 
day, in order to ascertain whether there was a 
baseline EG which should “trigger scrutiny” 
and also to compare Act 43 to other 
redistricting plans. 
Professor Jackman sought to determine how 
much the EG varied from election year to 
election year, and whether a districting plan 
had any impact on that EG. Professor 
Jackman presented a “scatterplot,” which 
graphed the relationship between the EG in 
the first election year of a redistricting plan 
(set forth on the x axis) and the average EG 
over the lifetime of the plan (set forth on the 
y axis). He found a “relatively strong 
predictive relationship,” meaning that a high 
EG in the first year of a redistricting plan 
likely means that the EG will remain high for 
the lifetime of the plan. 
Based on his research, Professor Jackman 
proposed that an EG of 7% or higher should 
be legally significant: 
“I arrived at 7 percent because that seemed to 
be a reasonable threshold for saying yes, if 
the first election under a plan produces an 
efficiency gap score at least that big, then you 
can be confident now that you've seen not just 
a one-off, but something that's going to 
persist over the life of the plan as a signal 
of—a reliable signal as to the set of efficiency 
gap scores and the average efficiency gap 
score you might see if the plan were allowed 
to run.” 
In other words, an EG of 7% in favor of one 
party in the first election year of a plan almost 
certainly means that the EG will favor that 
same party in each subsequent election year 
under that plan. 
Professor Jackman noted that the EGs for the 
2012 and 2014 races in Wisconsin—13% and 
10%, respectively—were particularly high by 
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historical levels. The EG in 2012 was, 
according to Professor Jackman, “among the 
largest scores we've seen anywhere” and “in 
the top 3 percent in terms of magnitude.” Act 
43's average EG ranked fifth out of the 206 
plans that Professor Jackman surveyed. He 
testified that he was “virtually certain” that 
“Act 43 will exhibit a large and durable 
advantage in favor of Republicans over the 
rest of the decade.” 
7. Sean Trende 
Sean Trende, Senior Elections Analyst for the 
website RealClearPolitics, served as an 
expert witness for the defendants. Mr. Trende 
primarily testified on the political geography 
of Wisconsin and its potential effect on the 
EG. 
Mr. Trende explained that, as a general 
matter, political geography of the United 
States currently favors Republicans. In his 
view, the Democratic coalition has 
contracted geographically and is now 
concentrated heavily in urban areas. This 
concentration, in turn, has hurt the 
Democratic Party in congressional elections, 
which tend to favor parties with wider 
geographic reach. 
Mr. Trende also testified to the political 
geography of Wisconsin itself, which he 
analyzed using a measure called the “partisan 
index” (“PI”). The purpose of the PI is “to 
determine the partisan lean of political units,” 
in order to “compare results across 
elections.” Mr. Trende explained that the 
county and ward PI values within Wisconsin 
have shifted such that the Democratic Party's 
influence was strengthening in areas “that 
already leaned Democratic,” but was 
contracting geographically. 
Mr. Trende then applied his PI analysis to 
Wisconsin's wards in what he referred to as a 
“nearest neighbor” analysis, which assessed 
the median distance between heavily 
Democratic wards compared to the median 
distance between heavily Republican wards. 
From this analysis, Mr. Trende concluded 
that it has “become[ ] progressively harder to 
draw ... Democratic districts elsewhere in the 
state,” which in his view explained at least 
some of the EG. However, he did not 
determine exactly how much of the EG was 
attributable to geography. 
8. Nicholas Goedert 
Nicholas Goedert, a visiting professor of 
political science at Lafayette College, was 
retained by the defendants to offer opinions 
on using the EG to measure partisan 
gerrymandering. 
Professor Goedert's main objection to the EG 
was its perceived volatility. In Professor 
Goedert's view, “wave elections are the 
norm,” meaning that “much more often than 
not one party wins by 5 percent or more” of 
the vote. Therefore, relying on an EG from 
one election year, which might have taken 
place during a close election, might not be 
reliable. Professor Goedert opined that, “at a 
very minimum, ... you need to have some sort 
of robust sensitivity testing that would be 
codified if you were going to use the 
efficiency gap in any way.” 
Professor Goedert also raised a series of 
policy concerns. First, he pointed out that the 
EG measure arguably rests on a “2-to-1” 
vote-to-seats ratio and therefore a certain 
standard of proportionality. He also noted 
that there are “normatively good reasons why 
a state might cho[ose] to draw a map in a 
certain way and even under these 
normatively good reasons we could and 
actually do observe very high efficien[cy] 
gaps.” For example, Professor Goedert noted 
that some states may wish to create a more 
proportional system or encourage 
competitive elections. In his view, states 
might be discouraged from pursuing these 
policy goals if the court adopted the EG as the 
standard for partisan gerrymandering. 
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E. Post–Trial Briefing 
Both parties filed post-trial briefs, which 
summarized their views of the case in light of 
the evidence presented at trial. The plaintiffs 
contended that they satisfied their proposed 
three-part test by proving discriminatory 
intent, discriminatory effect, and an absence 
of a justification for that effect. On intent, the 
plaintiffs focused in particular on the 
alternative maps that the drafters rejected, the 
“S” curves drawn by Professor Gaddie, and 
memos written by Foltz and Ottman. On 
effect, the plaintiffs stressed that the EG was 
not only likely to favor Republicans for the 
lifetime of the plan, but that it also was likely 
to stay relatively high. The plaintiffs also 
highlighted the sensitivity testing that had 
been conducted by Professors Jackman and 
Mayer. On justification, the plaintiffs pointed 
out that the previous Assembly maps in 
Wisconsin, the alternative plans drafted by 
the defendants, and Professor Mayer's 
Demonstration Plan all exhibited lower EGs 
while arguably complying as well with 
traditional districting criteria. 
In response, the defendants contended that “a 
plan that complies with all neutral districting 
criteria, and whose efficiency gap is 
consistent with prior court-drawn plans” 
cannot be unconstitutional. The defendants 
noted that Act 43's districts were congruent, 
compact, and fairly equal in population. 
Further, much of the secrecy surrounding Act 
43's enactment was consistent with how bills 
typically are enacted in Wisconsin. The 
defendants also pointed to evidence that the 
political geography in Wisconsin favors 
Republicans, which they contend explains 
the trend in EGs towards that party over the 
past two decades. In the defendants' view, 
this evidence also illustrates the unreliability 
of the EG. The defendants concluded that the 
plaintiffs had not presented enough of a 
reason for a court to intervene in the 
redistricting process. 
We express our appreciation to both parties 
for their thorough and informative 
presentation, and now turn to the legal 
principles that must guide our analysis of the 
case. 
III 
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The plaintiffs' claim is that Act 43 violates 
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
because it discriminates against Democratic 
voters by diminishing the strength of their 
votes in comparison to their Republican 
counterparts. 
We note, as a prefatory matter, that we have 
acknowledged, throughout this litigation, that 
the plaintiffs' standing to maintain a cause of 
action is a threshold issue. Indeed, in our 
disposition of the defendants' motion to 
dismiss, we addressed extensively standing 
and “conclude[d] that plaintiffs' alleged 
injury [wa]s sufficiently concrete and 
particularized under current law to satisfy 
Lujan with respect to a statewide challenge to 
the districting plan.” “We reach[ed] the same 
conclusion with respect to [Lujan's] second 
and third elements of standing, which are 
causation and redressability.” We noted, 
though, that the “defendants [we]re free to 
raise this issue again on a more developed 
record.” 
Lujan explains that, because the elements of 
standing “are not mere pleading requirements 
but rather an indispensable part of the 
plaintiff's case, each element must be 
supported in the same way as any other 
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at the successive stages of 
the litigation.” Our assessment of the 
evidence, as well as our elucidation of the 
political gerrymandering cause of action, 
therefore will inform our standing analysis. 
Consequently, we postpone a plenary 
discussion of standing until we fully have set 
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forth the evidence as well as the 
constitutional standard. As a precursor, 
however, we conclude that the plaintiffs have 
established a concrete and particularized 
injury: “[a]s a result of the statewide partisan 
gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the 
same opportunity provided to Republicans to 
elect representatives of their choice to the 
Assembly. As a result, the electoral influence 
of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters 
statewide has been unfairly [and] 
disproportionately ... reduced” for the life of 
Act 43.155 Additionally, the plaintiffs have 
shown causation: Act 43 was designed with 
the purpose of solidifying Republican control 
of the legislature for the decennial period and, 
indeed, has had that effect. Finally, the 
plaintiffs have established that their injury is 
redressable: adopting a different statewide 
districting map would redress the 
constitutional violation by removing the 
state-imposed impediment on Democratic 
voters. 
In resolving the plaintiffs' claim, we face a 
significant analytical problem. Although the 
Supreme Court's political gerrymandering 
cases establish that “an excessive injection of 
politics is unlawful,” (emphasis removed), 
the Court has not come to rest on a single, 
judicially manageable or discernible test for 
determining when the line between 
“acceptable” and “excessive” has been 
crossed. Indeed, a signature feature of these 
cases is that no single opinion has garnered a 
majority of the Court. 
But the absence of a well-trodden path does 
not relieve us of the obligation to render a 
decision. True, we cannot anticipate that the 
Court will alter course from the decisional 
law, however sparse, that currently exists. 
Nor can we cobble together the opinions of 
the various Justices who have written on the 
matter and call the resulting amalgam 
binding precedent. Nevertheless, 
understanding that we are in an area where 
the navigational signs are not yet well-placed, 
we must decide the case before us and satisfy 
our “duty ... to say what the law is,” or at least 
what we believe it to be. 
We begin by examining the cases that set 
forth the constitutional principles which later 
informed the Court's political 
gerrymandering decisions. 
A. The Foundational Case Law 
1. 
Over half a century ago, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the constitutionality of 
legislative apportionments is governed by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Reynolds was not a political 
gerrymandering case, but addressed 
allegations that an outdated apportionment 
scheme resulted in “serious discrimination 
with respect to the allocation of legislative 
representation” in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court spoke to the importance and 
nature of the right to vote in terms that also 
inform our consideration of the plaintiffs' 
claims. 
The Court first observed that the right to vote 
“is a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society. Especially since the right 
to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights, any alleged 
infringement of the right of citizens to vote 
must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.” The Court explained that 
“[m]ost citizens” exercise their “inalienable 
right to full and effective participation in the 
political process” by voting for their elected 
representatives. “Full and effective 
participation by all citizens in state 
government requires, therefore, that each 
citizen have an equally effective voice in the 
election of members of his state legislature.” 
Moreover, the concept of equal protection 
has been traditionally viewed as requiring the 
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uniform treatment of persons standing in the 
same relation to the governmental action 
questioned or challenged. With respect to the 
allocation of legislative representation, all 
voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same 
relation regardless of where they live. 
The Court explained, however, that the 
requirement of equal treatment was not 
limited to where a voter resided. Instead, 
“[a]ny suggested criteria for the 
differentiation of citizens are insufficient to 
justify any discrimination, as to the weight of 
their votes, unless relevant to the permissible 
purposes of legislative apportionment.”  
(emphasis added). The Court therefore 
concluded that, 
    “[s]ince the achieving of fair and effective 
representation for all citizens is concededly 
the basic aim of legislative apportionment, ... 
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the 
opportunity for equal participation by all 
voters in the election of state legislators. 
Diluting the weight of votes because of place 
of residence impairs basic constitutional 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just 
as much as invidious discriminations based 
upon factors such as race or economic 
status.” 
Reynolds therefore establishes that, in 
electing state representatives, the votes of 
citizens must be weighted equally. If an 
apportionment scheme violates the principle 
of one-person, one-vote, it must be justified 
on the basis of other, permissible, legislative 
considerations. 
2. 
The Court soon had the opportunity to apply 
the principles set forth in Reynolds to 
allegations of vote-dilution brought by racial 
minorities. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 
433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965), the 
Court considered the constitutionality of an 
apportionment scheme which included 
traditional single-member districts and 
multimember districts, where citizens reside 
in a comparatively larger district and vote for 
multiple representatives. Voters alleged that 
these multimember districts were “defective 
because county-wide voting in multi-district 
counties could, as a matter of mathematics, 
result in the nullification of the unanimous 
choice of the voters of a district.” The district 
court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs, finding that the statute was 
unconstitutional on its face. 
The Supreme Court disagreed that such 
districts were unconstitutional per se, and it 
declined to strike the plan. The Court 
acknowledged, however, that “[i]t might well 
be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-
member constituency apportionment scheme, 
under the circumstances of a particular case, 
would operate to minimize or cancel out the 
voting strength of racial or political elements 
of the voting population.” The Court, 
therefore, remanded for factfinding to 
determine whether the plaintiffs could meet 
this burden. 
Following Fortson, the Court has held that 
multimember districts violate the 
Constitution when the plaintiffs have 
produced evidence that an election was “not 
equally open to participation by the group in 
question—that its members had less 
opportunity than did other residents in the 
district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their 
choice.”  
Later cases refined the methodology by 
which courts evaluate claims of vote dilution. 
In Rogers v. Lodge, Burke County, Georgia, 
employed an at-large system of elections to 
determine its Board of Commissioners, rather 
than dividing the county into districts and 
allowing each district to choose a 
commissioner. African–American citizens in 
that county brought an action in which they 
alleged that the county's system of at-large 
elections violated their First, Thirteenth, 
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights 
by diluting their voting power. The district 
court held that, although the at-large electoral 
system was neutral in origin, it was being 
maintained for invidious purposes and 
therefore ordered the county to be divided 
into districts for purposes of electing 
commissioners. 
The Supreme Court affirmed. It explained 
that districts violate the Equal Protection 
Clause when “ ‘conceived or operated as 
purposeful devices to further racial 
discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling 
out or diluting the voting strength of” 
minority populations. These cases “are thus 
subject to the standard of proof generally 
applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases,” 
specifically the “ ‘quality of a law claimed to 
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be 
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.’ ” 
Discriminatory intent, however, “need not be 
proved by direct evidence,” but may be “ 
‘inferred from the totality of the relevant 
facts.’ ”  
Applying this standard, the Court “decline[d] 
to overturn the essential finding of the 
District Court ... that the at-large system ... 
ha[d] been maintained for the purpose of 
denying blacks equal access to the political 
processes in the county.” Evidence of 
discriminatory purpose included the fact that 
no African American ever had been elected 
despite “overwhelming evidence of bloc 
voting along racial lines.” There also was 
evidence of historical discrimination in the 
form of literacy tests, poll taxes, and school 
segregation; of a disparity in socio-economic 
status that “result[ed] in part from the 
lingering effects of past discrimination,”; and 
of county elected officials' unresponsiveness 
and insensitivity to African-American 
constituents. 
Although focused on racially discriminatory 
apportionment schemes, Fortson and 
subsequent vote-dilution cases establish that 
Equal Protection concerns arise when 
apportionment plans “minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength” either of racial minorities 
or, as we have here, “political elements of the 
voting population.” Moreover, they instruct 
that vote-dilution cases are governed by the 
same standards as other equal-protection 
claims, namely the plaintiffs must establish 
both a discriminatory intent and a 
discriminatory effect. 
B. Present Supreme Court Precedent 
1. 
The Court drew heavily from the Fortson line 
of cases in resolving the political 
gerrymandering claim asserted in Gaffney v. 
Cummings. In Gaffney, the Connecticut 
Apportionment Board created a redistricting 
plan designed to yield Democratic and 
Republican seats in proportion to the 
statewide vote. A three-judge district court 
invalidated the plan on the ground that the 
deviations from equality of population in 
both houses were not “justified by any 
sufficient state interest,” “[m]ore 
particularly, ... that the policy of partisan 
political structuring ... cannot be approved as 
a legitimate reason for violating the 
requirement of numerical equality of 
population in districting.”  
The Supreme Court reversed. In its analysis, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
“[s]tate legislative districts may be equal or 
substantially equal in population and still be 
vulnerable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment”; it stated: 
A districting plan may create multimember 
districts perfectly acceptable under equal 
population standards, but invidiously 
discriminatory because they are employed 
“to minimize or cancel out the voting strength 
of racial or political elements of the voting 
population.” We must, therefore, respond to 
appellees' claims in this case that even if 
acceptable populationwise, the 
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Apportionment Board's plan was invidiously 
discriminatory because a “political fairness 
principle” was followed in making up the 
districts in both the House and Senate. 
The Court, however, was “unconvinced” that 
the plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court observed that Connecticut's 
Apportionment Board had sought to “achieve 
a rough approximation of the statewide 
political strengths of the Democratic and 
Republican parties,” by implementing a 
“political fairness” plan. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Court saw no 
constitutional impediment to the State's 
considering partisan interests in this way.  
The Court made clear, however, that the 
drawing of legislative districts along political 
lines “is not wholly exempt from judicial 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
Relying on its vote-dilution cases, it gave as 
an example “multimember districts [that] 
may be vulnerable” to constitutional 
challenges “if racial or political groups have 
been fenced out of the political process and 
their voting strength invidiously minimized.” 
“Beyond this,” the Court continued, it had 
“not ventured far or attempted the impossible 
task of extirpating politics from what are the 
essentially political processes of the 
sovereign States.” 
In closing, however, the Court was careful to 
distinguish the plan before it, which 
employed political classifications for 
benign—even salutary—purposes, with 
plans that did not have proportional 
representation as their aim: 
    “[N]either we nor the district courts have a 
constitutional warrant to invalidate a state 
plan, otherwise within tolerable population 
limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize 
or eliminate the political strength of any 
group or party, but to recognize it and, 
through districting, provide a rough sort of 
proportional representation in the legislative 
halls of the State.” 
In sum, the Court reiterated that its concern 
was invidious discrimination by the State; 
absent the plaintiffs' establishing an intent to 
dilute the strength of a particular group or 
party, the Equal Protection Clause was not 
offended. 
2. 
The Court next addressed partisan 
gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer. 
Because Bandemer was the first case in 
which a party directly raised, and the Court 
squarely addressed, a claim that a legislative 
redistricting plan invidiously discriminated 
against members of a political party, we treat 
it in some depth. 
In Bandemer, Indiana Democrats challenged 
the 1981 state reapportionment plan passed 
by a Republican-controlled legislature. 
Specifically, they alleged that the plan was 
intended to disadvantage Democrats in 
electing representatives of their choosing, in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
November 1982, before the case went to trial, 
elections were held under the new plan. The 
district court had “sustained an equal 
protection challenge to Indiana's 1981 state 
apportionment on the basis that the law 
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of 
Indiana Democrats,” but the Supreme Court 
reversed. A majority of the Court first 
concluded that the issue before the Court, like 
those in the one-person, one-vote cases and 
in the vote-dilution cases, “is one of 
representation” and “decline[d] to hold that 
such claims [we]re never justiciable.” “As 
Gaffney demonstrates,” the Court continued, 
the fact that a “claim is submitted by a 
political group, rather than a racial group, 
does not distinguish it in terms of 
justiciability.” That the complaining group 
does not share an “immutable” characteristic 
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or otherwise “has not been subject to the 
same historical stigma may be relevant to the 
manner in which the case is adjudicated, but 
these differences do not justify a refusal to 
entertain such a case.” 
Turning to the standard to be applied, a 
majority of the Court agreed that the 
“plaintiffs were required to prove both 
intentional discrimination against an 
identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group.” A 
majority of the Court also believed that the 
first requirement—intentional discrimination 
against an identifiable group—had been met. 
Indeed, it observed that, “[a]s long as 
redistricting is done by a legislature, it should 
not be very difficult to prove that the likely 
political consequences of the 
reapportionment were intended.” 
The plurality, however, rejected “the District 
Court's legal and factual bases for concluding 
that the 1981 Act visited a sufficiently 
adverse effect on the appellees' 
constitutionally protected rights to make out 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” It 
was not the case that “any apportionment 
scheme that purposely prevents proportional 
representation is unconstitutional.” Indeed, 
the plurality noted that precedent “clearly 
foreclose[d] any claim that the Constitution 
requires proportional representation or that 
legislatures in reapportioning must draw 
district lines to come as near as possible to 
allocating seats to the contending parties in 
proportion to what their anticipated statewide 
vote will be.”  
Moreover, the plurality held “that a particular 
apportionment scheme makes it more 
difficult for a particular group in a particular 
district to elect the representatives of its 
choice” also did “not render that scheme 
constitutionally infirm. In reaching this 
conclusion, it noted that the Court had 
refused to approve the use of multimember 
districts “[o]nly where there [wa]s evidence 
that excluded groups ha[d] ‘less opportunity 
to participate in the political processes and to 
elect candidates of their choice.’ ” It 
emphasized that “unconstitutional 
discrimination occurs only when the electoral 
system is arranged in a manner that will 
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of 
voters' influence on the political process as a 
whole”: 
    “[A]n equal protection violation may be 
found only where the electoral system 
substantially disadvantages certain voters in 
their opportunity to influence the political 
process effectively. In this context, such a 
finding of unconstitutionality must be 
supported by evidence of continued 
frustration of the will of a majority of the 
voters or effective denial to a minority of 
voters of a fair chance to influence the 
political process.” 
Applying this standard to the facts before 
them, the plurality concluded that “this 
threshold condition” had not been met. It 
observed that the district court had relied 
“primarily on the results of the 1982 
elections” in which Democratic candidates 
had garnered “51.9% of the votes cast 
statewide,” but secured only 43 seats. Id. 
Republicans, however, had received only 
“48.1% ... yet, of the 100 seats to be filled, 
Republican candidates won 57.” “Relying on 
a single election to prove unconstitutional 
discrimination,” however, was 
“unsatisfactory.” The plurality specifically 
noted a lack of evidence that (1) the 1981 Act 
prevented the Democrats from “secur[ing] ... 
sufficient vote[s] to take control of the 
assembly”; (2) “the 1981 reapportionment 
would consign the Democrats to a minority 
status in the Assembly throughout the 
1980's”; or (3) “the Democrats would have no 
hope of doing any better in the 
reapportionment that would occur after the 
1990 census.” “Without findings of this 
nature,” the plurality stated, “the District 
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Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.” 
The plurality then addressed a few aspects of 
Justice Powell's opinion. “[T]he crux of [his] 
analysis” was that—“at least in some cases—
the intentional drawing of district boundaries 
for partisan ends and for no other reason 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.” It 
disagreed that “the specific intention of 
disadvantaging one political party's election 
prospects,” standing alone, established a 
constitutional violation. Instead, invidious 
intent must be coupled with evidence that 
“the redistricting d[id] in fact disadvantage [a 
party] at the polls,” and the disadvantage 
must be more than “a mere lack of 
proportionate results in one election.” The 
plurality, however, acknowledged that 
“election results” were “relevant to a 
showing of the effects required to prove a 
political gerrymandering claim under our 
view. And the district configurations may be 
combined with vote projections to predict 
future election results,” which also would be 
relevant to showing discriminatory effects.  
The plurality recognized that its own test 
“may be difficult of application.” 
“Nevertheless,” it concluded, the test 
“recognizes the delicacy of intruding on this 
most political of legislative functions and is 
at the same time consistent with our prior 
cases regarding individual multimember 
districts, which have formulated a parallel 
standard.”  
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in 
the judgment, but wrote separately. Justice 
O'Connor took issue with the plurality's 
reliance on both the “one-person, one-vote” 
principle and the Court's vote-dilution cases. 
In her view, Reynolds makes plain that the 
one person, one vote principle safeguards the  
individual's right to vote, not the interests of 
political groups: “To the extent that a citizen's 
right to vote is debased, he is that much less 
a citizen. The fact that an individual lives 
here or there is not a legitimate reason for 
overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his 
vote.” 
Justice O'Connor also viewed political 
gerrymandering as distinct from racial 
gerrymandering. She explained that, “where 
a racial minority group is characterized by 
‘the traditional indicia of suspectness' and is 
vulnerable to exclusion from the political 
process, individual voters who belong to that 
group enjoy some measure of protection 
against intentional dilution of their group 
voting strength by means of racial 
gerrymandering.”  
“[M]embers of the Democratic and 
Republican Parties,” however, did not 
constitute “a discrete and insular group 
vulnerable to exclusion from the political 
process by some dominant group: these 
political parties are the dominant groups, and 
the Court has offered no reason to believe that 
they are incapable of fending for themselves 
through the political process.” 
In an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, Justice Powell, joined by 
Justice Stevens, concluded that a redistricting 
plan violated the Constitution when it served 
“no purpose other than to favor one 
segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, 
economic, or political—that may occupy a 
position of strength at a particular time, or to 
disadvantage a politically weak segment of 
the community.” He believed that this 
conclusion followed from the principles 
articulated in Reynolds, namely “that equal 
protection encompasses a guarantee of equal 
representation, requiring a State to seek to 
achieve through redistricting ‘fair and 
effective representation for all citizens.’ ” He 
further explained that 
    “[t]he concept of “representation” 
necessarily applies to groups: groups of 
voters elect representatives, individual voters 
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do not. Gross population disparities violate 
the mandate of equal representation by 
denying voters residing in heavily populated 
districts, as a group, the opportunity to elect 
the number of representatives to which their 
voting strength otherwise would entitle them. 
While population disparities do dilute the 
weight of individual votes, their 
discriminatory effect is felt only when those 
individual votes are combined. Thus, the fact 
that individual voters in heavily populated 
districts are free to cast their ballot has no 
bearing on a claim of malapportionment.” 
Applying these standards, Justice Powell 
believed that the “case present[ed] a 
paradigm example of unconstitutional 
discrimination against the members of a 
political party that happened to be out of 
power” and would have found that Indiana's 
redistricting plan violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
Although history would establish that the 
plurality correctly predicted that its test for 
political gerrymandering was, in fact, 
“difficult of application,” Bandemer 
nevertheless provides some meaningful 
guidance. First, the Court's one-person, one-
vote and vote-dilution cases provide the 
foundation for evaluating claims of political 
gerrymandering. Second, that a “claim is 
submitted by a political group rather than a 
racial group, does not distinguish it in terms 
of justiciability.” And, third, a successful 
political gerrymandering claim must include 
a showing of both discriminatory intent and 
discriminatory effect. 
3. 
The Court revisited the issue of political 
gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer. In 
Vieth, the Court addressed an action filed by 
Democratic voters in Pennsylvania that 
challenged the state legislature's new 
congressional districting plan. Justice Scalia, 
writing for a plurality, began with a critique 
of the standard articulated in Bandemer: 
Over the dissent of three Justices, the Court 
held in Davis v. Bandemer that, since it was 
“not persuaded that there are no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards by 
which political gerrymander cases are to be 
decided,” such cases were justiciable.... 
There was no majority on that point. Four of 
the Justices finding justiciability believed 
that the standard was one thing; two believed 
it was something else. The lower courts have 
lived with that assurance of a standard (or 
more precisely, lack of assurance that there is 
no standard), coupled with that inability to 
specify a standard, for the past 18 years. 
In the plurality's view, “[e]ighteen years of 
judicial effort with virtually nothing to show 
for it justif[ied] ... revisiting the question 
whether the standard promised by Bandemer 
exists.” It concluded that “no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims 
have emerged. Lacking [such standards],” it 
concluded, “political gerrymandering claims 
are nonjusticiable and ... Bandemer was 
wrongly decided.” 
The plurality turned first to the shortcomings 
of the test proposed by the plaintiffs: 
To satisfy appellants' intent standard, a 
plaintiff must “show that the mapmakers 
acted with a predominant intent to achieve 
partisan advantage,” which can be shown “by 
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence 
that other neutral and legitimate redistricting 
criteria were subordinated to the goal of 
achieving partisan advantage.” ... As 
compared with the Bandemer plurality's test 
of mere intent to disadvantage the plaintiff's 
group, this proposal seemingly makes the 
standard more difficult to meet—but only at 
the expense of making the standard more 
indeterminate. 
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The plurality determined that, in a statewide 
plan, there was no principled way to discern 
predominant intent. 
The test also included an “effects” prong: 
“The requisite effect is established when ‘(1) 
the plaintiffs show that the districts 
systematically “pack” and “crack” the rival 
party's voters, and (2) the court's examination 
of the “totality of circumstances” confirms 
that the map can thwart the plaintiffs' ability 
to translate a majority of votes into a majority 
of seats.’ ” According to the plurality, this 
aspect of the test also was not judicially 
discernible because there is no constitutional 
right to proportional representation: the 
Constitution “guarantees equal protection of 
the law to persons, not equal representation 
in government to equivalently sized groups.” 
Nor, in the plurality's opinion, was the 
proposed test judicially manageable because 
there was no reliable method to establish “a 
party's majority status” or for “ensur[ing] that 
party wins a majority of seats—unless we 
radically revise the States' traditional 
structure for elections.”  
The plurality then critiqued the standards 
proposed by the dissenting Justices. Contrary 
to the view held by other members of the 
Court, the plurality did not believe that the 
“one-person, one-vote cases” had any 
“bearing upon this question,” either “in 
principle” or “in practicality.”  
    “Not in principle, because to say that each 
individual must have an equal say in the 
selection of representatives, and hence that a 
majority of individuals must have a majority 
say, is not at all to say that each discernible 
group, whether farmers or urban dwellers or 
political parties, must have representation 
equivalent to its numbers. And not in 
practicality, because the easily administrable 
standard of population equality adopted by 
Wesberry and Reynolds enables judges to 
decide whether a violation has occurred (and 
to remedy it) essentially on the basis of three 
readily determined factors—where the 
plaintiff lives, how many voters are in his 
district, and how many voters are in other 
districts; whereas requiring judges to decide 
whether a districting system will produce a 
statewide majority for a majority party casts 
them forth upon a sea of imponderables, and 
asks them to make determinations that not 
even election experts can agree upon.” 
Turning first to Justice Stevens's view, the 
plurality agreed that “severe partisan 
gerrymanders” were “incompatib[le] ... with 
democratic principles.” It could not agree, 
however, that political gerrymandering 
should be treated equivalently to racial 
gerrymandering. In the plurality's view, “[a] 
purpose to discriminate on the basis of race 
receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to 
discriminate on the basis of politics does 
not.” The plurality was unpersuaded by 
Justice Stevens's reference to political 
patronage cases, contending that “the 
underlying rights, and consequently 
constitutional harms, are not comparable.”  
The plurality also rejected Justice Souter's 
multi-factor test, which was “loosely based in 
form on [the Court's] Title VII cases.” 
According to the plurality, this test was 
“doomed to failure” because “[n]o test—yea, 
not even a five-part test—can possibly be 
successful unless one knows what he is 
testing for. In the present context, the test 
ought to identify deprivation of that minimal 
degree of representation or influence to 
which a political group is constitutionally 
entitled.” Although Justice Souter “vaguely 
describe[d] the harm he is concerned with as 
vote dilution, a term which usually implies 
some actual effect on the weight of a vote,” 
no element of his test measured this effect. 
Consequently, the plurality was unsure of 
“the precise constitutional deprivation his test 
[wa]s designed to identify and prevent.” 
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Addressing Justice Breyer's dissent, the 
plurality agreed “that our Constitution sought 
to create a basically democratic form of 
government,” but found that this was “a long 
and impassable distance away from the 
conclusion that the Judiciary may assess 
whether a group (somehow defined) has 
achieved a level of political power (somehow 
defined) commensurate with that to which 
they would be entitled absent unjustified 
political machinations (whatever that 
means).”  
The plurality concluded, therefore, that the 
Equal Protection Clause did not “provide[ ] a 
judicially enforceable limit on the political 
considerations that the States and Congress 
may take into account when districting.”  
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. 
He agreed that “[a] decision ordering the 
correction of all election district lines drawn 
for partisan reasons would commit federal 
and state courts to unprecedented 
intervention in the American political 
process.” “The Court,” he stated, was 
“correct to refrain from directing this 
substantial intrusion into the Nation's 
political life.” Furthermore, “[w]hile 
agreeing with the plurality that the complaint 
the appellants filed in the District Court must 
be dismissed, and while understanding that 
great caution is necessary when approaching 
this subject, [he] would not foreclose all 
possibility of judicial relief if some limited 
and precise rationale were found to correct an 
established violation of the Constitution in 
some redistricting cases.” 
Justice Kennedy believed that 
    “[a] determination that a gerrymander 
violates the law must rest on something more 
than the conclusion that political 
classifications were applied. It must rest 
instead on a conclusion that the 
classifications, though generally permissible, 
were applied in an invidious manner or in a 
way unrelated to any legitimate legislative 
objective.” 
In this case, Justice Kennedy explained, the 
plaintiffs had not overcome the dual hurdles 
of discernibility and manageability: 
    “The fairness principle appellants propose 
is that a majority of voters in the 
Commonwealth should be able to elect a 
majority of the Commonwealth's 
congressional delegation. There is no 
authority for this precept. Even if the novelty 
of the proposed principle were accompanied 
by a convincing rationale for its adoption, 
there is no obvious way to draw a satisfactory 
standard from it for measuring an alleged 
burden on representational rights. The 
plurality demonstrates the shortcomings of 
the other standards that have been considered 
to date.” 
However, Justice Kennedy was not willing to 
go so far as the plurality and hold partisan 
gerrymanders nonjusticiable. Although 
agreeing that there were “weighty arguments 
for holding cases like these to be 
nonjusticiable” and acknowledging that 
“those arguments may prevail in the long 
run,” it was Justice Kennedy's view that “the 
arguments [we]re not so compelling that they 
require us now to bar all future claims of 
injury from a partisan gerrymander.” 
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court's 
“willingness to enter the political thicket of 
the apportionment process with respect to 
one-person, one-vote claims ma[de] it 
particularly difficult to justify a categorical 
refusal to entertain claims against this other 
type of gerrymandering.”  
Justice Kennedy noted specifically that, in 
the end, it may be the First Amendment, not 
the Equal Protection Clause, which provides 
the framework within which political 
gerrymandering claims should be analyzed. 
“After all,” he explained, “these allegations 
involve the First Amendment interest of not 
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burdening or penalizing citizens because of 
their participation in the electoral process, 
their voting history, their association with a 
political party, or their expression of political 
views. Under general First Amendment 
principles those burdens in other contexts are 
unconstitutional absent a compelling 
government interest.” Moreover, a “ 
‘[r]epresentative democracy ... is 
unimaginable without the ability of citizens 
to band together in promoting among the 
electorate candidates who espouse their 
political views.’ ” According to Justice 
Kennedy, these precedents demonstrate that 
    “First Amendment concerns arise where a 
State enacts a law that has the purpose and 
effect of subjecting a group of voters or their 
party to disfavored treatment by reason of 
their views. In the context of partisan 
gerrymandering, that means that First 
Amendment concerns arise where an 
apportionment has the purpose and effect of 
burdening a group of voters' representational 
rights.” 
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality 
that application of a First Amendment 
standard would render invalid “all 
consideration of political interests in an 
apportionment.” He explained: 
    “The inquiry is not whether political 
classifications were used. The inquiry instead 
is whether political classifications were used 
to burden a group's representational rights. If 
a court were to find that a State did impose 
burdens and restrictions on groups or persons 
by reason of their views, there would likely 
be a First Amendment violation, unless the 
State shows some compelling interest.” 
Because “[t]he First Amendment analysis 
concentrates on whether the legislation 
burdens the representational rights of the 
complaining party's voters for reasons of 
ideology, beliefs, or political association,” 
Justice Kennedy suggested that “[t]he 
analysis allows a pragmatic or functional 
assessment that accords some latitude to the 
States.” 
Justice Stevens dissented. Drawing both on 
the Court's racial gerrymandering cases, and 
the Court's political patronage cases, Justice 
Stevens believed that the plaintiffs had 
standing, presented a redressable claim, and 
were entitled to relief. Specifically, he 
observed that “political belief and association 
constitute the core of those activities 
protected by the First Amendment” and that 
government employment decisions that 
burden these interests are subject to strict 
scrutiny. “Thus,” he continued, “unless party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for 
the position in question, government officials 
may not base a decision to hire, promote, 
transfer, recall, discharge, or retaliate against 
an employee, or to terminate a contract, on 
the individual's partisan affiliation or 
speech.” Justice Stevens concluded that “[i]t 
follows” therefore “that political affiliation is 
not an appropriate standard for excluding 
voters from a congressional district.” 
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, which rested on 
the “one-person, one-vote” principle. 
According to Justice Souter: 
    “Creating unequally populous districts is 
not, however, the only way to skew political 
results by setting district lines. The choice to 
draw a district line one way, not another, 
always carries some consequence for politics, 
save in a mythical State with voters of every 
political identity distributed in an absolutely 
gray uniformity. The spectrum of opportunity 
runs from cracking a group into impotent 
fractions, to packing its members into one 
district for the sake of marginalizing them in 
another. However equal districts may be in 
population as a formal matter, the 
consequence of a vote cast can be minimized 
or maximized, and if unfairness is 
sufficiently demonstrable, the guarantee of 
397 
  
equal protection condemns it as a denial of 
substantial equality.” 
Justice Souter acknowledged the Court's 
prior struggles in articulating a workable test 
for political gerrymandering. Accordingly, 
he suggested preserving the holding in 
Bandemer that political gerrymandering was 
justiciable, but “otherwise start[ing] anew.” 
Specifically, he suggested using a burden-
shifting test similar to that in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), “calling 
for a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a prima 
facie cause of action, at which point the State 
would have the opportunity not only to rebut 
the evidence supporting the plaintiff's case, 
but to offer an affirmative justification for the 
districting choices, even assuming the proof 
of the plaintiff's allegations.”  
Justice Breyer, also in dissent, opined that 
“the workable democracy that the 
Constitution foresees” must include “a 
method for transforming the will of the 
majority into effective government.” In his 
view, this method could be harmed by “the 
unjustified use of political factors to entrench 
a minority in power.” Justice Breyer quoted 
extensively from Reynolds to support his 
view that “[t]he democratic harm of 
unjustified entrenchment is obvious”: 
“Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded 
on representative government, it would seem 
reasonable that a majority of the people of a 
State could elect a majority of that State's 
legislators.... Since legislatures are 
responsible for enacting laws by which all 
citizens are to be governed, they should be 
bodies which are collectively responsive to 
the popular will.”  
Where unjustified entrenchment takes place, 
voters find it far more difficult to remove 
those responsible for a government they do 
not want; and these democratic values are 
dishonored. 
Consequently, “gerrymandering that leads to 
entrenchment amounts to an abuse that 
violates the Constitution's Equal Protection 
Clause.”  
Although the test articulated in Bandemer 
proved unworkable, Vieth has placed district 
courts in an even greater quandary. For all its 
shortcomings, the Bandemer decision at least 
set forth a test for district courts to apply. In 
Vieth, however, the members of the Court 
were unanimous only in their willingness to 
jettison the test set forth in Bandemer. We 
conclude, therefore, that the specific test for 
political gerrymandering set forth in 
Bandemer no longer is good law. Moreover, 
any attempt to craft a new test ought to avoid 
those shortcomings in the Bandemer test 
specifically identified by the members of the 
Court. 
4. 
The Supreme Court's most recent case on 
partisan gerrymandering, gives little more in 
the way of guidance. Nevertheless, we set 
forth those aspects of the decision that may 
be useful in evaluating the plaintiffs' claims. 
In the 1990s, the Democrats controlled both 
houses of the Texas legislature and the 
statehouse and enacted what was “later 
described as the shrewdest gerrymander of 
the 1990s.” Following the 2000 census, 
Texas was entitled to two additional 
congressional seats. However, the legislature 
now was split politically between a 
Republican Senate and a Democratic House 
of Representatives. “As so constituted, the 
legislature was unable to pass a redistricting 
scheme,” resulting in a court-ordered plan 
which left “[t]he 1991 Democratic Party 
gerrymander largely in place as a ‘legal’ 
plan.” In 2002, however, Republicans gained 
control of both houses of the legislature and 
enacted legislation that re-drew 
congressional districting lines; these new 
districts resulted in the Republicans securing 
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21 seats with 58% of the vote in statewide 
races, compared to the Democrats' 11 seats 
with 41% of the vote. 
Shortly after the plan was enacted, some 
Texas voters mounted both statutory and 
constitutional challenges to it. In the 
constitutional challenge, the plaintiffs 
claimed that a decision to enact a new 
redistricting plan mid-decade, “when solely 
motivated by partisan objectives, violates 
equal protection and the First Amendment 
because it serves no legitimate public 
purpose and burdens one group because of its 
political opinions and affiliation.” The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg, opined that “a successful claim 
attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of 
partisan gerrymandering must do what 
appellants' sole-motivation theory explicitly 
disavows: show a burden, as measured by a 
reliable standard, on the complainants' 
representational rights.” Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy was concerned that the plaintiffs' 
proposed test would exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny other, more serious 
examples of partisan gerrymandering: 
    “The text and structure of the Constitution 
and our case law indicate there is nothing 
inherently suspect about a legislature's 
decision to replace mid-decade a court-
ordered plan with one of its own. And even if 
there were, the fact of mid-decade 
redistricting alone is no sure indication of 
unlawful political gerrymanders. Under 
appellants' theory, a highly effective partisan 
gerrymander that coincided with decennial 
redistricting would receive less scrutiny than 
a bumbling, yet solely partisan, mid-decade 
redistricting. More concretely, the test would 
leave untouched the 1991 Texas redistricting, 
which entrenched a party on the verge of 
minority status, while striking down the 2003 
redistricting plan, which resulted in the 
majority Republican Party capturing a larger 
share of the seats. A test that treats these two 
similarly effective power plays in such 
different ways does not have the reliability 
appellants ascribe to it.” 
Justice Kennedy also noted that the current 
Texas map could “be seen as making the 
party balance more congruent to statewide 
party power.” “To be sure,” Justice Kennedy 
continued, 
    “there is no constitutional requirement of 
proportional representation, and equating a 
party's statewide share of the vote with its 
portion of the congressional delegation is a 
rough measure at best. Nevertheless, a 
congressional plan that more closely reflects 
the distribution of state party power seems a 
less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination 
than one that entrenches an electoral 
minority.” 
Justice Kennedy also commented on a 
submission by an amicus which “propose[d] 
a symmetry standard that would measure 
partisan bias by ‘compar[ing] how both 
parties would fare hypothetically if they each 
(in turn) had received a given percentage of 
the vote.’ ” He stated: 
Amici's proposed standard does not 
compensate for appellants' failure to provide 
a reliable measure of fairness. The existence 
or degree of asymmetry may in large part 
depend on conjecture about where possible 
vote-switchers will reside. Even assuming a 
court could choose reliably among different 
models of shifting voter preferences, we are 
wary of adopting a constitutional standard 
that invalidates a map based on unfair results 
that would occur in a hypothetical state of 
affairs. Presumably such a challenge could be 
litigated if and when the feared inequity 
arose. More fundamentally, the 
counterfactual plaintiff would face the same 
problem as the present, actual appellants: 
providing a standard for deciding how much 
partisan dominance is too much. Without 
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altogether discounting its utility in 
redistricting planning and litigation, I would 
conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable 
measure of unconstitutional partisanship. 
Justice Kennedy thus concluded that “a 
legislature's decision to override a valid, 
court-drawn plan mid-decade” is not 
“sufficiently suspect to give shape to a 
reliable standard for identifying 
unconstitutional political gerrymanders.” 
Consequently, he concluded that the 
petitioners had not established a “legally 
impermissible use of political classifications” 
and had not stated a claim on which relief 
could be granted. 
Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion joined 
by Justice Breyer, reiterated the view of 
impartiality that he had articulated in Vieth. 
He observed that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment's prohibition against invidious 
discrimination[ ] and the First Amendment's 
protection of citizens from official retaliation 
based on their political affiliation” “limit the 
State's power to rely exclusively on partisan 
preference in drawing district lines.” He 
explained: 
The equal protection component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires actions 
taken by the sovereign to be supported by 
some legitimate interest, and further 
establishes that a bare desire to harm a 
politically disfavored group is not a 
legitimate interest. Similarly, the freedom of 
political belief and association guaranteed by 
the First Amendment prevents the State, 
absent a compelling interest, from 
“penalizing citizens because of their 
participation in the electoral process, ... their 
association with a political party, or their 
expression of political views.” These 
protections embodied in the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments reflect the 
fundamental duty of the sovereign to govern 
impartially. 
Justice Stevens also set forth some of the 
representational harms engendered by 
political gerrymanders. Specifically, he noted 
that, “in addition to the possibility that a 
representative may believe her job is only to 
represent the interests of a dominant 
constituency, a representative may feel more 
beholden to the cartographers who drew her 
district than to the constituents who live 
there.” 
Justice Breyer, in addition to joining Justice 
Stevens's opinion, wrote separately to 
describe why he believed that the plan 
violated the Constitution: 
[B]ecause the plan entrenches the Republican 
Party, the State cannot successfully defend it 
as an effort simply to neutralize the 
Democratic Party's previous political 
gerrymander. Nor has the State tried to justify 
the plan on nonpartisan grounds, either as an 
effort to achieve legislative stability by 
avoiding legislative exaggeration of small 
shifts in party preferences or in any other 
way. 
In sum, “the risk of entrenchment is 
demonstrated,” “partisan considerations 
[have] render[ed] the traditional district-
drawing compromises irrelevant,” and “no 
justification other than party advantage can 
be found.” The record reveals a plan that 
overwhelmingly relies upon the unjustified 
use of purely partisan line-drawing 
considerations and which will likely have 
seriously harmful electoral consequences. 
For these reasons, I believe the plan in its 
entirety violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg adhered to their 
view, set forth in Vieth, as to the proper test 
for political gerrymandering, but concluded 
that there was “nothing to be gained by 
working through these cases on th[at] 
standard” because, like in Vieth, the Court 
“ha[d] no majority for any single criterion of 
impermissible gerrymander.” Chief Justice 
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Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, agreed with 
Justice Kennedy “that appellants ha[d] not 
provided a reliable standard for identifying 
unconstitutional political gerrymanders,” but 
took no position as to “whether appellants 
ha[d] failed to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted, or ha[d] failed to present a 
justiciable controversy.” Finally, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas reiterated their view that 
the voters' political gerrymandering claims 
were nonjusticiable. 
5. 
In its consideration of the reapportionment 
issue, the Court has acknowledged that the 
appropriate analysis is grounded not only in 
its jurisprudence of equal protection, but also 
its jurisprudence of associational rights under 
the First Amendment. The gravamen of an 
equal protection claim is that a state has 
burdened artificially a voter's ballot so that it 
has less weight than another person's vote. A 
year after Reynolds, the Court again 
articulated this concept in Fortson v. Dorsey,  
when it evaluated whether multimember 
legislative districts had a constitutionally 
impermissible impact on the weight of 
African–American voters. There, the Court 
reiterated its concern that voters' ability to 
participate in the electoral process was 
unequal. While declining to hold 
multimember districts were unconstitutional 
per se, it noted that “designedly or otherwise, 
a multi-member constituency apportionment 
scheme, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, [might] operate to minimize 
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or 
political elements of the voting population.” 
Again, in White v. Regester, the Court held 
that certain multimember districts were 
violative of the Constitution when the 
plaintiffs produced evidence that an election 
was not “equally open to participation by the 
group in question—that its members had less 
opportunity than did other residents in the 
district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their 
choice.” In Gaffney, the Court again noted 
that apportionment plans that “invidiously 
minimize[ ]” the voting strength of “political 
groups” “may be vulnerable” to 
constitutional challenges. 
In these cases, the Court's emphasis on 
ensuring that an individual's vote receive the 
same weight as every other person's vote 
necessarily implicates that individual's 
associational rights. The Court previously 
has observed the link between the right to 
vote and the right to associate in its ballot-
access cases. One of the foundational ballot-
access cases, involved a challenge to a state 
law which required independent candidates 
to file their nominating petitions seventy-five 
days before the primary election in order to 
qualify for the general election ballot. The 
Court observed that the statute in question 
implicated both the “right to vote” and 
“freedom of association”: “Each provision of 
these schemes, whether it governs the 
registration and qualifications of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the 
voting process itself, inevitably affects—at 
least to some degree—the individual's right 
to vote and his right to associate with others 
for political ends.”  
The Court then outlined the analysis a court 
must undertake in considering a challenge to 
a state's election law: 
    “It must first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate 
the precise interests put forward by the State 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not 
only determine the legitimacy and strength of 
each of those interests, it also must consider 
the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. 
Only after weighing all these factors is the 
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reviewing court in a position to decide 
whether the challenged provision is 
unconstitutional.” 
Applying these steps, the Court determined 
that the early filing deadline at issue in 
Anderson placed a burden on independent 
parties and that “it is especially difficult for 
the State to justify a restriction that limits 
political participation by an identifiable 
political group.” After considering the state's 
interests in keeping voters well-educated 
about the candidates, being fair to the parties 
who hold primaries, and ensuring political 
stability, the Court held that there was an 
unconstitutional burden on “the interests of 
the voters who chose to associate together to 
express their support for [an independent's] 
candidacy and the views he espoused.” The 
Court also noted that, in reaching its 
conclusion, it was relying “directly on the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments” and was 
“not engag[ing] in a separate Equal 
Protection Clause analysis.” It had relied, 
however, 
    “on the analysis in a number of our prior 
election cases resting on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
cases, applying the “fundamental rights” 
strand of equal protection analysis, have 
identified the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights implicated by restrictions 
on the eligibility of voters and candidates, 
and have considered the degree to which the 
State's restrictions further legitimate state 
interests.” 
Since Anderson, the Court has continued to 
assess election laws through the lens of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, without 
explicit reference to the Equal Protection 
Clause. In evaluating election laws, the Court 
employs a multi-step process that looks at the 
totality of the circumstances: 
    “When deciding whether a state election 
law violates First and Fourteenth 
Amendment associational rights, we weigh 
the character and magnitude of the burden the 
State's rule imposes on those rights against 
the interests the State contends justify that 
burden, and consider the extent to which the 
State's concerns make the burden necessary. 
Regulations imposing severe burdens on 
plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored 
and advance a compelling state interest. 
Lesser burdens, however, trigger less 
exacting review, and a State's important 
regulatory interests will usually be enough to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions. No bright line separates 
permissible election-related regulation from 
unconstitutional infringements on First 
Amendment freedoms.” 
Nevertheless, the close relationship between 
equal protection and associational rights is 
clear. For example, one of the equal 
protection cases relied upon in Anderson, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a 
law which required new political parties to 
obtain the signatures of electors equaling 
15% of the number of ballots cast in the 
preceding gubernatorial election. It stated: 
[W]e have ... held many times that 
“invidious” distinctions cannot be enacted 
without a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. In determining whether or not a state 
law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we 
must consider the facts and circumstances 
behind the law, the interests which the State 
claims to be protecting, and the interests of 
those who are disadvantaged by the 
classification. In the present situation the 
state laws place burdens on two different, 
although overlapping, kinds of rights—the 
right of individuals to associate for the 
advancement of political beliefs, and the right 
of qualified voters, regardless of their 
political persuasion, to cast their votes 
effectively. Both of these rights, of course, 
rank among our most precious freedoms. We 
have repeatedly held that freedom of 
402 
  
association is protected by the First 
Amendment. And of course this freedom 
protected against federal encroachment by 
the First Amendment is entitled under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the same 
protection from infringement by the States. 
Similarly we have said with reference to the 
right to vote: “No right is more precious in a 
free country than that of having a voice in the 
election of those who make the laws under 
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other 
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the 
right to vote is undermined.” 
The Court held that the law in question was 
unconstitutionally burdensome on new 
political parties.  
We therefore believe that there is a solid basis 
for considering the associational aspect of 
voting in assessing the gravamen of the harm 
allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs. Indeed, in 
this case, the associational harm is especially 
important to the analysis because the 
testimony of the defendants' witnesses as 
well as the plaintiffs' demonstrate that, given 
the legislative practice and custom of 
Wisconsin, legislative action is controlled, as 
a practical matter, solely by the majority 
caucus. In such a circumstance, when the 
state places an artificial burden on the ability 
of voters of a certain political persuasion to 
form a legislative majority, it necessarily 
diminishes the weight of the vote of each of 
those voters when compared to the votes of 
individuals favoring another view. The 
burdened voter simply has a diminished or 
even no opportunity to effect a legislative 
majority. That voter is, in essence, an unequal 
participant in the decisions of the body 
politic. 
On the facts presented in past cases, some 
members of the Supreme Court have 
expressed the view that judicial enforcement 
of the principle that each voter has a right to 
have his vote treated equally must be limited 
to situations where the dilution is based on 
classifications such as race and population. 
These reservations have been grounded in the 
concern that distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate political 
motivations is not a task to be undertaken by 
judges. In their view, moreover, there are 
insurmountable problems in formulating 
manageable standards. Other Justices have 
not accepted such a limitation. As we shall 
discuss at greater length later, however, this 
case does not present these conundrums. We 
are not presented with the problem of 
distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible political motivations. We have 
a far more straight-forward situation. The 
plaintiffs have established, on this record, 
that the defendants intended and 
accomplished an entrenchment of the 
Republican Party likely to endure for the 
entire decennial period. They did so when the 
legitimate redistricting considerations neither 
required nor warranted the implementation of 
such a plan. 
IV 
ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION 
As our description of the case law reveals, the 
law governing political gerrymandering, still 
in its incipient stages, is in a state of 
considerable flux. We must, however, accept 
that situation and seek in these authorities a 
solution to the case before us. Therefore, 
while not discounting the difficulty of the 
task before us, we now identify the 
guideposts available to us. 
We begin with a principle that is beyond 
dispute. State legislative apportionment is the 
prerogative and therefore a duty of the 
political branches of the state government. 
We must “recognize[ ] the delicacy of 
intruding on this most political of legislative 
functions.” We also know that we cannot rely 
on the simple finding “that political 
classifications were applied.” Similarly, “the 
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mere lack of proportional representation will 
not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional 
discrimination.”  
It is clear that the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause protect a citizen 
against state discrimination as to the weight 
of his or her vote when that discrimination is 
based on the political preferences of the 
voter. This principle applies not simply to 
disparities in raw population, but also to other 
aspects of districting that “operate to 
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial or political elements of the voting 
population.” Specifically, apportionment 
plans that “invidiously minimize[ ]” the 
voting strength of “political groups” “may be 
vulnerable” to constitutional challenges, 
because “each political group in a State 
should have the same chance to elect 
representatives of its choice as any other 
political group,” 
We conclude, therefore, that the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection clause 
prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is 
intended to place a severe impediment on the 
effectiveness of the votes of individual 
citizens on the basis of their political 
affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot 
be justified on other, legitimate legislative 
grounds. 
A. Discriminatory Intent or Purpose 
The Supreme Court has stressed the “basic 
equal protection principle that the invidious 
quality of a law ... must ultimately be traced 
to a discriminatory purpose.” A legislature's 
discriminatory intent also factors into a First 
Amendment analysis.  
The Court explicitly has held that equal 
protection challenges to redistricting plans 
require a showing of discriminatory purpose 
or intent. This requirement applies with equal 
force to cases involving political 
gerrymanders.  
1. 
When considering the level of partisan intent 
necessary to establish a political-
gerrymandering claim, our first task is to 
determine what kind of partisan intent 
offends the Constitution. The plurality in 
Bandemer simply required a plaintiff to show 
any level of “intentional discrimination 
against an identifiable political group.” It 
suggested that “[a]s long as redistricting is 
done by a legislature, it should not be very 
difficult to prove that the likely political 
consequences of the reapportionment were 
intended.” A majority of the Court in Vieth, 
however, rejected the Bandemer plurality's 
test, which included this standard of intent.  
At the outset, we note that the Court recently 
has acknowledged that the constitutionality 
of partisan favoritism in redistricting is an 
open question. Nevertheless, we know that 
legislatures may employ some political 
considerations when making redistricting 
decisions; considerations such as achieving 
“political fairness,” and “avoiding contests 
between incumbent[s],” are permissible. 
That some political considerations may 
intrude into the redistricting process without 
running afoul of the Constitution, however, 
does not answer the question whether 
partisan favoritism is permissible. The 
Court's members appear to acknowledge that 
some level of partisanship is permissible, or 
at least inevitable, in redistricting legislation. 
The plurality in Vieth, for instance, noted that 
“partisan districting is a lawful and common 
practice.” In his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
observed that political classifications are 
“generally permissible.” Justices Souter and 
Breyer, dissenting in Vieth, expressed the 
view that partisan favoritism in some form 
was inevitable, if not necessarily desirable.  
Other justices, however, have not 
acknowledged that political affiliation is “an 
appropriate standard for excluding voters 
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from a congressional district.” Even so, these 
justices have proposed tests that “cover only 
a few meritorious claims” and “preclude 
extreme abuses” of the districting process.  
As a starting point, it is safe to say that this 
concept of abuse of power seems at the core 
of the Court's approach to partisan 
gerrymandering. In Arizona State Legislature 
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, the Court defined partisan 
gerrymandering as “the drawing of 
legislative district lines to subordinate 
adherents of one political party and entrench 
a rival party in power.” Justice Kennedy 
noted in Vieth that a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering “must rest ... on a conclusion 
that [political] classifications ... were applied 
in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated 
to any legitimate legislative objective.” The 
plurality, as well, acknowledged that “an 
excessive injection of politics is un lawful.” 
And Justice Breyer in dissent observed that 
there was “at least one circumstance where 
use of purely political boundary-drawing 
factors can amount to a serious, and 
remediable, abuse, namely, the unjustified 
use of political factors to entrench a minority 
in power.”  
When “acceptable”—or at least tolerable—
crosses a line to become “excessive,” 
however, remains unclear. Moreover, as 
Justice Kennedy warns, a standard of 
excessiveness has its drawbacks: 
    “[C]ourts must be cautious about adopting 
a standard that turns on whether the partisan 
interests in the redistricting process were 
excessive. Excessiveness is not easily 
determined. Consider these apportionment 
schemes: In one State, Party X controls the 
apportionment process and draws the lines so 
it captures every congressional seat. In three 
other States, Party Y controls the 
apportionment process. It is not so blatant or 
egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle 
effort, capturing less than all the seats in each 
State. Still, the total effect of party Y's effort 
is to capture more new seats than Party X 
captured. Party X's gerrymander was more 
egregious. Party Y's gerrymander was more 
subtle. In my view, however, each is 
culpable.” 
“Excessiveness” does not need to be defined 
simply in terms of raw seat tallies. The 
danger with extreme partisan gerrymanders is 
that they entrench a political party in power, 
making that party—and therefore the state 
government—impervious to the interests of 
citizens affiliated with other political parties. 
This imperviousness may be achieved by 
manipulating a map to achieve a 
supermajority. But it also may be achieved by 
“lock[ing]-in” or creating the requisite “safe 
seats” such that legislators “elected from 
such safe districts need not worry much about 
the possibility of shifting majorities” and 
“have little reason to be responsive to the 
political minorities within their district.”  
When a party is “locked-in” through the 
intentional manipulation of legislative 
districts, “representational harms” to those 
affiliated with the “out”-party necessarily 
ensue. Specifically, “in addition to the 
possibility that a representative may believe 
her job is only to represent the interests of a 
dominant constituency, a representative may 
feel more beholden to the cartographers who 
drew her district than to the constituents who 
live there.” The result is a system that assigns 
different weights to the votes of citizens and 
accords to those citizens different levels of 
legislative responsiveness based on the party 
with which they associate.  
Whatever gray may span the area between 
acceptable and excessive, an intent to 
entrench a political party in power signals an 
excessive injection of politics into the 
redistricting process that impinges on the 
representational rights of those associated 
with the party out of power. Such a showing, 
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therefore, satisfies the intent requirement for 
an equal protection violation. 
2. 
A “ ‘discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more 
than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences. It implies that the 
decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part, 
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 
The plaintiffs therefore must show that the 
intent to entrench the Republican Party in 
power was “a motivating factor in the 
decision.” It need not be the “sole[ ]” intent 
or even “the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.” 
Indeed, it rarely can “be said that a legislature 
or administrative body operating under a 
broad mandate made a decision motivated by 
a single concern.” This is certainly true in 
redistricting legislation where the Court has 
identified “traditional districting principles 
such as compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions” that legitimately 
may inform drafters in the drawing of district 
lines.  
Relying on traditional districting principles, 
defendants propose a novel rule: a 
redistricting plan that “is consistent with, and 
not a radical departure from, prior plans with 
respect to traditional districting principles” 
cannot, as a matter of law, evince an 
unconstitutional intent. In other words, 
compliance with traditional districting 
principles necessarily creates a constitutional 
“safe harbor” for state legislatures. 
The defendants' approach finds no support in 
the law. It is entirely possible to conform to 
legitimate redistricting purposes but still 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the discriminatory action is an operative 
factor in choosing the plan. Indeed, the Court 
rejected a similar claim in Fortson: while 
acknowledging that there was no 
“mathematical disparity” that violated the 
principle of “one-person, one-vote,” it did not 
rule out the possibility that a districting plan, 
which included multimember districts, could 
“operate to minimize or cancel out the voting 
strength of racial or political elements of the 
voting population.” Similarly, in Gaffney, the 
Court observed that “[s]tate legislative 
districts may be equal or substantially equal 
in population and still be vulnerable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Moreover, the Court has made clear that 
“traditional districting principles” are not 
synonymous with equal protection 
requirements. Instead, they “are objective 
factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a 
district has been gerrymandered.” In other 
words, they are constitutionally permissible, 
but not “constitutionally required.” Id. 
Individual Justices also have noted that a 
map's compliance with traditional districting 
principles does not necessarily speak to 
whether a map constitutes a partisan 
gerrymander: 
    “[E]ven those criteria that might seem 
promising at the outset (e.g., contiguity and 
compactness) are not altogether sound as 
independent judicial standards for measuring 
a burden on representational rights. They 
cannot promise political neutrality when used 
as the basis for relief.” 
Highly sophisticated mapping software now 
allows lawmakers to pursue partisan 
advantage without sacrificing compliance 
with traditional districting criteria. A map 
that appears congruent and compact to the 
naked eye may in fact be an intentional and 
highly effective partisan gerrymander. When 
reviewing intent, therefore, we cannot simply 
ask whether a plan complied with traditional 
districting principles. Therefore, the 
defendants' contention—that, having adhered 
to traditional districting principles, they have 
satisfied the requirements of equal 
protection—is without merit. 
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We therefore must confront the question of 
how we are to discern whether, in creating the 
map that became Act 43, the drafters 
employed an impermissible intent—cutting 
out for the long-term those of a particular 
political affiliation. In assuming this task, we 
are mindful that “[i]nquiries into 
congressional [and other legislative bodies'] 
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.” 
When the issue is one of “mixed intent” as it 
is here, “[e]valuating the legality of acts ... 
can be complex .... When the actor is a 
legislature and the act is a composite of 
manifold choices, the task can be even more 
daunting.” “Determining whether invidious 
discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent 
as may be available,” including (1) “[t]he 
impact of the official action” as “an important 
starting point”; (2) “the historical background 
of the decision”; (3) “[t]he specific sequence 
of events leading up to the challenged 
decision”; (4) “[d]epartures from the normal 
procedural sequence”; (5) “legislative or 
administrative history ..., especially ... 
contemporary statements by members of the 
decisionmaking body, minutes of its 
meetings, or reports.” 
However, discerning the intent of a 
legislative body can be less daunting in some 
cases than in others. In some cases, the 
legislature is aware that a distinction is 
constitutionally impermissible and 
surreptitiously attempts to create legislation 
on the basis of that distinction. These cases 
require that we engage in a careful inquiry of 
circumstantial evidence, because the drafters' 
intent often is hidden from the casual 
observer. In other cases, a legislature seems 
unaware that a distinction is constitutionally 
impermissible and deliberately enacts 
legislation on the basis of that distinction. 
This situation typically arises in periods 
before the Supreme Court has illuminated the 
full meaning of a constitutional right. In these 
cases, courts are able to discern the 
legislature's intent more easily and less 
intrusively because the evidence is far more 
direct. 
This case falls more in the latter category. 
The Court never has invalidated a 
redistricting plan on the ground of partisan 
gerrymandering, and the Court's recent 
pronouncements have caused some district 
courts to question the viability of the cause of 
action. Here, the record demonstrates that, 
although the drafters were aware of some 
constitutional limits on the degree to which 
they could neutralize the political power of 
the opposition party, those limits were not 
firmly established. 
We therefore turn to the sequence of events 
that led to the enactment of Act 43 to discern 
whether one purpose behind the legislation 
was to entrench a political party in power. 
3. 
a. Evidence of intent 
The evidence at trial establishes that one 
purpose of Act 43 was to secure the 
Republican Party's control of the state 
legislature for the decennial period. The 
drafters' concern with the durable partisan 
complexion of the new Assembly map was 
present from the outset of the legislative 
process. Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick began 
drafting the map that would become Act 43 
in April 2011. One of their first orders of 
business was to develop a composite partisan 
score that accurately reflected the political 
makeup of population units, which would 
allow them to assess the partisan make-up of 
the new districts. When they came up with a 
composite of “all statewide races from [20]04 
to 2010” that “seem[ed] to work well,” they 
sent it to Professor Gaddie. 
Professor Gaddie, the “advisor on the 
appropriate racial and/or political make-up of 
legislative ... districts,” “buil[t] a regression 
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model ... to test the partisan makeup and 
performance of districts as they might be 
configured in different ways.” Professor 
Gaddie then tested the drafters' composite 
measure against his model and confirmed 
that their measure was “almost a perfect 
proxy for the open seat vote, and the best 
proxy you'll come up with.” Professor Mayer 
testified that the drafters' composite measure 
correlated very strongly with his own 
measure of partisanship, which led him to 
conclude that “they knew exactly what they 
were doing, that they had a very accurate 
estimate of the underlying partisanship of the 
Act 43 maps.” 
Once Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick received 
Professor Gaddie's imprimatur on their 
composite measure, they employed this 
measure “to assess the partisan impact of the 
map[s] that [they] drew.” We find that the 
maps the drafters generated, as well as the 
statistical comparisons made of the various 
maps, reveal that a focal point of the drafters' 
efforts was a map that would solidify 
Republican control. The maps often bore 
names that reflected the level of partisan 
advantage achieved. For instance, maps 
labeled “aggressive” referenced “a more 
aggressive map with regard to GOP leaning.” 
When producing these more advantageous 
maps, the drafters did not abandon traditional 
districting criteria; to the contrary, the maps 
complied with traditional districting criteria 
while also ensuring a significant partisan 
advantage. 
The drafters also created spreadsheets that 
collected the partisan scores, by district, for 
each of the map alternatives. For each 
spreadsheet, there was a corresponding table 
that listed the number of “Safe” Republican 
seats, “Lean” Republican seats, “Swing” 
seats, “Safe” Democratic seats, and “Lean” 
Democratic seats; these figures also were 
compared to the number of seats in each 
category under the Current Map, the map 
drawn by the court in Baumgart v. 
Wendelberger. 
The process of drafting and evaluating these 
alternative district maps spanned several 
months. In April, the drafters produced a 
document comparing the partisan 
performance of the Current Map to two early 
draft maps: Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's 
Basemap Assertive. Under the Current Map, 
the drafters anticipated that the Republicans 
would win 49191 Assembly seats. This 
number increased to 52 under the Joe's 
Basemap Basic map and to 56 under the Joe's 
Basemap Assertive map. The number of safe 
and leaning Republican seats increased from 
40 under the Current Map to 45 under the 
Joe's Basemap Basic map and 49 under the 
Joe's Basemap Assertive map; the number of 
swing seats decreased from 19 to 14 to 12. 
The number of safe and leaning Democratic 
seats, however, remained roughly the same 
under all three maps, hovering between 38 
and 40. 
The drafters prepared and evaluated the 
partisan performance of at least another six 
statewide alternative maps.196 Each of these 
maps improved upon the anticipated pro-
Republican advantage generated in the initial 
two draft plans. The total number of expected 
Republican seats now ranged between 57 and 
60, and the number of swing seats was 
diminished to between 6 and 11. The number 
of Democratic seats again remained about the 
same under each draft map. 
The drafters sent their completed draft maps 
to Professor Gaddie, who created a visual “S” 
curve for each map. These “S” curves show 
how each map would operate within an array 
of electoral outcomes. To produce the “S” 
curves, Professor Gaddie calculated the 
expected partisan vote shares for each 
district. He then shifted the vote share of each 
district ten points in either direction, from 
40% to 60%, and assigned a color to districts 
that “lean[ed]” towards, or were “safe” seats 
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for that party. Professor Gaddie explained 
that his analysis “was designed to tease out a 
potential estimated vote” under a range of 
electoral scenarios, when either “the 
Democrats have a good year” or “the 
Republicans have a good year.” At bottom, 
the “S” curves—at least some of which were 
printed in large format and kept in the map 
room—allowed a non-statistician, by mere 
visual inspection, to assess the partisan 
performance of a particular map under all 
likely electoral scenarios. On one occasion, 
Professor Gaddie showed the “S” curves to 
Senator Fitzgerald and explained to the 
Senator “how to interpret” them. 
Over several days in early June, the drafters 
presented a selection of regional maps drawn 
from their statewide drafts, approximately 
three to four per region, to the Republican 
leadership. Along with these regional 
alternatives, the leadership “saw the partisan 
scores for the maps that [the drafters] 
presented to them in those alternatives.” Foltz 
testified during his deposition that although 
he could not recall a particular example, he 
was sure that he was asked by the leadership 
about the partisan performance of the various 
regional options. 
Following this meeting, the drafters 
amalgamated the regional alternatives chosen 
by the leadership. Foltz testified that “the 
draft map called team map emerged as a 
result of the ... leadership's choices at those 
meetings.” Under the Team Map, which was 
also referred to as the “Final Map,”208 the 
Republicans could expect to win 59 
Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican 
seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4 
leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic 
seats. In the Tale of the Tape, the drafters 
compared the partisan performance of the 
Team Map directly to the Current Map on 
each of these criteria.210 They highlighted 
specifically that under the Current Map, “49 
seats are 50% or better,” but under the Team 
Map, “59 Assembly seats are 50% or better.” 
The Team Map underwent even more intense 
partisan scrutiny in a document identified as 
“summary.xlsx.” The drafters divided the 
new Team Map districts into six categories of 
partisan performance, listing beside each 
district its “new incumbent” and its 
Republican vote share under the Current Map 
and the Team Map; the change in Republican 
vote share was the district's “improvement” 
under the new plan. The drafters considered 
five districts to be “Statistical Pick Up[s],” 
meaning they were currently held by a 
Democratic incumbent but “move[d] to 55% 
or better” in Republican vote share under the 
new Team Map. Fourteen districts were 
grouped under the heading “GOP seats 
strengthened a lot,” meaning they were 
“[c]urrently held GOP seats that start[ed] at 
55% or below that improve[d] by at least 1%” 
in Republican vote share.215 Eleven districts 
were “GOP seats strengthened a little,” 
meaning they “improve[d] less than 1%.”216 
Only three districts were labeled “GOP seats 
weakened a little,” meaning they had “start 
[ed] at 55% or below” but “decline[d]” 
slightly in Republican vote share.217 
Another three districts were “GOP seats 
likely lost,” *894 meaning they had 
“drop[ped] below 45%” Republican vote 
share under the Team Map. Finally, the 
drafters noted four districts where Democrats 
were “weakened,” which were districts with 
“45% or better” Democratic vote share “that 
bec[a]me more GOP” under the Team Map. 
The drafters also identified twenty 
Republican Assembly members who enjoyed 
sufficiently comfortable partisan scores such 
that they could become “GOP donors to the 
team.” These were members of the Assembly 
who had partisan scores of 55% or greater 
and, therefore, could spread their partisan 
voting strength to politically weaker 
colleagues. 
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The Team Map also was sent to Professor 
Gaddie. The “S” curve demonstrates that this 
map would allow the Republicans to 
maintain a comfortable majority under likely 
voting scenarios; their statewide vote share 
could fall to 48%, and they still would 
preserve a 54 seat majority in the Assembly. 
The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54% 
of the statewide vote to capture a simple 
majority of Assembly seats. 
Once the map had been finalized, Foltz 
presented each Republican member of the 
Assembly with information on his or her new 
district. These memos provided a 
“[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in the new 
districts compared to the old. Specifically, 
the memoranda detailed what percentage of 
the population in the old and new districts 
voted for Republican candidates in 
representative statewide and national 
elections held since 2004. Importantly, the 
memoranda did not provide the individual 
legislators with any information about 
contiguity, compactness, or core population. 
Additionally, Ottman made a presentation to 
the Republican caucus that highlighted the 
long-term effects of Act 43, as reflected in his 
prepared notes: “The maps we pass will 
determine who's here 10 years from now,” 
and “[w]e have an opportunity and an 
obligation to draw these maps that 
Republicans haven't had in decades.” 
In sum, from the outset of the redistricting 
process, the drafters sought to understand the 
partisan effects of the maps they were 
drawing. They designed a measure of 
partisanship and confirmed the accuracy of 
this measure with Professor Gaddie. They 
used this measure to evaluate regional and 
statewide maps that they drew. They labeled 
their maps by reference to their partisanship 
scores, they evaluated partisan outcomes of 
the maps, and they compared the partisanship 
scores and partisan outcomes of the various 
maps. When they completed a statewide map, 
they submitted it to Professor Gaddie to 
assess the fortitude of the partisan design in 
the wake of various electoral outcomes. 
The map that emerged from this process 
reduced markedly the possibility that the 
Democrats could regain control of the 
Assembly even with a majority of the 
statewide vote. The map that would become 
Act 43 had a pickup of 10 Assembly seats 
compared to the Current Map. As well, if 
their statewide vote fell below 48%, the 
design of Act 43 ensured that the Republicans 
would maintain a comfortable majority. 
Finally, it is clear that the drafters were 
concerned with, and convinced of, the 
durability of their plan. Professor Gaddie 
confirmed the staying power of the 
Republican majority under the plan, and 
Ottman emphasized to the Republican caucus 
the long-term consequences of enacting the 
plan. 
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence 
establishes that one of the purposes of Act 43 
was to secure Republican control of the 
Assembly under any likely future electoral 
scenario for the remainder of the decade, in 
other words to entrench the Republican Party 
in power. 
b. Alleged shortcomings in the evidence 
The defendants point to the miscalculation of 
the composite measure, to limitations of the 
composite measure itself, and to the drafters' 
lack of reliance on Professor Gaddie's 
analysis as evidence that they did not have the 
requisite intent to subjugate the voting 
strength of Democrats. The defendants first 
note that the drafters' partisan score “was not 
even correct.” Because of an error in the data 
for the 2006 Governor's race—one of the 
components for their composite measure—
the drafters' numbers were skewed, and the 
resulting partisan scores were more pro-
Republican than if the scores had been 
calculated with the correct data. However, as 
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the plaintiffs note, these errors may diminish 
the reliability of the composite measure, but 
they are irrelevant to the drafters' intent. 
The defendants also disparage the notion that 
“the partisan scores were a crystal ball with 
predictive powers ensuring that Act 43 would 
lock Democrats out from seats that leaned 
Republican.” They contend that their 
composite did not have a “forward-looking 
component,” but was simply “an average of 
past elections applied to the new districts.” 
We reject as not worthy of belief the assertion 
that the drafters would have expended the 
time to calculate a composite score for each 
district on the statewide maps simply to gain 
an historical understanding of voting 
behavior. Their measure was only useful to 
them—and the exercise of calculating the 
composite was only worth the effort—if it 
helped them assess how Republican 
representatives in the newly created districts 
likely would fare in future elections. 
Moreover, each completed map was 
submitted to Professor Gaddie, who then 
generated an “S” curve. The “S” curves were 
designed to discern “the political potential of 
the district.” Professor Gaddie explained that, 
when he used the term “potential,” he meant 
“[i]f you had an election in the future, how 
might it turn out. So when I say potential ... 
this is our best estimate of what a non-
incumbent election would look like given a 
particular set of circumstances, depending on 
whether one party is stronger or weaker.” 
According to the defendants, however, 
Professor Gaddie's “S” curves are irrelevant 
to the issue of intent because the drafters 
“didn't look at them much.” We cannot 
accept that estimation of the importance of 
Professor Gaddie's work to the drafters. The 
record makes clear that the drafters sent 
Professor Gaddie their completed maps for 
which he produced “S” curves. Both Ottman 
and Foltz testified that, when the “S” curves 
were generated, Professor Gaddie provided 
an explanation of what they showed. That 
Ottman may not have used the “S” curves 
much once they were generated, or that Foltz 
was not able to explain their full significance 
at trial, five years later, does not diminish the 
fact that the drafters sought, and received, 
Professor Gaddie's expert analysis on how 
each map would behave under the range of 
likely electoral scenarios. 
Finally, the defendants contend that the 
partisan intent shown by the evidence in this 
case cannot be considered invidious because 
Act 43's districts are consistent with 
traditional districting principles. However, as 
we have explained earlier, a plan that adheres 
to those principles can violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. Here, the evidence shows 
that one purpose of enacting Act 43 was to 
secure Republican control of the Wisconsin 
Assembly. In particular, the history of Act 43 
reveals that the drafters created several 
alternatives that resulted in a less severe 
partisan outcome. Of the maps presented to 
them, the Republican leadership opted for a 
map that significantly increased the number 
of Republican-leaning districts compared to 
the Current Map. Further, the memos 
prepared for the Assembly members 
informed them whether the district number 
had changed, whether adjustment to the 
district population was necessary based on 
the census numbers, and provided a 
“[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in the new 
districts compared to the old, but provided 
little information regarding traditional 
districting factors. 
These facts, in tandem with the 
overwhelming number of reports and 
memoranda addressing the partisan outcomes 
of the various maps, lead us to conclude that, 
although Act 43 complied with traditional 
redistricting principles, it nevertheless had as 
one of its objectives entrenching the 
Republicans' control of the Assembly. 
B. Discriminatory Effect of Act 43 
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Act 43 also achieved the intended effect: it 
secured for Republicans a lasting Assembly 
majority. It did so by allocating votes among 
the newly created districts in such a way that, 
in any likely electoral scenario, the number of 
Republican seats would not drop below 50%. 
Through the combination of the actual 
election results for 2012 and 2014, the swing 
analyses performed by Professors Gaddie and 
Mayer, as well as the plaintiffs' proposed 
measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap (or 
“EG”), the plaintiffs have “show[n] a burden, 
as measured by a reliable standard, on [their] 
representational rights.”  
1. 
It is clear that the drafters got what they 
intended to get. There is no question that Act 
43 was designed to make it more difficult for 
Democrats, compared to Republicans, to 
translate their votes into seats. In the Tale of 
the Tape, the drafters compared the partisan 
performance of the Team Map directly to the 
Current Map. Where the Current Map had 
only “49 [Assembly] seats” that were “50% 
or better” for Republicans, the Team Map 
increased that number by ten so that “59 
Assembly seats” were designated as “50% or 
better” for Republicans. Moreover, under the 
Team Map that became Act 43, Republicans 
expected the following seat distribution: 38 
safe Republican seats, 14 leaning 
Republican, 10 swing, 4 leaning Democratic, 
and 33 safe Democratic seats. 
Professor Mayer explained the significance 
of this distribution at trial. Using the baseline 
partisan measure that he used to create his 
Demonstration Plan, Professor Mayer created 
a histogram that graphed the predicted 
percentage of Republican vote of each 
district (by 5% increments) on the x axis, and 
the number of districts that fell into each 5% 
increment on the y axis. The graph reveals 
that Act 43 includes 42 districts with 
predicted Republican vote percentages of 
between 50 and 60%; only seventeen districts 
have predicted Democratic vote percentages 
of between 50 and 60%. This demonstrates 
that, under Act 43, Republican voters are 
distributed over a larger number of districts 
so that they can secure a greater number of 
seats; in short, “Republicans are distributed 
in a much more efficient manner than 
Democrats.” Professor Mayer's graph also 
reveals that there are only 15 districts with a 
predicted Republican vote percentage of 60% 
or greater; this is compared to 25 districts that 
have a predicted Democratic vote percentage 
of 60% or greater. In other words, Democrats 
have been packed into “safe” Democratic 
districts. 
The 2012 and 2014 election results reveal 
that the drafters' design in distributing 
Republican voters to secure a legislative 
majority was, in fact, a success. In 2012, 
Republicans garnered 48.6% of the vote, but 
secured 60 seats in the Assembly.250 In 
2014, Republicans increased their vote 
percentage to 52 and secured 63 Assembly 
seats. 
Moreover, Professors Gaddie and Mayer 
testified that, consistent with what actually 
occurred in 2012 and 2014, under any likely 
electoral scenario, the Republicans would 
maintain a legislative majority. After 
Professors Gaddie and Mayer developed their 
regression models to measure baseline 
partisanship, each conducted a separate 
swing analysis to demonstrate this outcome. 
“What a swing analysis does,” Professor 
Mayer explained, “is ask the question ... what 
might happen” under different electoral 
conditions. To determine this, “the statewide 
vote percentage” is altered by a fixed amount, 
typically in one-percentage-point increments, 
across all districts. “It's a way of, generally 
speaking, estimating what is a plausible 
outcome given a change in the statewide 
vote, which in this case a change in the 
statewide vote is a proxy for a different 
election environment, what might happen if 
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there's a pro-Democratic swing or a pro-
Republican swing.” 
Professor Gaddie's swing analysis is 
contained in his “S” curves. His “S” curves 
include the electoral outcome for each map 
based on Republican statewide vote 
percentage ranging from 40% to 60%. The 
“S” curve for the Team Map demonstrates 
that, to maintain a comfortable majority (54 
of 99 seats), Republicans only had to 
maintain their statewide vote share at 48%. 
The Democrats, by contrast, would need 
more than 54% of the statewide vote to obtain 
that many seats. 
Professor Mayer's swing analysis did not 
include the wide-ranging electoral scenarios 
set forth in Professor Gaddie's “S” curves. 
Instead, Professor Mayer included only likely 
electoral scenarios in his analysis. He looked 
at the electoral outcomes dating back to 1992 
and determined that the maximum statewide 
vote share the Democrats had received was 
54% in 2006, or roughly 3% more than they 
had received in 2012. The minimum 
statewide vote share Democrats had received 
was 46% in 2010, or roughly 5% less than 
they had received in 2012. Professor Mayer's 
swing analysis, therefore, looked at how Act 
43 would fare under these two scenarios—the 
Democrats receiving 46% of the vote, and the 
Democrats receiving 54% of the vote. 
Adjusting the Democratic vote share in each 
district by these amounts, Professor Mayer 
predicted that a 5% decrease in Democratic 
vote share would have no effect on the 
allocation of legislative seats; the 
Republicans would keep the 60 seats they 
had, but would not increase their numbers. 
When Democratic vote share increased by 
3% to 54%, Professor Mayer predicted that 
the Democrats would secure only 45 seats. 
However, both Professor Gaddie and 
Professor Mayer underestimated the strength 
of Act 43 when it came to securing and 
maintaining Republican control. When the 
Republican vote share dropped in 2012 to 
48.6%, Republicans still secured 60 seats—
10 more than what Professor Gaddie's “S” 
curve predicted. Additionally, when the 
Republican vote share increased in 2014 to 
52%, the Republicans increased the number 
of seats they held by 3, as opposed to their 
seat share being stagnant, as predicted by 
Professor Mayer. In other words, the actual 
election results suggest that Act 43 is more 
resilient in the face of an increase in the 
statewide Democratic vote share, and is more 
responsive to an increase in the statewide 
Republican vote share, than either Professor 
Gaddie or Professor Mayer anticipated. 
The fact that Democrats and Republicans 
were treated differently under Act 43 
becomes even more stark when we examine 
the number of seats secured when the parties 
obtain roughly equivalent statewide vote 
shares. In 2012, the Democrats received 
51.4% of the statewide vote, but that 
percentage translated into only 39 Assembly 
seats. A roughly equivalent vote share for 
Republicans (52% in 2014), however, 
translated into 63 seats—a 24 seat disparity. 
Moreover, when Democrats' vote share fell to 
48% in 2014, that percentage translated into 
36 Assembly seats. Again, a roughly 
equivalent vote share for Republicans (48.6% 
in 2012) translated into 60 seats—again a 24 
seat disparity. The evidence establishes, 
therefore, that, even when Republicans are an 
electoral minority, their legislative power 
remains secure. 
2. 
The record here is not plagued by the 
infirmities that have precluded the Court, in 
previous cases, from concluding that a 
discriminatory effect has been established. In 
Bandemer, the Court made clear that 
plaintiffs could not establish a constitutional 
violation based “on a single election.” This 
was because 
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    “Indiana is a swing State. Voters 
sometimes prefer Democratic candidates, and 
sometimes Republican. The District Court 
did not find that because of the 1981 Act the 
Democrats could not in one of the next few 
elections secure a sufficient vote to take 
control of the assembly.... The District Court 
did not ask by what percentage the statewide 
Democratic vote would have had to increase 
to control either the House or the Senate. The 
appellants argue here, without a persuasive 
response from the appellees, that had the 
Democratic candidates received an additional 
few percentage points of the votes cast 
statewide, they would have obtained a 
majority of the seats in both houses. Nor was 
there any finding that the 1981 
reapportionment would consign the 
Democrats to a minority status in the 
Assembly throughout the 1980's or that the 
Democrats would have no hope of doing any 
better in the reapportionment that would 
occur after the 1990 census. Without findings 
of this nature, the District Court erred in 
concluding that the 1981 Act violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.” 
The record here answers the shortcomings 
that the Bandemer plurality identified. First, 
we now have two elections under Act 43. In 
2012, the Democrats garnered 51.4% of the 
vote, but secured only 39 seats in the 
Assembly—or 39.3% of the seats.267 In 
2014, the Democrats garnered 48% of the 
vote and won only 36 seats—or 36.4% of the 
seats.268 If it is true that a redistricting “plan 
that more closely reflects the distribution of 
state party power seems a less likely vehicle 
for partisan discrimination,” then a plan that 
deviates this strongly from the distribution of 
statewide power suggests the opposite. 
Moreover, as described in some detail above, 
Professor Gaddie's “S” curve and Professor 
Mayer's swing analysis reveal that the 
Democrats are unlikely to regain control of 
the Assembly. And Act 43 has proven even 
more resistant to increases in Democratic 
vote share, and more responsive to increases 
in Republican vote share, than was predicted. 
Consequently, it is not the case that “an 
additional few percentage points of the votes 
cast statewide” for the Democrats will yield 
an Assembly majority. 
Furthermore, because we have the actual 
election results to confirm the reliability of 
Professor Gaddie's model and “S”—curve 
analysis, we are not operating only in the 
realm of hypotheticals—a prospect that at 
least one member of the Court in LULAC 
found troubling. In LULAC, Justice Kennedy 
commented on a proposal by one of the amici 
to adopt a partisan-bias standard, which 
would compare how the two major parties 
“would fare hypothetically if they each (in 
turn) had received a given percentage of the 
vote.” Justice Kennedy explained that, 
    “[e]ven assuming a court could choose 
reliably among different models of shifting 
voter preferences, we are wary of adopting a 
constitutional standard that invalidates a map 
based on unfair results that would occur in a 
hypothetical state of affairs. Presumably such 
a challenge could be litigated if and when the 
feared inequity arose.” 
Professor Gaddie's “S” curves and Professor 
Mayer's swing analysis, like a partisan-bias 
analysis, depend upon a hypothetical state of 
affairs: they assume a uniform increase or 
decrease in vote share across all districts—
something that does not occur in actual 
elections. Here, however, the predictive work 
of the professors is combined with the results 
of two actual elections in which the feared 
inequity did arise. 
3. 
While the evidence we have just described 
certainly makes a firm case on the question of 
discriminatory effect, that evidence is further 
bolstered by the plaintiffs' use of the 
“efficiency gap,” or EG for short, to 
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demonstrate that, under the circumstances 
presented here, their representational rights 
have been burdened. We begin with an 
explanation of the EG. Because the EG is a 
new measure and was the focus of extensive 
testimony at trial, we believe it appropriate to 
examine its value and shortcomings in detail. 
a. 
The allegations in this case are that Act 43's 
drafters employed two of the traditional 
methods of gerrymandering in order to 
diminish the electoral power of Democratic 
voters in Wisconsin: “packing” and 
“cracking.” Packing refers to the 
concentration of a party's voters in a limited 
number of districts; as a result, the party wins 
these packed districts by large margins.270 
Cracking, on the other hand, is the division of 
a party's voters across a number of districts 
such that the party is unable to achieve a 
majority in any. The EG is a measure of the 
degree of both cracking and packing of a 
particular party's voters that exists in a given 
district plan, based on an observed electoral 
result. 
The EG calculation is relatively simple. First, 
it requires totaling, for each party, statewide, 
(1) the number of votes cast for the losing 
candidates in district races (as a measure of 
cracked voters), along with (2) the number of 
votes cast for the winning candidates in 
excess of the 50% plus one votes necessary 
to secure the candidate's victory (as a 
measure of packed voters). The resulting 
figure is the total number of “wasted” votes 
for each party. These wasted vote totals are 
not, of themselves, independently significant 
for EG purposes; rather, it is the comparative 
relationship of one party's wasted votes to 
another's that yields the EG measure. The EG 
is the difference between the wasted votes 
cast for each party, divided by the overall 
number of votes cast in the election. When 
the two parties waste votes at an identical 
rate, the plan's EG is equal to zero. An EG in 
favor of one party (Party A), however, means 
that Party A wasted votes at a lower rate than 
the opposing party (Party B). It is in this sense 
that the EG is a measure of efficiency: 
because Party A wasted fewer votes than 
Party B, Party A was able to translate, with 
greater ease, its share of the total votes cast in 
the election into legislative seats. Put simply, 
an EG in Party A's favor means it carried less 
electoral dead weight; its votes were, 
statistically, more necessary to the victories 
of its candidates, and, consequently, it 
secured a greater proportion of the legislative 
seats than it would have secured had Party A 
and Party B wasted votes at the same rate. 
In a related sense, the EG can be viewed as a 
measure of the proportion of “excess” seats 
that a party secured in an election beyond 
what the party would be expected to obtain 
with a given share of the vote. In a purely 
proportional representation system, a party 
would be expected to pick up votes and seats 
at a one-to-one ratio, i.e., for every additional 
percentage of the statewide vote the party 
gains, it should also gain a percentage in the 
share of the seats. Based on decades of 
observed historical data, however, the parties' 
experts agreed that with single-member, 
simple-plurality systems like Wisconsin's, 
we can expect that for every 1% increase in a 
party's vote share, its seat share will increase 
by roughly 2%. Thus, a party that gets 52% 
of the statewide vote should be expected to 
secure 54% of the legislative seats. If the 
party instead translates its 52% of the vote 
into 58% of the seats, the district plan has 
demonstrated an EG of 4% in favor of that 
party (the difference between the expected 
seat share and the actual seat share). 
Both Professors Mayer and Jackman 
calculated the EG for the 2012 Assembly 
elections in Wisconsin. In his analysis, 
Professor Mayer employed the “full 
method,” which requires aggregating, 
district-by-district, the wasted votes cast for 
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each party. Applying this methodology, he 
determined that Act 43 yielded a pro-
Republican EG of 11.69%. Professor 
Jackman, however, used the “simplified 
method,” that assumes equal voter turnout at 
the district level. His calculations estimated a 
pro-Republican EG of 13% for the 2012 
election. Professor Jackman also calculated 
an EG for the 2014 election; that calculation 
resulted in a pro-Republican EG of 10%. 
Professor Jackman also conducted an 
historical analysis of redistricting plans 
which compared the trends in efficiency gaps 
across a wide variety of states over the last 
forty years (a total of 786 state legislative 
elections). He observed that an EG in the first 
year after a districting plan is enacted bears a 
relatively strong relationship to the efficiency 
gap over the life of a plan. The party that 
“wastes” more votes in the first election year 
is likely to continue “wasting” more votes in 
future elections. 
Relatedly, Professor Jackman conducted two 
additional analyses which suggest that an 
efficiency gap above 7% in any districting 
plan's first election year will continue to favor 
that party for the life of the plan. First, 
Professor Jackman compared districting 
plans across a wide variety of states, and 
determined that over 95% of plans with an 
EG of at least 7% will never have an EG that 
favors the opposite party. Second, Professor 
Jackman conducted a “swing analysis” of all 
redistricting plans since 2010 and determined 
that nearly all plans that resulted in a 7% 
efficiency gap favoring one party in the first 
election year will retain an efficiency gap that 
favors that same party, even when one adjusts 
a party's statewide vote share by five points. 
Professor Jackman then compared his EG 
estimates for Act 43 with the historical EG 
estimates from other states. Given historical 
trends and averages, he opined that 
Wisconsin's plan would have an average pro-
Republican efficiency gap of 9.5% for the 
entire decennial period. Therefore, in his 
expert opinion, Wisconsin Democrats would 
continue to have a less effective vote for the 
life of the plan. Barring an “unprecedented 
political earthquake,” Democrats would be at 
an electoral disadvantage for the duration of 
Act 43. 
Professor Jackman also presented a swing 
analysis that was specific to Wisconsin. He 
relied on the actual results from 2012 in each 
district in Wisconsin and then adjusted the 
vote in each district based on a 5% swing in 
each party's vote share. He then calculated 
the EG for each of these vote-share levels. 
Professor Jackman observed that, even with a 
5% swing in the Democrats' favor, the EG 
would not drop below 7%. 
As we already have seen, this more efficient 
distribution of Republican voters has allowed 
the Republican Party to translate its votes into 
seats with significantly greater ease and to 
achieve—and preserve—control of the 
Wisconsin legislature. In both elections held 
under Act 43, the Republicans obtained a far 
greater proportion of the Assembly's 99 seats 
than they would have without the leverage of 
a considerable and favorable EG. In 2012, the 
Republicans won 61% of Assembly seats 
with only 48.6% of the statewide vote, 
resulting in a 13% EG in their favor. In 2014, 
the Republicans garnered 52% of the 
statewide vote but secured 64% of Assembly 
seats, resulting in a pro-Republican EG of 
10%.295 Thus, the Republican Party in 2012 
won about 13 Assembly seats in excess of 
what a party would be expected to win with 
49% of the statewide vote, and in 2014 it won 
about 10 more Assembly seats than would be 
expected with 52% of the vote. 
Moreover, the expert testimony before us 
indicates that the Republican Party's 
comparative electoral advantage under Act 
43 will persist throughout the decennial 
period; Democratic voters will continue to 
find it more difficult to affect district-level 
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outcomes, and, as a result, Republicans will 
continue to enjoy a substantial advantage in 
converting their votes into seats and in 
securing and maintaining control of the 
Assembly. 
b. 
The defendants have made a number of legal, 
methodological, and policy-based attacks 
against judicial use of the EG as a measure of 
a district plan's partisan effect. We begin with 
their claim that use of the EG is foreclosed by 
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme 
Court has made clear that the Constitution 
does not require that a map result in each 
party gaining a share of the legislative seats 
in proportion to their share of the statewide 
vote. (“To be sure, there is no constitutional 
requirement of proportional representation 
....”). The defendants have argued throughout 
this action that this precept forecloses the use 
of any metric that employs a votes-to-seats 
relationship as its starting point to measure a 
plan's partisan effect. The EG, they say, is 
rooted in a baseline requirement that a district 
plan deliver hyper-proportional 
representation in the form of the 2-to-1 seats-
to-votes ratio described above and is 
therefore unavailable for use as a measure of 
discriminatory effect. 
We cannot accept this argument. To say that 
the Constitution does not require proportional 
representation is not to say that highly dis 
proportional representation may not be 
evidence of a discriminatory effect. Indeed, 
acknowledging that the Constitution does not 
require proportionality, Justice Kennedy 
observed in LULAC that “a congressional 
plan that more closely reflects the 
distribution of state party power seems a less 
likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than 
one that entrenches an electoral minority.” 
We do not believe, therefore, that the 
Constitution precludes us from looking at the 
ratio of votes to seats in assessing a plan's 
partisan effect. 
As it has been presented here, the EG does 
not impermissibly require that each party 
receive a share of the seats in proportion to its 
vote share. Rather, the EG measures the 
magnitude of a plan's deviation from the 
relationship we would expect to observe 
between votes and seats. We do not believe 
Vieth or LULAC preclude our consideration 
of the EG measure. 
We turn next to what are best described as 
methodological and operational critiques of 
the EG measure. First, the defendants point 
out that the plaintiffs have proposed two 
distinct methods for calculating the EG. The 
differing approaches can yield materially 
different EG values, which, in turn, will 
produce uncertainty in the maps that should 
be subject to judicial scrutiny. As explained 
previously, Professor Mayer employed the 
“full method,” which included aggregating 
every district's wasted votes for each party. 
Professor Jackman used the “simplified 
method” that assumes equal voter turnout at 
the district level. These two methods produce 
identical results when voter turnout is equal 
across districts; however, where voter turnout 
varies, as it does in Wisconsin, the EG 
measure will differ depending on the method 
used. 
Although we view the full method as 
preferable because it accounts for the reality 
that voters do not go to the polls at equal rates 
across districts, we do not believe that this 
calls into question Professor Jackman's use of 
the simplified method in his analysis. 
Professor Goedert in his expert report 
described the simplified method as “an 
appropriate and useful summary measure” 
for calculating the EG,302 and the parties 
have stipulated that the shortcut's implied 2-
to-1 votes-to-seats relationship reflects the 
“observed average seat/votes curve in 
historical U.S. congressional and legislative 
elections.” Were there record evidence 
indicating that Professor Jackman's shortcut 
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did not correlate highly with both the full 
method and electoral reality, we would have 
reason to doubt its validity. Because this is 
not the case here, we are not troubled by the 
existence of distinct methods of calculating 
the EG. Moreover, we are not addressing a 
legislative plan that is at the statistical 
margins. In this case, both methods yield an 
historically large, pro-Republican EG. 
The defendants also contend that the EG, as 
an indicator of partisan gerrymandering, is 
both overinclusive and underinclusive. They 
presented evidence that districting plans, 
which had been put in place by courts, 
commissions, or divided governments, 
sometimes register high EG values.304 
Conversely, the defendants pointed to several 
congressional districting plans that are 
commonly understood as partisan 
gerrymanders but registered low EG values 
or even EG values favoring the party that did 
not create the districting map. We do not 
share this particular concern. If a nonpartisan 
or bipartisan plan displays a high EG, the 
remaining components of the analysis will 
prevent a finding of a constitutional violation. 
For example, if a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering is brought against a court- or 
commission-drawn district plan with a high 
EG, it will stall when the plaintiffs attempt to 
make the necessary showing of 
discriminatory intent. In the same way, a 
challenge to a map enacted with egregious 
partisan intent but demonstrating a low EG 
also will fail because the plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate the required discriminatory 
effect. The present case, of course, does not 
present either of these situations. Here, the 
plaintiffs have put forward sufficient 
evidence showing both that Act 43 was 
enacted with impermissible intent and that it 
demonstrates a large and durable EG value. 
Lastly, the defendants argue that the EG 
measure is overly sensitive to small changes 
in voter preferences. At trial, Mr. Trende 
testified that the EG will vary depending on 
whether there is a national wave in the 
electorate favoring one party or the other. He 
described a hypothetical scenario in which a 
national pro-Republican wave resulted in an 
increase in Republican vote share in every 
district of two points above the otherwise 
expected Republican vote share. This slight 
change, Mr. Trende explained, could alter the 
outcomes in particularly close races and thus 
produce a significantly different EG value 
than if the national wave had not occurred. 
Professor Goedert raised a related point. He 
suggested that assessing a given plan based 
on the results of the first observed election 
under the plan is arbitrary and may yield 
problematic results if that first election 
happens to be a national wave election. 
We acknowledge these as legitimate 
criticisms of the EG measure generally; 
however, they are less compelling in the 
context of this case. Both concerns are rooted 
in an EG being drawn from only a single 
election, which, for any number of reasons, 
may represent an electoral aberration. Here 
we have the results of two elections under Act 
43, one in which the Republicans failed to 
garner a majority of the statewide vote 
(2012), and one in which they exceeded it by 
two percentage points. Under both electoral 
scenarios, there was a sizeable pro-
Republican efficiency gap: 13% in 2012 and 
10% in 2014. 
Even in the absence of these results, however, 
there is evidence in the record that establishes 
the durability of Act 43's pro-Republican 
efficiency gap. Professor Jackman conducted 
an historical analysis of redistricting plans 
which compared the trends in efficiency gaps 
across a wide variety of states over the last 
forty years (totaling 786 state legislative 
elections). Based on this analysis, Professor 
Jackman estimated that Wisconsin's plan, 
with an initial pro-Republican efficiency gap 
of 13.3%, would have a plan average pro-
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Republican efficiency gap of 9.5%. In other 
words, the Republicans' ability to translate 
their votes into seats will continue at a 
significantly advantageous rate through the 
decennial period. 
Moreover, Mr. Trende himself attested to the 
durability of Act 43's EG in the face of a wave 
election. In his expert report, Mr. Trende 
observed that if the Democrats engaged in a 
“modestly better effort” to get out the vote, 
and secured just 600 more votes in Districts 
1 and 94, the “EG falls by more than two 
points off these modest shifts, to 9.466.” 
Nevertheless, Mr. Trende conceded that, 
although such a shift might affect the EG's 
applications in other contexts, it “would not 
make a difference in terms of whether the 
Wisconsin map invited Court scrutiny” 
because the EG still was above the plaintiffs' 
proposed threshold of 7%. 
The defendants also raise policy-based 
objections to the EG as a measure of 
discriminatory effect. First, they claim that 
the creation of many competitive districts, 
which may be a desirable and non-partisan 
policy choice, will result in a highly sensitive 
map in which the EG could swing rather 
wildly with even mild electoral shifts. We do 
not doubt this is the case. However, as with 
some of the criticisms that we already have 
discussed, this concern is ameliorated by 
other aspects of the equal protection analysis. 
It would be difficult to establish that drafters 
who designed a map with many competitive 
districts had the requisite partisan intent to 
show a constitutional violation. 
The defendants similarly claim that 
identifying an EG of zero as the baseline or 
ideal would discourage states from enacting 
systems of proportional representation. 
Professor Goedert in particular noted that if a 
state successfully achieved proportional 
representation, the plan might fail an EG 
analysis because it fails to give a hyper 
proportional share to the party winning the 
majority of the statewide vote. Again, 
however, drafters who had the intent to create 
a proportional system hardly could be 
accused of harboring a discriminatory intent. 
Moreover, the defendants have offered no 
evidence that Act 43's drafters had any 
interest in hewing closely to proportional 
representation; indeed, the evidence is 
directly to the contrary. For these reasons, we 
are not persuaded that the policy objections 
to the EG bear any relationship to this case. 
We further emphasize, in any event, that we 
have not determined that a particular measure 
of EG establishes presumptive 
unconstitutionality, which itself diminishes 
all of the defendants' policy-based 
arguments. Instead, we acknowledge that the 
expert opinions in this case have persuaded 
us that, on the facts before us, the EG is 
corroborative evidence of an aggressive 
partisan gerrymander that was both intended 
and likely to persist for the life of the plan. 
In sum, we conclude that the plaintiffs have 
established, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Act 43 burdens the 
representational rights of Democratic voters 
in Wisconsin by impeding their ability to 
translate their votes into legislative seats, not 
simply for one election but throughout the 
life of Act 43. We therefore turn our attention 
to whether the burden is justified by some 
legitimate state interest. 
V 
JUSTIFICATION 
In the initial stages of this litigation, the 
plaintiffs took the view that, should they 
successfully establish the intent and effects 
elements of their constitutional claim, the 
burden should then shift to the defendants to 
show that Act 43's unlawful effects were “ 
‘unavoidable’ in light of the state's political 
geography and legitimate districting 
objectives.” In our summary judgment order, 
we noted that “some type of burden-shifting 
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is appropriate,” adding that “to the extent that 
plaintiffs have an initial burden to show that 
[Act 43] cannot be justified using neutral 
criteria,” it was met at the summary judgment 
stage by their presentation of the 
Demonstration Plan. We left open the 
question of which party ultimately should 
bear the burden of proving Act 43's 
legitimacy. However, we rejected 
definitively the plaintiffs' “unavoidable” 
standard as an “overstate[ment]” of the 
degree of the burden. 
In response, the plaintiffs reformulated the 
third step of their test to allow the defendants 
to avoid liability if they can justify Act 43's 
effects on the basis of legitimate districting 
goals or Wisconsin's natural political 
geography. They maintain, however, that it is 
the State's burden ultimately to prove that Act 
43's effect is justified and not their burden to 
prove that it is not. 
The defendants maintain that even this lesser 
showing is too demanding. They argue that 
because Act 43 complies with traditional 
districting objectives, its partisan effect is 
necessarily excusable as a matter of law and 
need not be explained by neutral 
considerations. We already have considered 
this argument in detail in our evaluation of 
the intent element of the plaintiffs' claim, and 
so we do not repeat that discussion here. 
In the absence of explicit guidance from the 
Supreme Court, we think that the most 
appropriate course in this context is to 
evaluate whether a plan's partisan effect is 
justifiable, i.e., whether it can be explained 
by the legitimate state prerogatives and 
neutral factors that are implicated in the 
districting process. This approach allows us 
to hew as closely as possible to the Supreme 
Court's approach in analogous areas. As we 
observed in our summary judgment order, 
members of the Court have applied this 
formulation at several points throughout its 
political gerrymandering case law. It is also 
consistent with the Court's approach in the 
state legislative malapportionment context. 
The record before us does not require us to 
anticipate how the Supreme Court will 
resolve the allocations of proof on this issue. 
It is clear that the parties, recognizing the 
present ambiguity on this point, placed before 
us all the evidence they could in support of 
their respective positions. Assuming the 
plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of proof 
on the issue, they have carried that burden. 
The evidence further makes clear that, 
although Wisconsin's natural political 
geography plays some role in the 
apportionment process, it simply does not 
explain adequately the sizeable disparate 
effect seen in 2012 and 2014 under Act 43. 
Indeed, as we already noted and will discuss 
again, the defendants' own witnesses 
produced the most crucial evidence against 
justifying the plan on the basis of political 
geography. Their testimony credibly 
established that Act 43's drafters produced 
multiple alternative plans that would have 
achieved the legislature's valid districting 
goals while generating a substantially smaller 
partisan advantage. We therefore must 
conclude that, regardless where the burden 
lies, Act 43's partisan effect cannot be 
justified by the legitimate state concerns and 
neutral factors that traditionally bear on the 
reapportionment process. 
A. 
The defendants' primary argument is that 
Wisconsin's political geography naturally 
favors Republicans because Democratic 
voters reside in more geographically 
concentrated areas, particularly in urban 
centers like Milwaukee and Madison. For this 
reason, they submit, any districting plan in 
Wisconsin necessarily will result in an 
advantageous distribution of Republican 
voters statewide just as Act 43 does. 
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The plaintiffs have stressed, as a general 
matter throughout this litigation, that even if 
there were some inherent pro-Republican 
bias in Wisconsin, there is no evidence that 
such a bias could explain Act 43's large EG 
measures. They maintain that without such 
evidence, political geography cannot justify 
the burden that Act 43 places on Democratic 
voters in Wisconsin. 
The bulk of evidentiary support for the 
defendants' political geography argument 
was presented through the testimony of Mr. 
Trende. His overarching theory is that the 
Democratic coalition nationwide has become 
more liberal over the last several decades; as 
a result, it has contracted geographically and 
is now concentrated heavily in urban areas. 
This concentration, in turn, has hurt the 
Democratic Party in congressional elections, 
which tend to favor parties with wider 
geographic reach. Mr. Trende first 
demonstrated this theory using color-coded 
maps illustrating the 1996, 2004, and 2008 
presidential vote results by county in Texas, 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and 
Virginia. Over the three election cycles, the 
number of counties shaded blue (indicating 
that a majority of the county's votes in the 
presidential election were cast for the 
Democratic candidate) decreased, and the 
number of red counties (indicating that a 
majority of the county's votes in the 
presidential election were cast for the 
Republican candidate) increased. Mr. Trende 
testified that these maps supported his 
hypothesis that the Democratic coalition has 
shrunk over time. 
We are skeptical that presidential voting 
trends at the county level in states other than 
Wisconsin bear directly on the determination 
that we must make about Wisconsin's 
political geography. Moreover, the color-
coding of Mr. Trende's maps, although a 
useful demonstrative, purported to serve as a 
substitute for quantitative data on the margin 
of victory in each county. Without this 
information, we cannot know whether, for 
example, a county won by a Republican 
presidential candidate was deeply or 
narrowly Republican. Nor can we tell how 
the partisan breakdown of that county may 
have changed over time; as long as the county 
retained the same partisan majority, it 
remained the same color. In our view, this 
evidence is worthy of little, if any, weight. 
The remainder of Mr. Trende's testimony 
concerned the political geography of 
Wisconsin itself, which he analyzed using a 
measure called the “partisan index” (“PI”). 
The PI, he explained, is the difference 
between a party's vote share at one electoral 
level and its vote share at a larger electoral 
level. For example, the Republican PI for the 
State of Wisconsin is “computed by 
subtracting the share of the state that voted 
for the Republican presidential candidate 
from the share of the nation that voted for the 
Republican presidential candidate.” The 
purpose of the PI is “to determine the partisan 
lean of political units” in order to “compare 
results across elections.” 
Mr. Trende explained that Wisconsin's 
statewide PI, as compared to the national 
electorate, has remained stable since the 
1980s; however, the county and ward PI 
values have shifted. He presented color-
coded maps illustrating Wisconsin's 
presidential vote results by county in 1996, 
2004, and 2012. Each county was colored a 
shade of blue or red depending on its degree 
of partisanship, e.g., counties with large 
Democratic or Republican PI values were 
shaded dark blue or dark red, respectively. 
Although the maps did not contain the actual 
county PI values, Mr. Trende testified that the 
pro-Democratic PI values of Dane and 
Milwaukee Counties increased significantly 
between 1996 and 2012. He also testified that 
the combined PI values of three of 
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Wisconsin's reliably Democratic counties—
Dane, Milwaukee, and Rock—nearly 
doubled between 1996 and 2012, despite the 
statewide Democratic vote share actually 
decreasing over that time. On cross-
examination, Mr. Trende conceded that the 
heavily Republican Ozaukee, Washington, 
and Waukesha Counties had Republican PI 
values as large as the Democratic PI values in 
Dane and Milwaukee Counties. However, the 
trial evidence also showed that the total 
number of votes cast for major-party 
candidates in the Republican counties were 
significantly smaller than their Democratic 
counterparts. 
Mr. Trende then applied the PI to Wisconsin's 
wards in what he referred to as a “nearest 
neighbor” analysis. First, he calculated ward-
level PI values in order to determine the 
average partisan lean of Wisconsin's wards 
from 2002 to 2014. Mr. Trende testified that, 
based on his analysis, “over time, the average 
Democratic ward had become about two-and-
a-half percent more Democratic than it was in 
2002”; he did not, however, observe the same 
trend in Republican wards. Mr. Trende then 
grouped the wards into quantiles based on 
their degree of partisanship—the more 
heavily Democratic wards together with 
similarly Democratic wards and the same for 
Republican wards—and used a computer 
program to determine, for each ward in each 
grouping, the median distance between that 
ward and a ward of similar partisanship. Mr. 
Trende concluded that, over time, 
Democratic-leaning wards in each quantile 
had grown closer together but Republican-
leaning wards actually had grown farther 
apart. In his view, this made it more difficult 
to draw a neutral districting plan that did not 
favor Republicans. 
Although Mr. Trende's report and testimony 
provides some helpful background 
information on political trends and political 
geography generally, they do not provide the 
level of analytical detail necessary to 
conclude that political geography explains 
Act 43's disparate partisan effects. Mr. 
Trende's conclusions regarding the PI values 
of Wisconsin's counties were based largely 
on the shaded maps rather than quantitative 
data analysis. And although Mr. Trende did 
provide PI values for particular pro-
Democratic counties, he conceded on cross-
examination that several counties had pro-
Republican PI values as large as the pro-
Democratic numbers observed in Dane and 
Milwaukee counties. 
Additionally, we question how useful Mr. 
Trende's nearest neighbor analysis is in the 
context of this case. The significance of the 
distance between wards of similar 
partisanship is not clear given the restraints 
placed on the districting process in 
Wisconsin. Under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, Assembly districts must “be 
bounded by county, precinct, town or ward 
lines, to consist of contiguous territory and be 
in as compact form as practicable.” Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 4. Accordingly, the distance 
between wards of similar partisanship is 
relevant to reapportionment only to the extent 
that it is feasible that those wards be grouped 
together in one contiguous district. The 
nearest neighbor analysis, however, does not 
differentiate between those wards that 
realistically could be aggregated to form a 
lawful assembly district—wards that are 
physically adjacent (or at least near one 
another) and not separated by legally 
significant boundaries—and those that are 
not. 
This problem is further compounded by Mr. 
Trende's use of the median distance between 
wards rather than the mean distance. 
Although the average Republican ward is 
twice the size of the average Democratic 
ward, the undisputed trial evidence was that 
the median Republican ward is six times the 
size of the median Democratic ward. When 
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the mean is used, however, Professor Mayer 
demonstrates that the distance between 
Democratic and Republican wards of similar 
partisanship “are exactly parallel,” and the 
disparity between Republican- and 
Democratic-leaning wards and their closest 
neighboring ward of similar partisanship 
substantially decreases. 
Like Mr. Trende, Professor Goedert testified 
that Wisconsin's political geography 
inherently favors Republicans. Using 
Wisconsin's 2012 Presidential election 
results, Professor Goedert employed a 
uniform swing to adjust the vote share in each 
ward and anticipate the results in an election 
where each party garnered 50% of the total 
statewide vote. He then assembled the wards 
into ten different groups based on this 
adjusted percentage of the Democratic vote 
share. Professor Goedert's analysis showed 
that between seven and eight percent of 
Wisconsin's wards had a very high 
concentration of Democrats (more than 
eighty percent), while fewer than one percent 
of wards demonstrated a similar strength in 
Republican vote. He testified that because 
significantly more wards in Wisconsin are 
narrowly Republican than are narrowly 
Democratic, it is “fairly easy” “to try to pack 
Democrats into a small number of districts,” 
because “there are so many wards that are 
already so heavily packed.” For the same 
reasons, he explained, it is “easy” to 
“disperse” Republican voters. 
The persuasiveness of Professor Goedert's 
ward-level analysis was called into question 
at trial. To begin, the evidence showed that in 
the 2010 redistricting cycle Wisconsin's 
wards were, for the first time in the state's 
modern history, drawn after the Assembly 
district lines were created under Act 43. 
Professor Goedert admitted that he was 
unaware of this chronology when he 
conducted his analysis. The partisan 
imbalance in Act 43's district configuration 
therefore may have affected Professor 
Goedert's ward-level analysis. Furthermore, 
Professor Mayer testified that, in this context, 
the relevant geographic unit is not the ward 
but rather the district because, to create a 
district plan, wards ultimately must be 
aggregated into districts, at which point their 
biases may disappear. He also presented his 
own analysis illustrating that Wisconsin's 
ward distribution, although “not perfectly 
symmetrical,” resembles a normal 
distribution (i.e., a bell curve). He testified 
that such a distribution is closer to what 
would be expected given a neutral political 
geography. When Professor Mayer 
aggregated the wards into Act 43's districts, 
however, the resulting distribution was 
skewed due to “an unusually large number of 
districts where the Democrats will receive 
between 40 and 50 percent” of the district 
vote. In Professor Mayer's opinion, this 
incongruity between the distributions of 
Wisconsin's wards and its districts 
demonstrates that Act 43's partisan 
imbalance is caused by its district 
configuration; indeed, he characterized this 
distribution of districts as “the fingerprint of 
a gerrymander ... the absolute DNA of 
cracking.” 
Professor Mayer also presented his own 
analysis of Wisconsin's political geography. 
Specifically, he testified at length about 
measures known as the “Isolation Index” and 
“Global Moran's I,” which he said are far 
more common in this area of academic study 
than the methods employed by the 
defendants' experts. According to Professor 
Mayer, he used the Isolation Index to 
measure the extent to which the average 
Republican or Democratic voter lives in a 
ward that leans more heavily Republican or 
Democratic than the state as a whole. Global 
Moran's I, he explained, was used to measure 
the likelihood that a Republican- or 
Democratic-leaning ward is adjacent to a 
similarly Republican- or Democratic-leaning 
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ward. Professor Mayer testified that both of 
these measures show that Wisconsin's 
political geography is neutral and does not 
inherently favor one party or the other. 
We do not find these methods reliable as they 
have been applied in this context. Professor 
Mayer acknowledged on cross-examination 
that he had not heard of the Isolation Index 
before he was retained as an expert in this 
case. Similarly, Professor Mayer testified that 
he had never calculated the Global Moran's I 
measure before he was retained for this 
litigation. Moreover, the defendants 
emphasized during trial that Professor Mayer 
relied on scholarly articles that either used a 
related measure known as Local Moran's I, or 
used Global Moran's I to study demographic 
groups. He could not point to any peer-
reviewed, scholarly article that had used 
either measure specifically on partisanship. 
Having carefully examined the evidence 
bearing on this issue, we find that substantial 
portions of the record indicate, at least 
circumstantially, that Wisconsin's political 
geography affords Republicans a modest 
natural advantage in districting. Indeed, the 
plaintiffs conceded as much in their closing 
argument when counsel stated that “there 
likely is some natural packing” of 
Democratic voters, “especially of minority 
voters in places like Milwaukee.” Several 
pieces of evidence lead us to this conclusion. 
The first, and most compelling, is Professor 
Mayer's analysis comparing the distributions 
of Wisconsin's wards and Act 43's districts by 
Democratic vote share. As Professor Mayer 
himself testified, the ward-level distribution 
is “not perfectly symmetrical.” In fact, the 
mean ward in the distribution—the highest 
point on the curve—is located left of the fifty 
percent line, which indicates that the average 
ward in Wisconsin leans slightly Republican. 
His analysis also shows that there are a 
substantial number of wards that are over 
eighty percent Democratic, but virtually no 
wards that are similarly Republican. We find 
these facts to be consistent with the notion 
that Democratic voters are uniquely packed 
in urban centers like Milwaukee and 
Madison. 
Moreover, Mr. Trende's testimony 
establishes that the counties with the highest 
Democratic PI values are far larger in 
population than counties with equivalent 
Republican PI values. This fact indicates that 
some of the most heavily Democratic areas in 
Wisconsin are more densely populated than 
their equally Republican counterparts. Again, 
we find this to be consistent with a modest 
Republican advantage in the State's political 
geography. 
We also find it significant that Republican-
leaning wards in Wisconsin tend to be twice 
the size of Democratic-leaning wards. 
Indeed, when Professor Mayer conducted his 
own nearest neighbor analysis using the 
mean distances between wards, it became 
clear that this size differential exists at every 
level of partisanship. We recognize that the 
impact of this disparity on the districting 
process arguably is negligible because 
districts must be approximately equal in 
population; ward size, therefore, does not 
directly bear on the creation of districts. Still, 
the tendency of Republican wards to be much 
larger than Democratic wards is consistent 
with the notion that Democratic voters on the 
whole are more likely than Republican voters 
to live in geographically concentrated areas. 
This, in turn, increases the prospect that 
heavily Democratic wards will exist within 
the same political boundary such that it is, at 
least somewhat, more difficult to draw 
politically competitive districts in that part of 
the state. 
Finally, it is undisputed that Professor 
Mayer's Demonstration Plan itself exhibited 
a slight pro-Republican bias despite his stated 
objective, reiterated at trial, of drawing an 
alternative to Act 43 that performed 
424 
  
comparably on traditional districting 
objectives but “had an efficiency gap as low 
to zero as [he] could get it.” Under the 
Demonstration Plan, when the Republicans 
secure 48% of the statewide vote as they did 
in 2012, the plan still yields an EG of 2.2% in 
favor of the Republicans. This certainly is a 
far smaller advantage than the 11.69% pro-
Republican EG generated under Act 43 in 
2012, but it nevertheless illustrates that even 
a neutrally drawn plan, crafted under 
conditions unimpeded by politics, imposes a 
slight burden on Democratic voters. 
For these reasons, we find that Wisconsin's 
political geography, particularly the high 
concentration of Democratic voters in urban 
centers like Milwaukee and Madison, affords 
the Republican Party a natural, but modest, 
advantage in the districting process. 
B. 
Because the evidence at trial establishes that 
Wisconsin has a modestly pro-Republican 
political geography, we now examine 
whether this inherent advantage explains Act 
43's partisan effect. We conclude that it does 
not. 
The record reveals that, before the legislature 
enacted Act 43, its drafters had produced 
several alternative district plans that 
performed satisfactorily on traditional 
districting criteria but secured a materially 
smaller partisan advantage when compared to 
the advantage produced by Act 43. Foltz and 
Ottman testified that, while drafting a 
particular map, they would remain attentive 
to various districting criteria—population 
equality, compactness, contiguity, and 
municipal and county splits—as well as 
where incumbents lived and levels of 
disenfranchisement. When the drafters 
finalized a statewide map, they were able to 
generate various reports through the 
autoBound software that evaluated the plan 
on these different districting criteria. In 
particular, once the drafters had “a statewide 
plan finalized, all 99 assembly districts,” they 
would “take th[e] [partisan] composite 
column from auto[B]ound and then move it 
over into ... Excel spreadsheets.” These 
spreadsheets evaluated a plan's expected 
district-by-district partisan performance, and 
the drafters exported and saved them for 
numerous statewide draft plans. 
Although the autoBound software also 
enabled the drafters to generate reports on 
other districting criteria that they were 
considering, the defendants have not pointed 
us to any documents in the record that 
compare the various maps under 
consideration according to traditional district 
criteria. It therefore is unclear precisely how 
the drafters' statewide maps performed on 
other districting criteria. Nevertheless, Foltz 
testified that the drafters “would pull regional 
alternatives from” the statewide maps they 
had finalized and evaluated. These regional 
maps were then presented to the Republican 
leadership with the expectation that they 
ultimately would be a part of a final district 
plan. Neither Foltz nor Ottman testified, and 
nothing in the record indicates, that any of 
these statewide plans performed 
unsatisfactorily on any other districting 
criteria. Indeed, had these maps 
demonstrated, for instance, insufficiently 
compact districts or an unacceptable number 
of municipal splits, the drafters would not 
have pulled regional alternatives from them 
to present to the legislative leadership. We 
therefore can infer that the finalized 
statewide plans for which we have partisan 
performance spreadsheets in the record 
complied satisfactorily with the other 
districting criteria that the drafters 
considered. 
The evidence also revealed that as the 
reapportionment process progressed and the 
drafters finalized and evaluated these 
statewide draft plans, the magnitude of the 
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expected partisan advantage increased. In 
many instances, the names of these plan 
alternatives reflected the degree of partisan 
advantage that could be anticipated in the 
map, e.g., “Assertive” or “Aggressive.” Each 
of the drafters' partisan score spreadsheets 
included a corresponding table comparing the 
partisan performance of the draft plan to the 
Current Map. These performance 
comparisons were made on the following 
criteria: “Safe” Republican seats, “Lean” 
Republican seats, “Swing” seats, “Safe” 
Democratic seats, and “Lean” Democratic 
seats. Under the Current Map, the drafters 
anticipated that the Republicans would 
secure 49 Assembly seats, with 40 districts 
safe or leaning Republican, 40 districts safe 
or leaning Democratic, and 19 swing 
districts. However, by the time the drafters 
had solicited the preferences of the 
Republican legislative leadership and pieced 
together the Team Map—the closest version 
in the record to Act 43—the expected 
Republican seats had ballooned to 59. The 
number of safe or leaning Republican 
districts had grown from 40 to 52, apparently 
at the expense of swing districts, which 
decreased from 19 to 10. The number of safe 
or leaning Democratic districts also were 
reduced from 40 to 37. 
Careful review of the record convinces us 
that benign factors cannot explain this 
substantial increase in Republican advantage 
between the Current Map and the plan that 
would become Act 43. Rather, it is evident 
that the drafters achieved this end by making 
incremental “improvements” to their plan 
alternatives throughout the drafting process. 
For example, the Republican advantages 
expected in the drafters' initial two draft 
plans, produced in early April 2011, were 
significantly smaller than the advantage 
anticipated in the Team Map. Under these 
draft plans—Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's 
Basemap Assertive—the drafters expected 
Republican candidates to win 52 and 56 
seats, respectively, compared to the 49 
expected under the Current Map. The Current 
Plan's 40 safe and leaning Republican 
districts improved to 45 and then to 49, while 
the number of swing districts dwindled from 
19 to 14 to 12. The number of pro-
Democratic districts, however, remained 
relatively constant. 
Apparently not satisfied with the political 
performance of these early plans, the drafters 
produced and evaluated at least another six 
statewide maps prior to their meeting with the 
Republican leadership in early June 2011. 
Each of these maps improved upon the 
anticipated pro-Republican advantage 
generated in the initial two draft plans. The 
total number of expected Republican seats in 
these drafts ranged between 57 and 60, and 
the number of swing seats ranged between 6 
and 11. The number of Democratic seats 
again remained about the same under each 
draft map. 
The Team Map, as an amalgamation of 
several statewide plan alternatives, reflects 
the drafters' iterative efforts throughout the 
drafting process to achieve a substantial, if 
not maximal, partisan advantage. That these 
efforts were highly successful is obvious with 
the benefit of hindsight. But the drafters 
themselves took pains to gauge their success 
at the time, taking stock of the degree to 
which they had improved upon the Current 
Map. In their Tale of the Tape, the drafters 
compared the partisan performance of the 
Team Map directly to the Current Map. They 
highlighted specifically that under the 
Current Map, “49 seats are 50% or better,” 
but under the Team Map, “59 Assembly seats 
are 50% or better.” In a second document, 
they categorized each of Wisconsin's 
Assembly districts according to its partisan 
“improvement” from the Current Map to the 
Team Map. For example, five districts were 
“Statistical Pick Up[s],” held by a 
Democratic incumbent who would now face 
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a “55% or better” Republican vote share. 
Another fourteen districts were 
“strengthened a lot”: “Currently held GOP 
seats that start[ed] at 55% or below [and] 
improve[d] by at least 1%” in Republican 
vote share. The drafters also made particular 
note of which Republican Assembly 
members had contributed to the achievement 
of their partisan goals, the 20 so-called “GOP 
donors to the team.” 
The substantial record evidence of the 
multiple statewide plan alternatives produced 
during the drafting process convinces us that 
Wisconsin's modest, pro-Republican political 
geography cannot explain the burden that Act 
43 imposes on Democratic voters in 
Wisconsin. The drafters themselves 
disproved any argument to the contrary each 
time they produced a statewide draft plan that 
performed satisfactorily on legitimate 
districting criteria without attaining an 
expected partisan advantage as drastic as that 
demonstrated in the Team Map and, 
ultimately, in Act 43. In reaching this 
conclusion, we emphasize that we did not 
require, as the plaintiffs initially proposed, 
that the defendants show that Act 43's 
partisan effect was necessary or unavoidable. 
Rather, our task at trial was to determine 
whether the burden that Act 43 imposes is 
justifiable in light of legitimate districting 
considerations and neutral circumstances. 
The defendants offered Wisconsin's natural 
political geography as one such neutral 
circumstance. Because we find that a 
Republican advantage in political geography, 
although it exists, cannot explain the 
magnitude of Act 43's partisan effect, and 
because we find that the plan's drafters 
created and passed on several less 
burdensome plans that would have achieved 
their lawful objectives in equal measure, we 
must conclude that the burden imposed by 
Act 43 is not justifiable. 
Professor Mayer's Demonstration Plan 
provides additional evidence that the 
legislative imbalance resulting from Act 43 is 
not attributable to political geography. 
Professor Mayer attempted to draw an 
alternative districting plan to Act 43 “that had 
an efficiency gap as low to zero as I could get 
it” while also complying with traditional 
districting criteria as well as Act 43. He first 
created a regression model that estimated 
partisanship for each geographic area, so that 
he could compare his plan to Act 43. To 
ensure the model was accurate, Professor 
Mayer compared the predictions made by his 
regression model to the actual results in 2012. 
He concluded that the results aligned almost 
perfectly. 
Once he was confident in his model, 
Professor Mayer “used a GIS redistricting 
program called Maptitude for redistricting to 
go ahead and complete the task of actually 
drawing the Assembly district map.” 
Proceeding along this course, Professor 
Mayer was able to draw a districting map that 
would have yielded a pro-Republican EG of 
only 2.2% for 2012, and “is comparable to 
Act 43” with respect to “all constitutional 
requirements.” Specifically his plan has a 
population deviation of .86% whereas Act 43 
has a population deviation of .76%. He also 
noted that his plan keeps the same number of 
majority-minority districts. The plan is also 
slightly more compact, based on the “Reock 
score,” than Act 43. Finally, it had three 
fewer county splits but two more municipal 
splits than Act 43. 
The defendants argue that we should discount 
the evidentiary value of the Demonstration 
Plan for several reasons. First, they maintain 
that the Demonstration Plan “achieved its EG 
through 20/20 hindsight” and that the low EG 
will “hold only for those specific election 
conditions” that occurred in 2012. 
Specifically, the defendants contend that if 
the Republicans had a good electoral 
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outcome like the one they saw in 2014, they 
would have received 63 seats under the 
Demonstration Plan and ended up with the 
same EG as Act 43. Consequently, from the 
standpoint of partisan effects, the 
Demonstration Plan is just as problematic as 
Act 43. 
Although this evidence shows the need to test 
how the Demonstration Plan fares under 
likely electoral scenarios, it does not render 
the Demonstration Plan useless for our 
purposes. Under Professor Mayer's 
Demonstration Plan, the EG would be 
significantly pro-Republican had the 
Republicans received a high vote share in the 
first election year of the plan. However, had 
the opposite happened, and Democrats 
received a higher vote share in the first 
election year, the EG would have skewed 
towards the Democrats. This is because the 
Demonstration Plan was designed to have 
competitive districts, and the EG will be 
reactive to such districts. By contrast, as 
Professor Gaddie's and Professor Jackman's 
sensitivity analyses show, Act 43 will remain 
pro-Republican regardless of the electoral 
outcome. Consequently, the Demonstration 
Plan and Act 43 do not suffer from the same 
infirmities. 
The defendants also contend that Professor 
Mayer's Demonstration Plan fails to account 
for core retention, i.e., it does not try to keep 
districts from the previous districting plan in 
a similar form. Although there is testimony 
by Ottman that the drafters “looked at kind of 
what the core of the existing district was 
compared to the new district,” we question 
how much this consideration actually 
factored into the drafting process. In Baldus, 
the court noted that “[o]nly 323,026 people 
needed to be moved from one assembly 
district to another in order to equalize the 
populations numerically,” but that “Act 43 
moves more than seven times that number—
2,357,592 people”—a number that the court 
found to be “striking.” 
On a similar note, the defendants point out 
that Professor Mayer did not draw Senate 
districts and therefore did not account for 
how many voters would be disenfranchised 
by moving into a Senate district where they 
would not get a vote for another two years. 
Ottman testified that, because he worked for 
Senator Fitzgerald and “was familiar with the 
Senate seats,” he “was able to eyeball 
[disenfranchisement] a little bit.” Foltz 
testified that “you can notice 
[disenfranchisement] when you're drawing 
individual districts. But I think it's another 
one of those metrics where the back-end 
report is really where you get a sense for 
where you're sitting.” Although Foltz ran 
“disenfranchisement reports on [his] plans,” 
he did not testify as to specific numerical 
targets he was aiming for, nor did he testify 
that any of his maps were changed in 
response to the reports that were generated. 
The defendants also urge that the 
Demonstration Plan incorporates districts 
around Fond du Lac that are not compact. 
There may be individual districts in the 
Demonstration Plan that are not as compact 
as their equivalent districts in Act 43. 
Nevertheless, the Demonstration Plan has a 
better overall “Reock score”—the measure of 
compactness utilized by the drafters—than 
Act 43 has. We cannot conclude, therefore, 
that, overall, the Demonstration Plan was less 
compact than Act 43. 
Finally, the defendants argue that the 
Demonstration Plan fails to protect 
incumbents to the same degree as Act 43. 
Professor Mayer testified that he “didn't pay 
attention to where incumbents resided.” The 
defendants contend that the number of paired 
incumbents in the Demonstration Plan was so 
great that such a plan would not have passed 
in the legislature. According to the 
defendants, the Demonstration Plan paired 37 
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incumbents, 13 more than were paired in Act 
43. 
There is no question that, unlike Act 43, the 
Demonstration Plan does not take into 
account incumbency concerns. This infirmity 
does not negate entirely the value of the 
Demonstration Plan. Notably, the defendants 
have not argued that the location of 
incumbents hampered them in their efforts to 
draw a non-partisan plan or otherwise 
accounts for the electoral imbalance resulting 
from Act 43. Nevertheless, Professor Mayer's 
lack of attentiveness to this concern well 
might diminish the Demonstration Plan's 
worth as a viable, legislative alternative. The 
Demonstration Plan still shows, however, 
that it is very possible to draw a map with 
much less of a partisan bent than Act 43 and, 
therefore, that Act 43's large partisan effect is 
not due to Wisconsin's natural political 
geography. 
The evidence of multiple statewide plan 
alternatives produced during the drafting 
process, coupled with Professor Mayer's 
Demonstration Plan, convinces us that 
Wisconsin's modest, pro-Republican political 
geography cannot explain the burden that Act 
43 imposes on Democratic voters in 
Wisconsin. The drafters established this 
finding themselves; they produced several 
statewide draft plans that performed 
satisfactorily on legitimate districting criteria 
without attaining the drastic partisan 
advantage demonstrated in the Team Map 
and, ultimately, in Act 43. Professor Mayer's 
Demonstration Plan further dispels the 
defendants' claim. As we have noted in our 
discussion, the evidence in support of a larger 
effect of political geography simply lacked 
specificity and careful analysis and, 
consequently, was less convincing. 
VI 
STANDING 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife makes clear 
that we must assess the issue of standing at 
all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, now 
that we have set forth the factual record and 
the elements of a political gerrymandering 
cause of action, we revisit the issue of 
standing.405 The standing requirement is 
meant to ensure that the plaintiffs have 
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome 
of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation 
of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions.” The party invoking 
federal jurisdiction, here the plaintiffs, bears 
the burden of establishing Article III 
standing. 
The constitutional requirements for standing 
are well-established: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, 
there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—
the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action 
of some third party not before the court.” 
Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to 
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.” 
We turn first to the question whether the 
plaintiffs have established the invasion of a 
legally protected interest. Although the 
proposition is not settled in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, we hold, for the reasons set 
forth in this opinion, that state legislatures 
cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause, adopt a districting plan that is 
intended to, and does in fact, entrench a 
political party in power over the decennial 
period. The plaintiffs have established that, 
“[a]s a result of the statewide partisan 
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gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the 
same opportunity provided to Republicans to 
elect representatives of their choice to the 
Assembly. As a result, the electoral influence 
of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters 
statewide has been unfairly [and] 
disproportionately ... reduced” for the life of 
Act 43. Professor Whitford testified to the 
impact of political gerrymandering on 
individual voters in Wisconsin where it is 
“extremely difficult” to pass legislation 
through a bipartisan coalition. Wisconsin's 
strict caucus system means that all of the 
important “debate and discussion” of 
proposed legislation takes place in the party 
caucus meeting, and the party's vote, yea or 
nay, is the one “that matters.” Consequently, 
erecting a barrier that prevents the plaintiffs' 
party of choice from commanding a 
legislative majority diminishes the value of 
the plaintiffs' votes in a very significant way. 
We believe the situation here is very close to 
that presented in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
82 S.Ct. 691. In Baker, the plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim was that a decades-old 
districting statute constitute[d] arbitrary and 
capricious state action, offensive to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in its irrational 
disregard of the standard of apportionment 
prescribed by the State's Constitution or of 
any standard, effecting a gross disproportion 
of representation to voting population. The 
injury which appellants assert is that this 
classification disfavors the voters in the 
counties in which they reside, placing them 
in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable 
inequality vis-à -vis voters in irrationally 
favored counties. 
The Court explained that, “[i]f such 
impairment does produce a legally 
cognizable injury, [the appellants] are among 
those who have sustained it.” As noted above, 
today we recognize a cognizable equal 
protection right against state-imposed 
barriers on one's ability to vote effectively for 
the party of one's choice. Moreover, Act 43 
did, in fact, prevent Wisconsin Democrats 
from being able to translate their votes into 
seats as effectively as Wisconsin 
Republicans. Wisconsin Democrats, 
therefore, have suffered a personal injury to 
their Equal Protection rights—akin to that 
suffered by the plaintiffs in Baker—that is 
both concrete and particularized. 
Moreover, there can be no dispute that a 
causal connection exists between Act 43 and 
the plaintiffs' inability to translate their votes 
into seats as efficiently as Republicans. The 
evidence has established that one of the 
purposes behind Act 43 was solidifying 
Republican control of the legislature for the 
decennial period. Indeed, the drafters had 
drawn other statewide maps that, their own 
analysis showed, would secure fewer 
Republican seats. Finally, adopting a 
different statewide districting map, perhaps 
one of those earlier maps or a map as 
proposed in Professor Mayer's 
Demonstration Plan, would redress the 
constitutional violation by removing the 
state-imposed impediment on Democratic 
voters.  
Defendants nevertheless contend that the 
plaintiffs lack standing for several reasons. 
First, they assert that “[a] majority of Justices 
in Vieth properly recognized that a statewide 
challenge to a redistricting plan was not 
justiciable.” This view, however, is not the 
equivalent of holding that the plaintiffs did 
not have standing to pursue their cause of 
action. Standing is just one aspect of 
justiciability, which also includes ripeness, 
mootness, and the political question doctrine. 
The Vieth plurality held that the plaintiffs' 
claim for political gerrymandering presented 
a nonjusticiable political question; only one 
Justice opined that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring a statewide political 
gerrymandering claim. 
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The defendants also claim that in recognizing 
the plaintiffs' standing to challenge a 
statewide map, we are at odds with the 
Court's holding in United States v. Hays. 
Hays, like its predecessor, involved 
allegations that a districting map constituted 
“an effort to segregate voters into separate 
voting districts because of their race.” This 
particular cause of action is limited, 
therefore, to individuals who “reside[ ] in a 
racially gerrymandered district” because they 
are the ones who “ha[ve] been denied equal 
treatment because of the legislature's reliance 
on racial criteria.” 
The rationale and holding of Hays have no 
application here. As we already have 
discussed, the harm in such cases is not that 
the racial group's voting strength has been 
diluted, but that race has been used “as a basis 
for separating voters into districts.” The 
district lines, therefore, “embody stereotypes 
that treat individuals as the product of their 
race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—
their very worth as citizens—according to a 
criterion barred to the Government by history 
and the Constitution.” The concern here is a 
very different one: it is the effect of a 
statewide districting map on the ability of 
Democrats to translate their votes into seats. 
The harm is the result of the entire map, not 
simply the configuration of a particular 
district. It follows, therefore, that an 
individual Democrat has standing to assert a 
challenge to the statewide map. 
The defendants also argue that the wrong 
alleged by the plaintiffs is not sufficiently 
“particularized” to satisfy the standing 
requirement. According to the defendants, 
“the plaintiffs are asserting an injury that is 
not personal to any one of them, but instead 
is common to anyone who supports the 
Democratic Party.” We cannot take the 
defendants' arguments at face value. If, for 
instance, Congress should pass a law that 
imposed income taxes only on Democrats, 
surely an individual Democrat could bring a 
constitutional challenge to the law even 
though the harm was shared by so many. 
Moreover, an injury is not sufficiently 
particularized only if it is a wrong shared by 
the “public at large”: 
    “We have consistently held that a plaintiff 
raising only a generally available grievance 
about government—claiming only harm to 
his and every citizen's interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public 
at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.” 
The harm that the plaintiffs have experienced 
is not one shared by the public at large. It is 
one shared by Democratic voters in the State 
of Wisconsin. The dilution of their votes is 
both personal and acute. Consequently, the 
plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement of a 
particularized injury. 
The defendants finally maintain that “[t]here 
is no reliable causal connection between re-
doing statewide districts and what the 
Plaintiffs themselves are involved in, namely 
localized elections.” We believe that this 
claim is belied by the evidence. The plaintiffs 
have established that, given Wisconsin's 
caucus system, the efficacy of their vote in 
securing a political voice depends on the 
efficacy of the votes of Democrats statewide. 
Moreover, the drafters themselves drew maps 
that would have resulted in significantly 
greater partisan balance than that obtained by 
Act 43. In short, there is no question that Act 
43 imposed a disability on Democratic voters 
and that redrawing a district map—indeed, 
perhaps employing one of the drafters' earlier 
efforts—would remove that disability. 
VII 
ORDER 
A. Remedy 
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs request three 
types of relief: (1) that we declare the 
Assembly districts established by Act 43 
unconstitutional; (2) that, “[i]n the absence of 
a state law establishing a constitutional 
district plan for the Assembly districts, 
adopted by the Legislature and signed by the 
Governor in a timely fashion, [we] establish 
a redistricting plan that meets the 
requirements of the U.S. Constitution and 
federal statutes ...”; and (3) that we enjoin the 
defendants from “administering, preparing 
for, and in any way permitting the 
nomination or election of members of the 
State Assembly from the unconstitutional 
districts that now exist.” 
We defer, at this time, a ruling on the 
appropriate remedy. The parties have not had 
an opportunity to brief fully the timing and 
propriety of remedial measures. We therefore 
order briefing on the appropriate remedy 
according to the following schedule: 
1. The parties shall file simultaneous briefs 
on the nature and timing of all appropriate 
remedial measures in 30 days' time; 
2. Simultaneous response briefs are due 15 
days thereafter. 
The parties will provide the court with all 
evidentiary and legal support they believe is 
required for the court to make its ruling. If the 
parties do not believe that the court can rule 
on the appropriate remedy without the benefit 
of additional testimony, they should inform 
the court of the nature and extent of the 
testimony they believe is required. 
B. Evidentiary Matters 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the 
motions set forth in our docket numbers 151 
(with respect to the admission of exhibits 98–
100, 102, 118–119, 131, 141, 148, 150–152, 
333, 391, 394, 405–406, 408, 414–415, 417, 
and 498) and 154 are DENIED. The motions 
set forth in our docket numbers 152 and 158 
are GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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“Partisan gerrymandering is almost as old as America, but will the 
Supreme Court decide it has gone too far?” 
 
Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
June 19, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide 
whether partisan gerrymandering — in which 
voting districts are drawn to favor one party 
— is a time-honored American political 
tradition or has evolved into an 
unconstitutional rigging of elections. 
The Wisconsin case of Gill vs. Whitford, to 
be heard in the fall, could yield one of the 
most important rulings on political power in 
decades. 
Gerrymandering has been derided for 
generations, often mocked in cartoons 
depicting bizarre-shaped districts that look 
like salamanders or spiders. 
But in recent decades, because of software 
programs, gerrymandered maps look less 
obvious and are more effective in giving one 
party an insurmountable advantage. The 
maps can all but ensure that the party in 
power at the beginning of a decade — when 
districts are drawn — will keep control of a 
state legislature and win most of a state’s 
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Democrats maintain that the Republican 
Party has used its control of electoral maps 
after the 2010 census to give Republicans an 
unfair grip on power in Congress. 
For example, Pennsylvania, Ohio and 
Michigan are closely divided states in terms 
of party affiliation and all voted for former 
President Obama. Yet 34 of their 48 House 
representatives are Republican largely 
because of gerrymandering. 
North Carolina’s electoral map was rejected 
by the Supreme Court recently for illegally 
using race in an effort to create more GOP-
leaning districts. It sends 10 Republicans and 
three Democrats to the House, even though 
statewide races often reflect a population that 
is narrowly divided. 
Democrats have played the same game, 
although they now control far fewer states. In 
Maryland, Democrats drew a map that 
allowed their party to control seven of the 
eight seats in the House. 
What is unclear is whether the justices see 
this as politics as usual. The Supreme Court 
has viewed political gerrymandering as 
distasteful but not illegal. The justices have 
never struck down a state’s electoral map 
because it was unfairly partisan, though they 
have outlawed gerrymandering along racial 
lines. 
Voting rights advocates are hopeful that it 
will be different this time. They say party 
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leaders have gone too far in rigging the 
system in their favor. 
Paul Smith, a lawyer for the Campaign Legal 
Center, said gerrymandering “is worse now 
than any time in recent memory.” He 
represents a dozen Democratic voters from 
Wisconsin who sued the state over its 
electoral map for the state Assembly. 
The map makes it likely the GOP will win a 
supermajority of seats in the Assembly even 
when more votes are cast statewide for 
Democrats than for Republicans. 
In 2012, 51% of Wisconsin voters cast ballots 
for Democrats in the state legislative races, 
compared with 48.6% for Republicans. But 
Republicans still won 60 of the 99 seats in the 
Assembly. 
Last year, a three-judge federal panel agreed 
with the challengers and ruled 2 to 1 that the 
Wisconsin map was unconstitutional. The 
map’s “motivating factor” was an “intent to 
entrench a political party in power,” said 
Judge Kenneth Ripple, a Reagan appointee to 
the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Chicago. The judges cited the work of 
University of Chicago law professor 
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, who devised a 
mathematical formula that showed the 
Wisconsin plan was an extreme gerrymander. 
Trevor Potter, president of the Campaign 
Legal Center and former Republican 
chairman of the Federal Election 
Commission, urged the high court to affirm 
that decision. “The threat of partisan 
gerrymandering isn’t a Democratic or 
Republican issue. It’s an issue for all 
American voters,” he said. “We’re confident 
that when the justices see how pervasive and 
damaging this practice has become, the 
Supreme Court will adopt a clear legal 
standard that will ensure our democracy 
functions as it should.” 
The Republican National Committee does 
not share his assessment of the problem or the 
solution. Its lawyers urged the Supreme 
Court to take up the Wisconsin case and 
uphold the state’s map. They argued that their 
party’s advantage reflects the “reality of 
political geography.” They say Democratic 
voters are concentrated in the cities, giving 
the GOP a big edge elsewhere. “The 
Constitution contains no right to proportional 
representation in legislative bodies based on 
statewide totals,” they argued. 
Wisconsin’s attorney general directly 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The state’s 
lawyers said the districts were compact and 
neatly drawn. They said the Democrats are at 
a disadvantage because their voters are 
concentrated in Milwaukee and Madison. 
They urged the court to overturn the lower-
court ruling and throw out the claim on the 
grounds that redistricting is a political 
process, not a legal one. They also won a 
procedural ruling on Monday that could be a 
good omen for the Republicans. 
Shortly after announcing the court would 
hear the case, the justices issued an order that 
put on hold the lower court’s decision that 
required Wisconsin lawmakers immediately 
redraw the map for its legislative districts. 
The order came on a 5-4 vote. The four 
Democratic appointees — Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — dissented. 
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That means the court’s five Republican 
appointees voted with Wisconsin’s 
Republican leaders. The five justices 
apparently agreed with the state's argument 
that it should not be forced to redraw the map 
until the high court finally rules on its 
constitutionality. But the order also suggests 
they are skeptical of the lower court's ruling. 
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“The Supreme Court Takes On Partisan Gerrymandering” 
 
The Atlantic 
Vann R. Newkirk II 
June 19, 2017 
 
Partisan gerrymandering can be 
unconstitutional—at least in theory. In the 
1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer, the 
Supreme Court did not find reason to declare 
an unconstitutional gerrymander, but its 
ruling did state “that political 
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable 
under the Equal Protection Clause.” 
Despite that ruling, and despite regular 
rulings against racial gerrymanders over the 
past five decades, the Court hasn’t actually 
declared a single political district 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
disenfranchises voters by political party. In 
the 2004 Vieth v. Jubelirer case, Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s ruling on Pennsylvania 
congressional districts “concluded that 
political gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable because no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating such claims exist.” 
That ruling will be tested over the coming 
weeks, as the Court agreed Monday to review 
Gill v. Whitford, after a federal district court 
in November struck down Republican-drawn 
state assembly maps in Wisconsin on the 
grounds of partisan gerrymandering. In a 
story similar to other gerrymandering cases 
percolating in federal courts now, after 
grabbing control of the Wisconsin state 
legislature in 2010, Republicans used the 
Census-based decennial redistricting as an 
opportunity to dilute Democratic votes and 
solidify partisan advantage in the future. That 
advantage was so effective that at the time of 
the lower court’s ruling, scholars claimed 
Democrats would have to win 54 percent of 
the available votes to regain political control 
of the state. 
There’s still an uphill battle for the Wisconsin 
plaintiffs and for opponents of partisan 
gerrymandering. In the Court’s order, the 
question of jurisdiction was postponed until a 
hearing on the merits of the case. That means 
the justices will have to determine if partisan 
gerrymandering is even justiciable. If they 
decide it’s not, that might be the death blow 
to future cases alleging partisan 
gerrymandering. 
But there’s some hope for the plaintiffs yet. 
As Ian Millhiser at ThinkProgress notes, in 
the 2004 Vieth v. Jubelirer case, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy left the door open for a 
challenge. In response to Scalia’s holding 
that partisan gerrymanders are impossible to 
consider because there are no standards to 
measure how they affect constitutional rights 
and no useful objective tests to identify them 
(unlike racial gerrymanders, where discrete 
known factors are applied by the Court), 
Kennedy wrote that “if workable standards 
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do emerge to measure these burdens … 
courts should be prepared to order relief.” 
The lower court, at least, was swayed by one 
such standard. The University of Chicago 
professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and the 
Public Policy Institute of California fellow 
Eric McGhee devised a way to measure the 
“efficiency gap” between parties. They 
measure “wasted” votes that occur either 
when a voter votes for a losing candidate or 
when a voter votes for a candidate who would 
have won anyways, which in turn captures 
the extent to which voters are “cracked” and 
placed in districts where their preferred 
candidates will never win or “packed” into 
hyper-concentrated districts. If one party has 
substantially more wasted voters and a lower 
efficiency than the other, then 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee claim that’s 
proof of an unconstitutional gerrymander.  
The lower court found that claim compelling. 
It’s unclear if the Supreme Court will find 
their formula equally compelling, but its 
decision will reverberate either way. North 
Carolina’s redrawn congressional districts 
now face review by federal courts as partisan 
gerrymanders after the original Republican-
drawn maps were struck down by the 
Supreme Court. There are also ongoing 
lawsuits in Maryland and Pennsylvania over 
partisan gerrymandering. 
The Court’s decision might impact those 
cases, but it could also have major effects on 
the future of redistricting. The 2020 Census 
isn’t far away, and Republicans in 2010 
created a proof-of-concept for using hyper-
partisan redistricting to amplify Democratic 
voter concentration and dominate local, state, 
and federal lawmaking bodies. Opponents—
armed now with landmark analysis from 
Justice Kagan making it much easier to 
identify racial gerrymanders—will have real 
tools to fight this advanced gerrymandering, 
especially if the precedent in this case makes 
a partisan test available. 
But if the Court takes the view that partisan 
gerrymandering is simply not actionable—or 
the more extreme view that it’s not any 
different from other partisan pieces of the 
political process under the Constitution—that 
decision will make it difficult to stop an 
increasingly sophisticated wave of hyper-
partisan gerrymandering in 2021 and beyond. 
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“How 2 academics got the Supreme Court to reexamine 
gerrymandering” 
 
Vox 
Dylan Matthews 
June 19, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court has officially agreed to 
hear a case with the potential to put firm 
limits on partisan gerrymandering — and 
dramatically change the way states draw 
legislative boundaries. 
The case, Gill v. Whitford, challenges the 
2011 Wisconsin state assembly map. Those 
districts were drawn by the Republican state 
legislature in Wisconsin, and packed 
Democrats into a smaller number of districts 
to maximize Republican odds. The lawsuit 
argues that the map is an unconstitutional 
effort to help Republicans retain power. 
That kind of gerrymandering, the suit alleges, 
violates Democrats’ constitutional rights in 
two ways: under the First Amendment 
freedom of association, since they’re being 
disenfranchised based on the party they chose 
to join, and under the 14th Amendment’s 
equal protection clause, because Democrats 
are effectively entitled to less representation 
than Republicans. 
A divided three-judge panel of the US 
District Court for Wisconsin ruled last year 
against the Wisconsin map, concluding that 
the plaintiffs are correct and that the map’s 
gerrymandering is unconstitutional. Kenneth 
Ripple, the author of that opinion, wrote, "We 
conclude … that the evidence establishes that 
one of the purposes of [the district map] was 
to secure Republican control of the Assembly 
under any likely future electoral scenario for 
the remainder of the decade, in other words 
to entrench the Republican Party in power." 
The panel stayed the map and ordered the 
legislature to redraw it. As part of agreeing to 
hear the case, the five conservatives on the 
Supreme Court (John Roberts, Neil Gorsuch, 
Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and 
Anthony Kennedy) stayed the ruling, 
effectively removing the near-term 
requirement that Wisconsin redraw its map. 
The four liberals (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena 
Kagan) dissented. 
The Wisconsin state assembly districts being 
challenged. Wisconsin State Legislature 
Gerrymandering is as old as the American 
republic, and has been done for a variety of 
reasons. Historically, districting meant to 
reduce the power of black voters has been 
very common. But partisan gerrymandering 
has also been a dominant force. Typically, the 
party in control of a state legislature will try 
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to draw congressional and state legislative 
districts in such a way as to maximize their 
own odds. 
For instance, Democrats in charge of the 
Maryland legislature have divvied up 
Democratic base voters in the DC suburbs 
and Baltimore into large a number of 
districts, while concentrating Republicans in 
more rural parts of the state in a smaller 
number of districts. Republicans in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania have done the reverse, 
concentrating urban voters in a few heavily 
Democratic districts. 
While the Supreme Court has ruled on many 
aspects of the districting process — banning 
state legislative districts with unequal 
populations and banning districts intended to 
disenfranchise black voters — it has issued 
muddled opinions on the question of whether 
partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. 
There’s extensive case law on racial 
gerrymanders, which has established that 
racial discrimination in districting is subject 
to strict scrutiny by courts. 
But discrimination on the basis of party is not 
the same as racial discrimination. The Court 
has agreed to no firm standard as to which 
political considerations are and are not 
allowed in creating congressional and 
legislative districts, and in 2004’s Vieth v. 
Jubelirer a plurality opinion by the right wing 
of the Court argued that no such standard is 
even possible. 
But the Court’s four liberals dissented, and 
Anthony Kennedy filed a concurrence 
arguing that it was possible the Court could 
develop such a standard in the future. 
Since then, there’s been a lot of academic 
energy around trying to develop such a 
standard. University of Chicago law 
professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and 
political scientist Eric McGhee devised one 
promising option, which notes that 
gerrymandering forces the losing party to 
"waste" votes by placing all its voters into a 
small number of districts where the party gets 
a landslide, rather than spreading out those 
voters so they can have more impact. 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee argue that fair 
districting requires a roughly equal number 
of wasted votes for each party, and that 
districting schemes where one party is 
wasting many more votes are 
unconstitutional. They call their metric the 
“efficiency gap,” calculated by taking the 
difference between the number of “wasted 
votes” for each party, and dividing that 
difference by the total number of votes. 
The efficiency gap is key to the plaintiffs’ 
arguments in Gill v. Whitford. They 
proposed setting a threshold of 7 percent: If a 
districting plan produces a larger gap than 
that, if one party is getting a wasted-vote 
advantage of more than 7 percent of the total 
vote, then it’s getting a huge leg up, which 
will continue for a long time. As Yale Law 
School dean Heather Gerken noted in a Vox 
piece following the initial district court 
decision, a gap above that amount indicates 
that the disadvantaged party “would have 
almost no chance of taking control of the 
legislature during the 10-year districting 
cycle.” 
By contrast, the Wisconsin plan created 
efficiency gaps of 13 percent and 10 percent 
in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Those are 
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truly massive advantages enjoyed by the 
Republican Party. 
By taking up the case, the Supreme Court is 
essentially promising to rule on the merits of 
the efficiency gap as a means of determining 
whether an improper partisan gerrymander 
has happened — and, if one has occurred, on 
whether that violates either First or 14th 
Amendment protections. 
The key question, as always on this Supreme 
Court, is where Kennedy will land. His 2004 
concurrence indicated an openness to 
quantitative measures of partisan skew, and 
the efficiency gap and similar measures were 
to some extent devised to answer that demand 
of his. However, he sided with the Court’s 
conservatives in staying the lower court 
ruling, which might indicate a lack of 
sympathy with the plaintiffs and a 
willingness to let the map slide.
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“How This Supreme Court Case Will Affect the Next Election” 
 
Time 
Thomas Wolf 
June 21, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear 
argument this fall in a potentially landmark 
partisan-gerrymandering case from 
Wisconsin. This will give the Justices an 
opportunity to weigh in on an important 
question that they’ve never clearly answered: 
Whether there are any constitutional limits on 
politicians’ ability to draw electoral maps to 
give their party a leg up. How the Court 
decides will go a long way to determining 
whether you choose your representatives — 
or the other way around — and whether 
you’ll be able to hold them accountable when 
they put party agendas over your interests. 
The Wisconsin case — known as Gill v. 
Whitford — is a great opportunity for the 
Justices to (attempt to) answer this question 
because it involves an especially extreme and 
troubling example of gerrymandering. In 
2010, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican 
governor and Republican majorities to both 
statehouses, giving the GOP total control 
over the state’s redistricting process for the 
first time in 40 years. The party’s leaders 
seized the opportunity. They hired a private 
law firm to supervise aides and consultants 
who worked away in a secret “map room” 
Democrats were shut out of the process, and 
even rank-and-file Republicans were shown 
only information relating to their own 
districts. Leadership rushed the approval 
process for the final plan, which was 
engineered to ensure Republicans would get 
a 54-seat majority even if they only garnered 
48% of the statewide vote. 
The map performed even more reliably than 
expected. In 2012, Republicans won 60 of the 
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly despite 
winning only 48.6% of the two-party state-
wide vote; in 2014, they won 63 seats with 
only 52% of the state-wide vote. These 
results are way off from what we’d expect 
given the history of Wisconsin’s elections. 
And using this extremely unusual majority, 
Republicans in the legislature went on to pass 
a raft of controversial legislation, including 
(on party lines) a law eliminating 
investigations into political misconduct that 
had targeted associates of Scott Walker, the 
state’s Republican governor. 
Parties using super-majorities to pursue 
extreme agendas is unfortunate and wrong, 
but not hard to explain. After all, if legislators 
think their majorities are safe regardless of 
how you vote, why wouldn’t they think they 
have leeway to push the envelope? (A similar 
dynamic seems to be at work in Congress 
right now, where the wildly unpopular health 
care bill passed the House even with twenty 
Republicans defecting.) 
441 
  
In 2015, a group of Wisconsin voters sued to 
force the legislature to draw a less biased and 
more representative map. This was, in many 
ways, a gamble: no plaintiffs had taken a 
partisan-gerrymandering case to trial and 
won in more than three decades. But the 
plaintiffs broke that streak. (Plaintiffs in 
racial gerrymandering cases — which ask 
courts to determine whether mapmakers 
relied too heavily on race when drawing 
district lines — have historically had more 
success, including a major victory in North 
Carolina in May.) 
The trial court ruled that the assembly map 
was “an aggressive partisan gerrymander” 
that unconstitutionally guaranteed a 
Republican majority in the state assembly “in 
any likely electoral scenario,” violating both 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause (which, among other 
things, requires that all voters have an equal 
opportunity to participate in elections) and 
the First Amendment. In making their case to 
the court, the challengers pointed to strong 
evidence that the bias in the Wisconsin map 
wasn’t accidental, including documents 
showing how the mapmakers used advanced 
statistics to figure out how each district 
would vote and how they developed a string 
of maps that became increasingly biased in 
favor of Republicans with each iteration. The 
goal of the map, as one key document said, 
was to “determine who’s here 10 years from 
now.” The plaintiffs also relied on the results 
of the “efficiency gap,” a mathematical test 
that can flag maps that have a level of bias so 
high that it’s statistically unlikely that it’s 
random. 
Wisconsin argued that it was impossible to 
draw a less biased map because Democrats 
were clustered together while Republicans 
were spread around the state. The trial court 
found, however, that any clustering — to the 
extent it existed — couldn’t account for the 
map’s severe and durable levels of bias. 
If the Supreme Court agrees that Wisconsin’s 
gerrymander is unconstitutional, you could 
see substantial changes to redistricting. The 
ruling would open the door to challenges 
targeting other maps that have the same kind 
of extreme, lasting bias favoring one party 
that’s been seen in Wisconsin. A recent 
report by the Brennan Center shows there are 
roughly six congressional maps and nine or 
so state legislative maps like that right now. 
Challenges are already pending in North 
Carolina and Pennsylvania. More 
importantly, a win for the plaintiffs will 
change the rules of the game for the next 
round of redistricting in 2021. If legislators 
can no longer get a pass for drawing maps to 
maximize their party’s advantage, they’re 
less likely to try to do so. 
Changes in how legislators draw maps would 
likely have a major impact on how Congress 
and state legislatures look and act. For 
example, the same Brennan Center report 
shows that 16 to 17 Republican seats in the 
current House of Representatives are due to 
extremely biased maps. That’s a majority of 
the 24 seats Democrats would need to win to 
take back control of the House. With a 
different mix of legislators on the Hill, 
Congress’ legislative priorities could change. 
This all means that you could see the return 
of legislatures that more accurately mirror the 
diverse communities they represent, and 
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legislators that are more responsive to your 
concerns. When politicians can’t pick their 
voters and retreat to their safe seats, voters 
are back in charge. 
If, meanwhile, the Court rules in a way that 
gives partisan gerrymandering a greenlight, 
the battle against partisan abuses likely 
would shift from the courts to voters. In 
several states — including Michigan and 
Ohio — reformers are putting together ballot 
initiatives to turn redistricting over to 
independent commissions. But this solution 
isn’t available in every state, only 
underscoring the importance of the Court 
stepping in this fall to provide some new 
ground rules. 
Those rules will set the tone for American 
politics and elections for a generation and 
determine whether voters, rather than 
politicians, run our governments. It doesn’t 
get much more fundamental than that. 
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“Does Partisan Gerrymandering Violate the First Amendment?” 
 
Slate 
Mark Joseph Stern 
June 19, 2017 
 
On Monday morning, the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear Gill v. Whitford, a blockbuster 
case that could curb partisan gerrymandering 
throughout the United States. Shortly 
thereafter, the justices handed down two 
excellent decisions bolstering the First 
Amendment’s free speech protections for sex 
offenders and derogatory trademarks. While 
the link between these two rulings and 
Whitford isn’t obvious at first glance, it 
seems possible that both decisions could 
strengthen the gerrymandering plaintiffs’ 
central argument—and help to end extreme 
partisan redistricting for good. 
The first ruling, Matal v. Tam, involves “a 
dance-rock band” called the Slants that 
sought to trademark its name. Simon Tam, 
the founding member, chose the name 
precisely because of its offensive history, 
hoping to “reclaim” the term. (He and his 
fellow band members are Asian American.) 
But the Patent and Trademark Office refused 
to register the name, citing a federal law that 
bars the registration of trademarks that could 
“disparage … or bring … into contemp[t] or 
disrepute” any “persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.” 
(The same rule spurred the revocation of the 
Redskins’ trademark.) 
Every justice agreed that the anti-
disparagement law ran afoul of the First 
Amendment. They split, however, on the 
question of why, exactly, the rule violates the 
freedom of speech. Justice Samuel Alito, 
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts as well 
as Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen 
Breyer, applied the somewhat lenient test for 
commercial speech, which requires that a law 
be “narrowly drawn” to further “a substantial 
interest.” The trademark rule, Alito wrote, is 
ridiculously broad: It could apply to such 
theoretical trademarks as “Down with 
homophobes” (disparaging beliefs) and 
“James Buchanan was a disastrous president” 
(disparaging a person, “living or dead”). The 
law, then, “is not an anti-discrimination 
clause,” Alito concluded. It “is a happy-talk 
clause,” one that is far too sweeping to 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy perceived even 
more insidious censorship at play. In a 
concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena 
Kagan, Kennedy wrote that the measure in 
question constitutes “viewpoint 
discrimination”—an “egregious” form of 
speech suppression that is “presumptively 
unconstitutional.” Under the First 
Amendment, Kennedy explained, the 
government may not “singl[e]out a subset of 
messages for disfavor based on the views 
expressed,” even when the message is 
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conveyed “in the commercial context.” The 
anti-disparagement rule does exactly that, 
punishing an individual who wishes to 
trademark a name that the government finds 
offensive. “This is the essence of viewpoint 
discrimination,” Kennedy declared, and it 
cannot comport with the First Amendment. 
A similar rift opened up between the justices 
in the second free speech case of the day, 
Packingham v. North Carolina—another 
unanimous ruling with split opinions. (Justice 
Neil Gorsuch did not participate in either 
case, as oral arguments came before he was 
confirmed.) Packingham involved a North 
Carolina law that prohibited registered sex 
offenders from accessing any social media 
website, including Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
Twitter. The language of the statute is so 
sweeping that it also barred access to 
websites with commenting features such as 
Amazon and even the Washington Post. In 
essence, the law excludes sex offenders from 
the internet. North Carolina has used it to 
prosecute more than 1,000 people. 
 
Kennedy, joined by all four liberals, 
subjected the law to intermediate scrutiny, 
asking whether it “burden[s] substantially 
more speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.” He easily 
found that it did. The “Cyber Age is a 
revolution of historic proportions,” Kennedy 
wrote, and “social media users … engage in 
a wide array of protected First Amendment 
activity on topics as diverse as human 
thought.” Our interactions on the internet 
alter “how we think, express ourselves, and 
define who we want to be”; to “foreclose 
access to social media altogether is to prevent 
the user from engaging in the legitimate 
exercise of First Amendment rights.” The 
North Carolina law therefore suppresses too 
much expression and is thus in contravention 
of the Constitution. 
In his ode to social media, Kennedy 
proclaimed that the internet has become “the 
modern public square,” the 21st-century 
equivalent to those “public streets and parks” 
where the Framers hoped Americans would 
“speak and listen, and then, after reflection, 
speak and listen once more.” (Kennedy’s 
prose remains distinctive as ever.) In a 
concurrence, Alito, joined by Roberts and 
Thomas, rejected Kennedy’s public square 
theory as “loose,” “undisciplined,” and 
“unnecessary rhetoric” that elides 
“differences between cyberspace and the 
physical world.” The three conservatives 
agreed that the North Carolina law swept too 
far but insisted that Kennedy’s opinion 
granted sex offenders a dangerous amount of 
freedom on the web. 
So: What do these cases—both correctly 
decided, in my view—have to do with 
gerrymandering? 
To start, it’s important to view 
gerrymandering through a free speech lens, 
one developed by Kennedy himself in 2004. 
When the government draws districts 
designed to dilute votes cast on behalf of the 
minority party, it punishes voters on the basis 
of expression and association. To create an 
effective gerrymander, the state classifies 
individuals by their affiliation with political 
parties—a fundamental free speech 
activity—then diminishes their ability to 
elect their preferred representatives. 
Supporters of the minority party can still cast 
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ballots. But because of their political views, 
their votes are essentially meaningless. 
Kennedy has called this a “burden on 
representational rights.” It’s also something 
much simpler: viewpoint discrimination. In 
performing a partisan gerrymander, the 
government penalizes people who express 
support for a disfavored party—much like, in 
Tam, the government penalizes those who 
wish to trademark a disfavored phrase. Both 
state actions punish individuals on the basis 
of their viewpoints: If you back the minority 
party, your vote won’t matter; if you give 
your band an offensive name, you can’t 
trademark it. And even though neither action 
qualifies as outright censorship, both restrict 
“the public expression of ideas” that the First 
Amendment is meant to protect. 
Packingham also includes a subtler gift to the 
Whitford plaintiffs. In an aside, Kennedy 
compared the North Carolina law 
unfavorably to a Tennessee measure that bars 
campaigning within 100 feet of a polling 
place. Unlike the North Carolina law, 
Kennedy explained, the Tennessee statute 
“was enacted to protect another fundamental 
right—the right to vote.” 
Perhaps this passage is just more “loose 
rhetoric”—but I doubt it. Fundamental rights 
receive heightened protection under the 
Constitution. And although most Americans 
would probably agree that voting is a 
fundamental right, the Supreme Court has 
been cagey about saying so and inconsistent 
in safeguarding it. When the court upheld a 
voter ID law in 2008, for example, six 
justices paid lip service to the “right to vote” 
even as they shredded it; only the dissenting 
justices noted that the right is “fundamental” 
under the Constitution. Similarly, when the 
court’s conservatives gutted the Voting 
Rights Act in 2013, they did not call the right 
to vote “fundamental.” Instead, they 
celebrated the “fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty,” an archaic and 
discredited states’ rights doctrine. The upshot 
of that decision seemed to be that states’ 
rights are fundamental but voting rights are 
not. 
Kennedy voted to uphold the voter ID law 
and kneecap the Voting Rights Act. But the 
justice is always evolving, and his aside in 
Packingham reads to me like a renewed 
commitment to the franchise set in the free 
speech context. If so, that’s terrific news for 
opponents of partisan gerrymandering. Such 
gerrymandering limits an individual’s 
fundamental right to vote (by making her 
vote useless) on the basis of her viewpoint 
(that is, her support for a political party). In 
effect, the practice attaches unconstitutional 
conditions to both voting rights and free 
speech, putting many voters in a quandary: 
They can either muffle their political 
viewpoints and cast meaningful ballots or 
express their political viewpoints and cast 
meaningless ballots. The Constitution does 
not permit states to punish individuals for 
exercising their rights in this manner. 
Unfortunately, these tea leaves do not 
indicate inevitable doom for partisan 
gerrymandering. Kennedy recently indicated 
concern about judicial intervention into the 
redistricting process, and in the past he has 
questioned whether courts can accurately 
gauge which gerrymanders go too far. The 
Whitford challengers believe they have the 
right tool to measure partisan gerrymanders, 
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a mathematical formula called the efficiency 
gap. Nobody yet knows if Kennedy will 
agree, and the justice has sent mixed 
signals—it’s worth noting that he joined the 
court’s conservatives in voting to stay the 
lower court decision in Whitford while the 
justices consider the case. (The court had 
ordered Wisconsin to redraw its maps.) 
Still, Monday’s decision indicates that 
Kennedy and the court are, at the very least, 
moving in the right direction on the issues at 
the heart of partisan gerrymandering. Free 
expression and association aren’t really free 
if the government can punish you for your 
viewpoint by ensuring your ballot doesn’t 
matter; the right to vote isn’t fundamental if 
it can be diluted on the basis of political 
affiliation. The basic First Amendment 
principles Kennedy espoused on Monday 
explain why the court may well curtail 
partisan gerrymandering next term. In fact, 
they explain why the Constitution demands 
nothing less. 
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“Wisconsin Federal Court Permanently Blocks State Redistricting Plan” 
 
Urban Milwaukee 
January 27, 2017 
 
A three-judge panel in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin today 
permanently blocked the state’s redistricting 
plan that unconstitutionally denies voters the 
ability to elect lawmakers. This ruling by the 
court ensures that new, constitutional maps 
will be in place for the next state legislative 
elections. 
Whitford v. Gill is the first case in 30 years 
that has allowed a partisan gerrymander 
challenge to go to trial. The state will now 
decide whether to appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
The Campaign Legal Center (CLC) along 
with co-counsel represent lead plaintiff Bill 
Whitford and the other 11 plaintiffs in the 
case. Private counsel on the case includes 
Douglas M. Poland of Rathje & Woodward, 
LLC, Peter G. Earle, Michele L. Odorizzi of 
Mayer Brown and Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos of University of Chicago 
Law School. 
Should Whitford v. Gill reach the Supreme 
Court it will provide the nation’s highest 
court the opportunity to set a legal standard 
on partisan gerrymandering for the first time. 
CLC Director of Voting Rights and 
Redistricting Gerry Hebert released the 
following statement: 
“This is truly another monumental victory for 
the plaintiffs in this case and for all 
Wisconsin Voters. Today, the court made a 
clear statement that holding yet another 
unconstitutional election under Act 43 would 
cause significant harm to the voters. The 
Wisconsin legislature has continuously 
demonstrated a disregard for the rights of the 
voters and an inability to craft a fair, legal 
redistricting plan. In drawing a new plan, the 
legislature must put voters first, not partisan 
politics. Rest assured that our plaintiffs will 
continue to be involved in this process, 
monitoring the legislature’s actions and 
assuring that the new plan meets all the legal 
requirements.” 
Doug Poland, partner attorney at the law firm 
Rathje & Woodward, released the following 
statement: 
“The November 1 deadline means the 
legislature has plenty of time to hold hearings 
with broad participation from Wisconsin 
citizens,” said Doug Poland of the law firm 
Rathje & Woodward, who served as co-lead 
trial counsel. “There is no excuse for limiting 
participation by all interested parties to draw 
a fair map in an open and transparent process. 
The time for cloaking the process in secrecy 
has ended. The plaintiffs, their lawyers, and 
all of Wisconsin, are watching.”  
Bill Whitford, the lead plaintiff in the case, 
released the following statement: 
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“I’m very pleased with this decision. Today 
is a good day for Wisconsin voters, and 
another step in the journey of ensuring that 
our voices are heard. Now, we will be 
keeping a watchful eye on the state 
legislature as they draw the new maps and I 
ask them,  for the sake of our democracy, to 
put partisan politics aside and the interests of 
all voters first.” 
Dale Schultz, former Senate Majority Leader, 
released the following statement: 
“Wisconsin citizens deserve clarity, and 
potential candidates need to know what 
districts they would be running in,” said 
former Senate Majority Leader Dale Schultz 
(R-Richland Center), who co-chairs the Fair 
Elections Project. “The court is making the 
right decision to implement their verdict, and 
we are pleased that Wisconsin is on its way 
to having honest elections. I hope the 
Legislature chooses to conduct this new map-
drawing process in an open, transparent 
manner, heeding the concerns of multiple 
federal panels.” 
Sachin Chheda, Director of the Fair Elections 
Project, released the following statement: 
“Yet again, the federal courts have ruled 
clearly – Wisconsin’s district maps are an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, they 
violate the rights of millions of Wisconsin 
citizens, and it’s time to move ahead and 
draw new maps,” said Sachin Chheda, 
Director of the Fair Elections Project, which 
helped organize the lawsuit. “This is a victory 
for democracy and we look forward to a 
process to draw these maps that engage the 
community and invite public participation. 
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Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute 
16-980 
Ruling Below: A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699 (C.A.6 (Ohio), 2016) 
Organizations and an individual brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Ohio 
Secretary of State, alleging violations of National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA), relating to state's process for removing inactive registrants from 
state's registered voter rolls and state's confirmation notice for registrants whose residence had 
changed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, George C. Smith, J., 
denied plaintiffs' request for permanent injunction and entered judgment for Secretary. Plaintiffs 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 
Question Presented: Whether 52 U.S.C. § 20507 permits Ohio's list-maintenance process, 
which uses a registered voter's voter inactivity as a reason to send a confirmation notice to that 
voter under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. 
 
A. Philip Randolph Institute; Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless; Larry Harmon, 
Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
Jon Husted, Secretary of State, Defendant–Appellee. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 
Decided on September 23, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
CLAY, Circuit Judge. 
  
The A. Philip Randolph Institute (“APRI”), 
the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the 
Homeless (“NEOCH”), and Larry Harmon 
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit seeking to 
enjoin the defendant, Ohio Secretary of State 
Jon Husted (“the Secretary”), from removing 
the names of registered voters from Ohio's 
voter rolls pursuant to the state's so-called 
Supplemental Process, which Plaintiffs 
allege violates the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), and the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”). 
Plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring 
the Secretary either to reinstate otherwise 
eligible voters who were improperly removed 
from the rolls pursuant to the Supplemental 
Process, or to count provisional ballots cast 
by such persons. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged 
that the change-of-address confirmation 
notices mailed to voters as part of the 
Supplemental Process fail to meet the 
standards for such notices set out in the 
NVRA. Before us is Plaintiffs' appeal from 
the district court's order denying Plaintiffs' 
request for a permanent injunction and 
directing entry of judgment in favor of the 
Secretary. For the reasons set forth below, we 
REVERSE the district court's judgment and 
REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
BACKGROUND 
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Factual History 
 
In addition to maintaining procedures for 
removing the names of the deceased, those 
who have been adjudicated incompetent, and 
convicted felons from its voter rolls, Ohio 
utilizes two processes for identifying and 
purging from the rolls voters who are no 
longer eligible to vote because they have 
moved outside their county of registration. 
The first is Ohio's “NCOA Process,” under 
which the Secretary's office compares the 
names and addresses contained in Ohio's 
Statewide Voter Registration Database to the 
National Change of Address (“NCOA”) 
database. “The NCOA database contains 
names and addresses of individuals who have 
filed changes of address with the United 
States Postal Service.” The Secretary 
thereafter provides each county's Board of 
Elections (“BOE”) with a list of voters 
registered therein who appear to have *703 
moved, based on the comparison of the two 
databases. The BOEs then “send[ ] a 
confirmation notice ... to each individual 
identified.” That notice is a postage prepaid 
forwardable form on which the voter must 
indicate whether he or she still lives at the 
same address. Recipients of the notice are 
removed from the rolls if they: (1) do not 
respond to the confirmation notice or update 
their registration; and (2) do not subsequently 
vote during a period of four consecutive years 
that includes two federal elections. 
 
Ohio's so-called “Supplemental Process” is 
the second method the state uses for 
identifying and removing from the rolls 
voters who are no longer eligible to vote due 
to a change of residence. The Supplemental 
Process is largely identical to the NCOA 
Process, except in the way it begins: rather 
than identifying voters who may have moved 
by reference to the NCOA database, each 
county's BOE compiles a list of registered 
voters who have not engaged in any “voter 
activity” for two years. For the purposes of 
the Supplemental Process, “voter activity” 
includes “filing a change of address” with a 
designated state agency; “filing a voter 
registration card with the [BOE]; ... casting 
an absentee ballot; casting a provisional 
ballot; [or] voting on election day.” After 
compiling a list of inactive voters, each BOE 
sends a confirmation notice to those on its 
list. As with the NCOA Process, voters sent a 
confirmation notice are removed from the 
rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four 
years and fail to either respond to the notice 
or re-register. In sum, under the 
Supplemental Process, a voter is purged from 
the rolls after six years of inactivity—even if 
he or she did not move and otherwise remains 
eligible to vote. 
 
When this litigation began, the confirmation 
notices sent to voters pursuant to both the 
NCOA Process and Supplemental Process 
required that voters provide their name, 
current Ohio address, date of birth, and either 
their Ohio driver's license number, their 
Social Security number, or a copy of a 
document verifying their identity and 
address. The notices required that voters 
provide such information regardless of 
whether they had changed address or were 
merely confirming that they still lived at the 
same address. Moreover, the notices did not 
adequately inform voters of the consequences 
of failing to respond to the notice; rather, the 
form indicated that the recipient's registration 
“may” be canceled if he or she did not 
respond, re-register, or vote in the next four 
years. Finally, the form failed to inform 
voters who had moved outside of Ohio on 
how they could remain eligible to vote in 
their new state. 
As discussed below, the Secretary issued a 
new confirmation notice form during the 
pendency of this litigation. On the newly 
issued form, voters can confirm that they 
451 
  
have not changed address by simply signing, 
dating, and returning the postage prepaid 
form. The new form also provides voters with 
the dates by which they must either return the 
form or vote in order to remain registered. 
Notably, however, the new form still lacks 
information on how persons who have moved 
to another state can register to vote in their 
new state. 
 
Procedural History 
 
This case began with two letters sent by 
NEOCH and APRI to the Secretary in 
December 2015 and February 2016, 
respectively. Both letters asserted that Ohio's 
Supplemental Process violated Section 8 of 
the NVRA. Not long after sending their 
letters, APRI and NEOCH representatives 
began meeting with the Secretary in an 
attempt to resolve their concerns without 
litigation. Those meetings failed to produce 
results, causing Plaintiffs to file this suit in 
federal district court on April 6, 2016. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged two causes of 
action relevant to this appeal: first, that the 
Supplemental Process unlawfully removes 
registered voters from the rolls due to their 
failure to vote in violation of Section 8, 
subsection (b)(2) of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 
20507(b)(2); and second, that the 
confirmation notices sent to voters under 
both the NCOA Process and the 
Supplemental Process fail to meet the 
standards for such forms set out in the 
NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(2). 
 
The day after filing their complaint, Plaintiffs 
moved for a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) prohibiting the Secretary from 
“removing eligible Ohio voters from the 
voter rolls on account of their failure to vote 
pursuant to Ohio's ‘Supplemental Process.’ ” 
Plaintiffs' motion also requested a 
preliminary injunction compelling the 
Secretary to reinstate voters already removed 
from the rolls pursuant to the Supplemental 
Process. Four days later, Plaintiffs agreed to 
withdraw their request for a TRO in exchange 
for the Secretary's agreement not to initiate 
the Supplemental Process prior to July 1, 
2016. A week after Plaintiffs filed their 
complaint, the parties agreed to engage in 
limited discovery and to address all the 
dispositive issues in the case through 
simultaneous briefing. The parties filed their 
briefs in May and June of 2016, with 
Plaintiffs styling their briefs as memoranda 
supporting motions for summary judgment 
and a preliminary injunction. On June 17, 
2016—the day the parties' final briefs were 
due before the district court—the Secretary 
issued a directive requiring BOEs to use a 
new version of the confirmation notice form. 
As discussed above, that new form corrected 
all but one of Plaintiffs' alleged deficiencies. 
On June 29, 2016, the district court issued an 
order denying Plaintiffs' motions for 
summary judgment and a preliminary 
injunction; the order directed entry of 
judgment in favor of the Secretary. 
Addressing the parties' arguments under 
permanent injunction standards, the court 
began by rejecting Plaintiffs' arguments that 
the Supplemental Process violates the NVRA 
and the HAVA. The court held that because 
Section 8 of the NVRA does not explicitly 
dictate what information states may or must 
use as a “trigger” for sending a confirmation 
notice, that decision was impliedly left to the 
states. The court also concluded that the 
Supplemental Process does not violate the 
NVRA and the HAVA's prohibition on 
removing voters from the rolls solely by 
reason of their failure to vote because such 
removal occurs only after a voter has failed 
to vote and failed to respond to a 
confirmation notice. 
Turning to the Plaintiffs' arguments 
regarding the legality of Ohio's confirmation 
notice form, the district court first noted the 
Secretary's promise that his newly issued 
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form would be used during the upcoming 
voter roll purges. Relying on that promise, 
the court held that the Secretary's voluntary 
cessation of illegal activity was sufficient to 
moot Plaintiffs' challenges to the 
confirmation notice form. Finally, the court 
rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the newly 
issued form still violated 52 U.S.C. § 
20507(d)(2)(B) by failing to provide those 
who have moved out of Ohio with 
information on how to stay registered. The 
court held that this argument was waived 
because Plaintiffs' briefing failed to raise the 
argument, and that the argument failed on the 
merits in any event because it “defies logic” 
that the NVRA would require local registrars 
to “coach” voters on how to register in a 
different state. Thus having rejected all of 
Plaintiffs' arguments on the merits, the 
district court held that no preliminary 
injunction was warranted and that judgment 
should be entered for the Secretary.4 
Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal the 
following day. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The parties agree that there are no disputes 
regarding the facts recounted above, and that 
the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' request 
for an injunction was based solely on its 
interpretation of the NVRA and the HAVA. 
“When reviewing the decision of a district 
court to grant or to deny a request for 
issuance of a permanent injunction, ... legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo.” We also 
review de novo the district court's conclusion 
that some of Plaintiffs' claims are now moot. 
  
Analysis 
I. Plaintiffs' Challenge to Ohio's 
Supplemental Process 
 
Congress' stated purposes in enacting the 
NVRA were, inter alia, “to establish 
procedures that will increase the number of 
eligible citizens who register to vote in 
elections for Federal office; ... [and] to ensure 
that accurate and current voter registration 
rolls are maintained.” “These purposes 
counterpose two general, sometimes 
conflicting, mandates: To expand and 
simplify voter registration processes so that 
more individuals register and participate in 
federal elections, while simultaneously 
ensuring that voter lists include only eligible 
... voters.” Those sometimes conflicting 
mandates are reflected in the language of 
Section 8 of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507, 
which is where our analysis must begin. 
Importantly, Section 8's language pairs the 
mandate that states maintain accurate voter 
rolls with multiple constraints on how the 
states may go about doing so. 
 
Those constraints begin with subsection (a) 
of Section 8, which states that “[i]n the 
administration of voter registration for 
elections for Federal office, each State shall 
... provide that the name of a registrant may 
not be removed from the official list of 
eligible voters except” under certain 
circumstances. The Act then provides an 
exhaustive list of circumstances justifying 
removal: “criminal conviction or mental 
incapacity as provided by state law, the death 
of the registrant, or ... a change of the 
registrant's residence.” This case concerns 
the final circumstance justifying removal—
change of residence—which is subject to its 
own mandate and accompanying constraints. 
Subsection (a)(4) of Section 8 requires that 
states “conduct a general program that makes 
a reasonable effort to remove the names of 
ineligible voters from the official lists of 
eligible voters by reason of ... a change in the 
residence of the registrant;” the Act thereafter 
specifies that any such program must be 
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conducted “in accordance with subsections 
(b), (c), and (d).” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(B). 
Subsection (b) provides two additional 
constraints on states' discretion. First, all roll 
maintenance procedures must “be uniform, 
nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Second, and 
more pertinent to this appeal, subsection 
(b)(2) provides that roll maintenance 
procedures “shall not result in the removal of 
the name of any person from the official list 
of voters registered to vote in an election for 
Federal office by reason of the person's 
failure to vote.” This language from 
subsection (b)(2) was later modified by the 
HAVA, which appended the following clause 
to the general prohibition on removal by 
reason of failure to vote: 
 
... except that nothing in this paragraph may 
be construed to prohibit a State from using 
the procedures described in subsections (c) 
and (d) to remove an individual from the 
official list of eligible voters if the 
individual— 
 
(A) has not either notified the applicable 
registrar (in person or in writing) or 
responded during the period described in 
subparagraph (B) to the notice sent by the 
applicable registrar; and then 
 
(B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or 
more consecutive general elections for 
Federal office. 
 
By the HAVA's own terms, however, this 
language is not to “be construed to authorize 
or require conduct prohibited under ... or to 
supersede, restrict, or limit the application of 
... [the NVRA].”  
 
Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 8 provide 
two final constraints on states' roll 
maintenance procedures. First, subsection 
(c)(2)(A) provides that “any program the 
purpose of which is to systematically remove 
the names of ineligible voters from the 
official list of eligible voters” must be 
completed “not later than 90 days prior to the 
date of a primary or general election for 
Federal office.” Second, subsection (d)(1) 
establishes that states “shall not remove the 
name of a registrant from the official list of 
eligible voters in elections for Federal office 
on the ground that the registrant has changed 
residence” without first subjecting the 
registrant to the confirmation notice 
procedure outlined in that subsection. That 
mandatory confirmation notice procedure is 
the one described above as the final step of 
Ohio's NCOA Process and Supplemental 
Process: a forwardable postage prepaid and 
pre-addressed form is sent to a voter, and the 
voter is removed from the rolls if (1) he or she 
does not respond to the confirmation notice 
or update his or her registration, and (2) he or 
she does not subsequently vote during a 
period of four consecutive years that includes 
two federal elections.  
 
Finally, we note that in subsection (c)(1) of 
Section 8, Congress provided states with an 
example of a procedure for identifying and 
removing voters who had changed residence 
that would comply with the NVRA's 
mandates and accompanying constraints. 
That subsection provides that “[a] State may 
meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) by 
establishing a program under which” voters 
who appear to have moved based on 
information contained in the NCOA database 
are sent subsection (d) confirmation notices. 
The parties do not dispute that Ohio's NCOA 
Process mirrors this so-called “safe-harbor” 
procedure and that the NCOA Process is thus 
permissible under the NVRA. 
 
The focus of this case, therefore, is Ohio's 
Supplemental Process. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs argue that the Supplemental 
Process violates the clause of subsection 
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(b)(2)—hereinafter referred to as the 
“prohibition clause”—prohibiting roll 
maintenance processes that “result in the 
removal of the name of any person from the 
official list of voters registered to vote in an 
election for Federal office by reason of the 
person's failure to vote.” The Secretary 
responds that the Supplemental Process is 
permitted by the exception to subsection 
(b)(2)'s prohibition clause added by the 
HAVA—hereinafter referred to as the 
“except clause”—which states: “... except 
that nothing in this paragraph may be 
construed to prohibit a State from using the 
procedures described in subsections (c) and 
(d).” The legality of Ohio's Supplemental 
Process can therefore be boiled down to two 
questions: whether the Process is expressly 
permitted by subsection (b)(2)'s except 
clause; and, if not, whether the Supplemental 
Process violates that subsection's prohibition 
clause. 
 
A. The Supplemental Process is not 
expressly permitted by subsection (b)(2)'s 
except clause 
 
Turning to the first operative question, it 
bears repeating that the Supplemental 
Process fully incorporates subsection (d)'s 
confirmation notice procedure. Certainly, 
under the except clause's plain language, such 
incorporation is permissible even though the 
confirmation notice procedure itself involves 
consideration of a registrant's failure to vote. 
But that conclusion does not end our 
inquiry—the Supplemental Process does not 
only employ subsection (d)'s confirmation 
notice procedure. Rather, under the 
Supplemental Process, the confirmation 
notice procedure is “triggered” by a 
registrant's failure to engage in any “voter 
activity” for two years. We must therefore 
determine whether that trigger provision 
should be analyzed separately from the 
confirmation notice procedure, such that the 
trigger is subject to the prohibition clause; or, 
in the alternative, whether the Supplemental 
Process' incorporation of the confirmation 
notice procedure means that the entire 
Process—including the trigger—is permitted 
under the except clause. 
 
The Secretary advocates for the second of 
these two positions. He states, for example, 
that “[t]he language that a cancellation ‘shall 
not result’ from a ‘failure to vote’ ‘except’ 
when coupled with the failure to ‘respond[ ]’ 
to an address-confirmation inquiry authorizes 
the Ohio Supplemental Process.” The 
operative language in this argument is the 
phrase “when coupled with,” by which the 
Secretary implies that a process resulting in 
removal by reason of failure to vote is 
nevertheless permitted by the except clause 
so long as it is “coupled with” the procedures 
outlined in subsection (d). We note, however, 
that neither the phrase “when coupled with,” 
nor any comparable language, appears in the 
except clause's text. The Secretary's 
argument is therefore flawed insofar as it 
requires us to “read[ ] a phrase into the statute 
when Congress has left it out.” 
 
Moreover, the Secretary's reading of the 
except clause would require us to ignore the 
traditional rule of statutory construction 
dictating that exceptions to a statute's general 
rules be construed narrowly. Contrary to that 
general rule, the Secretary would have us 
adopt an expansive interpretation of the 
except clause under which states can not only 
“us[e] the procedures described in 
subsections (c) and (d),” rather, under the 
Secretary's interpretation, use of those 
procedures would render states' processes 
completely immune to the general rule that 
the except clause modifies. We decline to 
adopt this interpretation, and instead err on 
the side of giving maximum effect to the 
prohibition clause's general rule.  
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Further counseling against the Secretary's 
interpretation is the fact that reading “when 
coupled with” into the except clause would 
reduce the prohibition clause to mere 
surplusage. That is because the plain 
language of subsection (d)(1) provides that 
processes for removing voters based on 
change in residence must incorporate 
subsection (d)'s confirmation notice 
procedure. In other words, it is required that 
such processes be “coupled with” subsection 
(d)'s procedure. Thus, under the Secretary's 
interpretation, subsection (b)(2)'s prohibition 
clause would serve no purpose because all 
state procedures would necessarily be 
permitted by the except clause by virtue of 
their (mandatory) incorporation of the 
confirmation notice procedure. This reading 
of the NVRA would contravene the Supreme 
Court's repeated insistence that “a statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to 
all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous.” 
 
The Secretary responds that his interpretation 
does not reduce the prohibition clause to 
surplusage because when read together, the 
prohibition and except clauses constitute a 
single “belt-and-suspenders” rule that merely 
“explains what is permitted and what is 
prohibited by describing both sides of the 
same coin.” In other words, the Secretary 
would have us hold that subsection (b)(2) 
only prohibits processes that do not 
incorporate the confirmation notice 
procedure, and that the except clause simply 
reinforces that prohibition by expressly 
“permitt[ing]” use of the confirmation notice 
and safe-harbor procedures. But this 
argument once again ignores the fact that 
subsection (d)(1) already mandates that “[a] 
State shall not remove the name of a 
registrant from the official list of voters” 
without performing the confirmation notice 
procedure. We decline to read subsection 
(b)(2) as a mere reiteration of that mandate. 
Perhaps more importantly, we find that the 
Secretary's “belt-and-suspenders” argument 
ignores the NVRA's plain language: 
subsection (b)(2)'s clauses are not written as 
alternative presentations of the same rule; 
rather, those clauses explicitly establish a 
general rule with a proviso. 
 
The Secretary also argues that the Senate and 
House reports accompanying the NVRA 
justify his interpretation of the except clause. 
Those reports both state, in pertinent part: 
 
    Almost all states now employ some 
procedure for updating lists at least once 
every two years, though practices may vary 
somewhat from county to county. About one-
fifth of the states canvass all voters on the list. 
The rest of the states do not contact all voters, 
but instead target only those who did not vote 
in the most recent election (using not voting 
as an indication that an individual might have 
moved). Of these, only a handful of states 
simply drop the non-voters from the list 
without notice. These states could not 
continue this practice under [the NVRA]. 
 
This passage in the reports, the Secretary 
argues, suggests that subsection (b)(2)'s 
prohibition is intended to invalidate only 
those state processes that “simply drop the 
non-voters from the list without notice.” Id. 
Thus, the argument goes, the reports indicate 
that the except clause permits any process 
that incorporates subsection (d)'s 
confirmation notice procedure. 
 
This argument is problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, we may only look to the 
legislative history of a statute to “explain the 
meaning and purpose of a provision whose 
text is genuinely ambiguous.” As discussed 
above, the unambiguous language of Section 
8 requires rejecting the Secretary's 
interpretation, lest we be forced to 
simultaneously write new language into, and 
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essentially excise language out of, the 
NVRA. But even if we did conclude that the 
NVRA's language is ambiguous, we would 
find little solace in the even more ambiguous 
language of the congressional reports on 
which the Secretary relies. Not only is the 
above-quoted passage from the congressional 
reports internally unclear as to which of the 
practices described therein is prohibited 
under the NVRA, the passage does not 
purport to provide an exhaustive list of 
processes that subsection (b)(2) was designed 
to prohibit. 
 
Based on the above, we reject the Secretary's 
contention that the Supplemental Process' 
incorporation of subsection (d)'s 
confirmation notice procedure means that the 
entire Supplemental Process is automatically 
permitted under the except clause. That 
interpretation of the NVRA would require us 
to improperly ignore “the language and 
design of the statute as a whole.” We further 
conclude that the only reasonable reading of 
the NVRA is that any part of a state's roll 
maintenance process that does not mimic the 
expressly permitted procedures outlined in 
subsections (c) or (d)—in this case, the 
Supplemental Process' two-year “trigger” 
provision—is subject to subsection (b)(2)'s 
prohibition clause. 
 
B. The Supplemental Process violates 
subsection (b)(2)'s prohibition clause 
 
Having concluded that we must focus our 
analysis on the Supplemental Process' two-
year trigger provision, we turn to the second 
dispositive question in this case: whether that 
trigger provision “result[s]” in removal by 
reason of failure to vote. We typically 
“proceed from the understanding that unless 
otherwise defined, statutory terms are 
generally interpreted in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning.” “Webster's dictionary 
defines ‘result’ as ‘to proceed or arise as a 
consequence, effect, or conclusion.’ ” 
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. 
Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 
2002). In this case, the Supplemental Process' 
trigger provision explicitly uses a person's 
failure to engage in any “voter activity”—
which includes voting—for two years as the 
“trigger” for sending a confirmation notice. 
Under the ordinary meaning of “result,” the 
Supplemental Process would violate the 
prohibition clause because removal of a voter 
“proceed[s] or arise[s] as a consequence” of 
his or her failure to vote. 
 
As noted by the Secretary and the district 
court, however, subsection (b)(2)'s 
prohibition clause appears to have been given 
a more narrow interpretation by the HAVA. 
Passed in 2002, the HAVA created an 
“independent ... requirement [that states] 
maintain an accurate list of eligible voters.” 
In connection with that requirement, the 
HAVA requires states to implement 
 
    [a] system of file maintenance that makes 
a reasonable effort to remove registrants who 
are ineligible to vote from the official list of 
eligible voters. Under such system, consistent 
with the National Voter Registration Act of 
1993, registrants who have not responded to 
a notice and who have not voted in 2 
consecutive general elections for Federal 
office shall be removed from the official list 
of eligible voters, except that no registrant 
may be removed solely by reason of a failure 
to vote. 
 
This section of the HAVA, the Secretary 
argues, restates the NVRA's prohibition and 
except clauses “in slightly different words” 
and in so doing suggests that subsection 
(b)(2)'s prohibition on consideration of 
failure to vote only operates to prohibit state 
processes that remove registrants from the 
rolls “solely” by reason of their failure to 
vote. 
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In the end, however, this language from the 
HAVA does not change our analysis because 
operation of the Supplemental Process' 
trigger is ultimately based “solely” on a 
person's failure to vote. This is so, 
notwithstanding the fact that the 
Supplemental Process includes voting as one 
of several types of “voter activity” in which a 
voter must fail to engage in order to trigger 
the sending of a confirmation notice. We 
must assume not only that Congress intended 
the prohibition clause to play some role in the 
NVRA's statutory scheme, but also that 
Congress intended the prohibition to be more 
than a paper tiger. But the clause would have 
no teeth at all if states could circumvent it by 
simply including “voting” in a disjunctive list 
of activities in which a registrant must fail to 
engage in order to “trigger” the confirmation 
notice procedure. In more concrete terms, a 
state cannot avoid the conclusion that its 
process results in removal “solely by reason 
of a failure to vote,” by providing that the 
confirmation notice procedure is triggered by 
a registrant's failure either to vote or to climb 
Mt. Everest or to hit a hole-in-one. 
 
For his part, the Secretary reiterates that the 
Supplemental Process incorporates 
subsection (d)'s requirement that the voter 
must fail to respond to a confirmation notice 
before that voter can be removed from the 
rolls. He thereafter argues that the Process' 
incorporation of that failure-to-respond 
requirement insures that voters are never 
removed “solely” for failure to vote. But this 
argument merely rehashes the one we 
rejected above—that a state's process for 
identifying and removing voters who have 
changed residence comports with subsection 
(b)(2)'s prohibition clause so long as it 
incorporates subsection (d)'s confirmation 
notice procedure. This interpretation of the 
NVRA would render the prohibition clause 
entirely superfluous because subsection 
(d)(1) already requires states to use the 
confirmation notice procedure. Once again, 
we decline “to adopt an interpretation of a 
congressional enactment which renders 
superfluous another portion of that same 
law.”  
 
Finally, we note that the parties' arguments 
and the district court's order raise two 
additional questions: (1) whether processes 
for identifying and removing from *712 the 
rolls voters who have changed residence 
must have provisions that “trigger” 
subsection (d)'s confirmation notice 
procedure; and (2) what the NVRA and the 
HAVA have to say, if anything, about the 
form such “triggers” can or cannot take. 
While these questions are undoubtedly 
important, we need not answer them in order 
to hold that Ohio's Supplemental Process is 
impermissible under the NVRA. Regardless 
of whether “trigger” provisions are required, 
and regardless of what forms such “triggers” 
can or cannot take, it is clear that the 
Supplemental Process does include a trigger, 
and that that trigger constitutes perhaps the 
plainest possible example of a process that 
“result[s] in” removal of a voter from the rolls 
by reason of his or her failure to vote. We 
therefore hold that Ohio's Supplemental 
Process violates Section 8, subsection (b)(2) 
of the NVRA. 
 
II. Plaintiffs' Challenge to Ohio's 
Confirmation Notice Form 
 
Below, the district court held: (1) that 
Plaintiffs' challenges to Ohio's confirmation 
notice form were mooted by the Secretary's 
adoption of a new form that addressed all but 
one of Plaintiffs' concerns; and (2) that 
Plaintiffs' remaining challenge to the form—
that it fails to provide out-of-state voters with 
information on how to remain registered—is 
not supported by Section 8's statutory 
language. We address these holdings in turn. 
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A. Mootness 
 
Claims become moot “when the issues 
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties 
lack a legally cognizable interest in the 
outcome.” Generally, “voluntary cessation of 
allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the 
tribunal of power to hear and determine the 
case, i.e., does not make the case moot.” 
However, a narrow exception to that general 
rule exists in cases where a defendant 
claiming that its voluntary compliance moots 
a case successfully carries “the formidable 
burden of showing that it is absolutely clear 
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not 
reasonably be expected to recur.” We have 
stated that it is a “rare instance” in which this 
standard will be met.  
 
The Secretary argues that because he is a 
governmental actor, we should defer to his 
assurances that his recent changes to the 
confirmation notice form are permanent. 
Although it is true that “cessation of the 
allegedly illegal conduct by government 
officials has been treated with more 
solicitude by the courts than similar action by 
private parties,” such solicitude does not 
carry much of an official's burden of 
demonstrating that “there is no reasonable 
expectation ... that the alleged violation will 
recur.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
declined to defer to a governmental actor's 
voluntary cessation, even where that 
cessation occurred pursuant to legislative 
process. 
 
Nevertheless, apparently relying on such 
solicitude, the district court held that 
Plaintiffs' claims were moot because “[t]here 
is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant 
does not plan to use this Revised Notice in 
2016 or at any other point in the future.” We 
note as an initial matter, however, that this 
holding gets it backwards: Plaintiffs were not 
required to produce evidence suggesting that 
the Secretary planned on reengaging in the 
allegedly illegal behavior after resolution of 
the case. Rather, it was—and remains—the 
Secretary's “formidable burden” of “showing 
that it is absolutely clear the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 
expected to recur.” The Secretary has failed 
to meet that burden in this case. 
 
To begin, the new confirmation notice form 
was issued pursuant to the Secretary's 
“directive,” rather than any legislative 
process. Thus, this is not a case in which 
reversing the cessation would be particularly 
burdensome. Indeed, it appears from the 
record that the confirmation notice form is 
revised on a relatively frequent basis—at 
least four times in the last nine years, not 
counting the most recent revision. And 
because the Ohio Secretary of State is an 
elected official, there remains a distinct 
possibility that a future Secretary will be less 
inclined to maintain the confirmation notice 
in its current form. Finally, we note that the 
circumstances of the Secretary's issuance of 
the new form do not inspire confidence in his 
assurances regarding the likelihood of 
recurrence—he issued that new form on the 
same day as the parties' final merits briefs 
were due before the district court, attaching 
the form as an exhibit to his brief and only 
then presenting his mootness argument. This 
fact makes the Secretary's voluntary 
cessation appear less genuine.  
 
Given these facts, we conclude that the 
Secretary has not carried his burden of 
showing that it is “absolutely clear the 
allegedly wrongful behavior could not 
reasonably be expected to recur.” Plaintiffs' 
challenges to the confirmation notice 
therefore have not been rendered moot by the 
new form. Even if we felt differently about 
the possibility of recurrence, however, that 
alone would not render Plaintiffs' request for 
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an injunction moot. A claim becomes moot 
only if “interim relief or events have 
completely and irrevocably eradicated the 
effects of the alleged violation.” As Plaintiffs 
note, the Secretary's newly-issued form does 
nothing to correct the fact that Ohio has, for 
years, been removing voters from the rolls 
because they failed to respond to forms that 
are blatantly non-compliant with the NVRA. 
Thus, in any event, the new form could not 
render all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief moot. 
  
B. Merits 
 
The final question before us concerns the 
merits of Plaintiffs' remaining challenge to 
the newly issued confirmation notice form. 
Plaintiffs argue that the form does not comply 
with the NVRA's mandate, contained in 
subsection (d)(2)(B) of Section 8, that “[i]f 
the registrant has changed residence to a 
place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in 
which the registrant is registered,” any 
confirmation notice sent to that voter must 
provide “information concerning how the 
registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.” 
Plaintiffs assert that the newly issued form 
violates this provision because it does not 
provide Ohio registrants who have moved out 
of state with information on how to re-
register in their new state. This requirement 
could be satisfied, Plaintiffs contend, by 
simply modifying the confirmation notice to 
direct the recipient to the Federal Election 
Assistance Commission's website, on which 
the recipient will find “instructions and 
guidance for voter registration in all states.”  
 
Below, the district court held that it “defies 
logic that the NVRA would saddle the 
various secretaries of state (or their 
equivalents) with the onerous burden of 
coaching out-of-state residents through the 
registration process in their new states of 
residence.” In support of this assertion, the 
court noted that the subsection on which 
Plaintiffs' argument is based provides that 
states must supply registrants with 
information on how to “continue” to be 
eligible to vote. Without much additional 
analysis, the district court proclaimed that the 
word “continue” necessarily means 
“continue to vote within that State—not 
register in another state.” The Secretary's 
arguments on appeal buttress this conclusion 
by arguing that “[n]o voter can ‘continue to 
be eligible’ to vote by moving from Ohio to 
Michigan, ... [r]ather, the new Michigander 
must become a newly registered Michigan 
voter.”  
 
We find this argument unavailing. To begin, 
subsection (d)(2)(B)'s plain language 
contains no intra-state limitation. Instead, 
that subsection provides that information on 
how to continue to be eligible to vote must be 
presented to anyone who “has changed 
residence to a place outside the registrar's 
jurisdiction.” The “outside the registrar's 
jurisdiction” language is the part of 
subsection (b)(2)(B)'s mandate that 
establishes its geographic applicability—had 
Congress intended to place geographic 
limitations on the mandate, it would have 
done so with this language rather than relying 
on a counterintuitive definition of the word 
“continue.” Moreover, that word—
“continue”—must be accorded its ordinary 
meaning. “Continue” means to “keep up or 
maintain esp[ecially] without interruption a 
particular condition.” Certainly, a registrant 
can “keep up or maintain ... without 
interruption,” id. her condition of being 
“eligible to vote,” regardless of whether she 
must fully re-register or merely confirm her 
new address. 
 
Further weighing against the Secretary's 
interpretation of subsection (d)(2)(B)—
whereby “continuing” to vote excludes 
situations in which voters must fully re-
register—is the fact that some states require 
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voters to fully re-register even when they 
move to a new jurisdiction within the same 
state. Indeed, the 2007 version of Ohio's 
confirmation notice form suggests that Ohio 
itself once required voters who moved 
between counties to fully re-register. Under 
the Secretary's reasoning, intra-state movers 
subject to such re-registration requirements 
would not be entitled to “information 
concerning how [they] can continue to be 
eligible to vote,” because the requirement 
that they re-register means that they are not 
“continuing” to be eligible to vote. Not only 
would this outcome completely defeat the 
purpose of subsection (d)(2)(B)'s mandate in 
states with re-registration requirements, it 
would contradict the Secretary and district 
court's own conclusion that the word 
“continue” operates to free states of 
subsection (b)(2)(B)'s mandate with regard to 
out-of-state movers only. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the district court 
erred by holding that Plaintiffs' claims 
regarding Ohio's confirmation notice are 
moot, and that the court erred by concluding 
that Ohio need not provide out-of-state 
movers with information on how they can 
continue to be eligible to vote. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE 
the district court's judgment and REMAND 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
CONCURRING IN PART AND 
DISSENTING IN PART 
 
SILER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and 
concurring in part. 
Because of the urgency of this issue and the 
need to allow the Supreme Court to consider 
it, I write the dissent/concurrence in 
condensed fashion. It does not reflect the 
extent to which I disagree with the majority 
opinion, although I respect it. 
I commend the Secretary for issuing a new 
confirmation notice form during the 
pendency of this litigation. In all aspects of 
the law, except for directions on how the 
voter can continue his registration, it 
complies with the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). 
Both sides agree that the language of the 
NVRA is unambiguous. “If the words of the 
statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry 
is at an end, and the plain meaning of the text 
must be enforced.” 
  
This seems to be a much simpler process than 
as outlined in the majority opinion. The 
Secretary has established a Supplemental 
Process for purging voters from the voting 
rolls in Ohio. The key language in the statute 
attacked by the plaintiffs is from 52 U.S.C. § 
20507(b)(2), which directs that States shall 
not remove “the name of any person from the 
official list of voters registered to vote in an 
election for Federal office by reason of the 
person's failure to vote.” However, that same 
subsection allows a State to use “the 
procedures described in subsections (c) and 
(d) to remove an individual from the official 
list of eligible voters” under certain 
circumstances. That subsection indicates that 
if the voter: 
 
(A) has not either notified the applicable 
registrar (in person or in writing) or 
responded during the period described in 
subparagraph (B) to the notice sent by the 
applicable registrar; and then 
 
(B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or 
more consecutive general elections for 
Federal office,  
 
then subsection (d) provides how States may 
cancel registrations of those who may have 
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changed addresses. Id. It provides that the 
registrant should not be removed from the list 
of voters unless he or she confirms that he or 
she has changed residence or has failed to 
respond to a notice described in paragraph (2) 
and has not voted during a certain period of 
time.  
 
The part of the statute which is in contention 
is § 20507(b)(2), which indicates that the 
State shall not remove the voter “by reason of 
the person's failure to vote.” The Secretary 
indicates that the person is not removed from 
the voting rolls until after the registrant is sent 
a notice by mail to find out if he or she still 
lives at the old address. Not until that person 
fails to respond, as plaintiff Larry Harmon 
did, does the State then list the voter as 
“inactive” in the registration database. 
Nevertheless, this “inactive” voter has all the 
rights to cast a regular ballot at any election, 
but if four years transpire without the 
registrant's voting, his or her registration 
record is canceled. However, if the registrant 
has any voting activity during those four 
years, he or she returns to an active voter 
status. 
 
The text of the NVRA directs the States to 
“conduct a general program that makes a 
reasonable effort to remove the names of 
ineligible voters from the official lists of 
eligible voters by reason of” death or 
relocation. The district court found the 
Secretary has made a reasonable effort to 
carry out that mandate, and I agree. The State 
cannot remove the registrant's name from the 
rolls for a failure to vote only, and Ohio does 
not do so. It removes registrants only if (1) 
they have not voted or updated their 
registration for the last two years, (2) also 
failed to respond to the address-confirmation 
notice, and (3) then failed to engage in any 
voter activity in four consecutive years, 
including two consecutive Federal elections 
following that notice. 
 
The decision of the district court also follows 
the language in HAVA. The district court 
cited the following language from that act: 
 
    [C]onsistent with the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 ..., registrants who 
have not responded to a notice and who have 
not voted in 2 consecutive general elections 
for Federal office shall be removed from the 
official list of eligible voters, except that no 
registrant may be removed solely by reason 
of a failure to vote. 
 
As the Secretary has explained, it is his 
position that no voter is removed solely by 
reason of a failure to vote, and thus he has 
complied with the language from both 
statutes. I agree. The statutes leave it to the 
States to implement, and Ohio has developed 
a lawful procedure. 
 
On the question of mootness, I agree with the 
majority that the plaintiffs had standing to 
bring the challenge to the notice form when 
the case was filed. However, I disagree with 
the conclusion that this case is not moot 
because the issues, save one, concerning the 
confirmation notice form have been corrected 
by the Secretary. Cessation of certain 
“conduct by government officials has been 
treated with more solicitude by the courts 
than similar action by private parties.” I agree 
with the district court that there is no 
evidence to show that the Secretary would 
change the current notice, and this court 
should give him deference on that question. 
However, I concur with the majority that the 
current notice does not comply with the 
NVRA final mandate that when the Secretary 
sends the confirmation notice that the 
registrant has been purged, the notice must 
provide “information concerning how the 
registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.”  
The district court found that this issue was 
waived by the plaintiffs for failure to include 
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it in their pleadings before filing their reply 
brief. However, their motion for summary 
judgment argued that the confirmation notice 
forms do not advise people who have moved 
out of the State how they could register in 
their new State. Although I agree with the 
district court that the State officials have been 
given an “onerous burden of coaching out-of-
state residents through the registration 
process in their new States of residence,” that 
is what the statute requires. The district court 
ruled that the mandate only applies to give the 
registrant information about registering in 
another location in Ohio, but the language of 
the statute is broader than that. In their brief 
on appeal, plaintiffs have suggested that an 
easy way to comply would be by directing 
voters to the Election Assistance 
Commission's website containing the federal 
form, which provides instructions and 
guidance for voter registration in all States. 
Although such a notice should be easy to 
attach to the notification to the registrants, it 
assumes that all registrants know how to 
utilize websites. 
  
Nevertheless, that is the relief which the 
plaintiffs have requested, and it seems simple 
enough for the Secretary to institute that 
amendment to the notice. 
 
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the 
district court, except insofar as it declined to 
require the Secretary to amend its notice to 
voters who have moved to other States. I 
would grant relief on that sole issue. 
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“High court to review Ohio’s method for removing voters from 
registration rolls” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
May 30, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court said Tuesday it will hear 
yet another voting rights dispute next term 
and consider reinstating Ohio’s method for 
purging the names of those who do not 
regularly vote from registration rolls. 
Civil rights groups, which have successfully 
challenged the state’s process, told the 
Supreme Court that there was no reason to 
disturb a decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 6th Circuit striking down the 
rules as a violation of federal voting law. 
Democrats and advocates for the poor say the 
state’s efforts are disproportionately felt in 
neighborhoods that tend to vote Democratic. 
The procedure has prompted years of 
litigation between the advocates and the 
Republican-led legislature. 
But Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, a 
Republican who is running for governor, said 
the process has been used under both 
Democrats and Republicans. It is a way to 
clear the voter rolls of those who have died or 
moved away and increases public 
confidence, he said. 
“Maintaining the integrity of the voter rolls is 
essential to conducting an election with 
efficiency and integrity,” Husted said in a 
statement. 
“I remain confident that once the justices 
review this case they will rule to uphold the 
decades-old process that both Republicans 
and Democrats have used in Ohio to maintain 
our voter rolls as consistent with federal 
law,” he added. 
He said that in his time in office, the efforts 
have resulted in the removal of nearly 
560,000 deceased Ohioans from the rolls and 
“the resolution of more than 1.65 million 
voters who were registered more than once.” 
But opponents say it is inappropriate to have 
such efforts be triggered by a failure to vote. 
Under Ohio’s procedure, voters who do not 
vote for two years are sent registration 
confirmation notices. If they do not respond 
and do not vote over the next four years, they 
are removed from the rolls. 
The groups that challenged the law said the 
procedure violates a part of the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993, which 
prohibits a voter-list maintenance program 
for federal elections that “result[s] in the 
removal of the name of any person from the 
official list of voters . . . by reason of the 
person’s failure to vote.” 
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Other states take action only after receiving 
notice that a person has moved, the groups 
said. 
The provision in the federal law “reflects the 
basic principle that, just as every eligible 
voter has the constitutional right to vote, each 
one also has the right not to cast a vote — and 
the mere exercise of that right should not be 
the basis for removal from the voter rolls,” 
the organizations told the court in a brief. 
André Washington, president of one of the 
groups that challenged the state, the Ohio A. 
Philip Randolph Institute, said in a statement 
that the names of approximately 40,000 
voters in Cuyahoga County were purged in 
2015 “and a disproportionate number of 
those people came from low-income 
neighborhoods and communities of color.” 
Husted told the court that it needed to get 
involved because a growing number of states 
had similar procedures. 
But opponents said only a handful of states 
do what Ohio does and that the justices 
should wait for the issue to be examined by 
other courts. 
The case, which will be argued in the term 
that begins in October, is Husted v. A. Philip 
Randolph Institute. 
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“Use It or Lose It?” 
 
The Atlantic 
Matt Ford 
May 30, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will review Ohio’s 
contested purge of its voter rolls next term, 
adding a potentially major case on voting 
rights to its docket for the first time since 
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the high court. 
The justices agreed to hear the case, Husted 
v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, in their 
weekly release of orders on Tuesday. At issue 
is the removal of tens of thousands of Ohio 
voters from the state’s voter list ahead of last 
November’s election. The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals blocked the process before 
Election Day last year before it had fully 
taken effect, while a federal district court 
allowed 7,515 voters who had already been 
removed by that point to cast a ballot. 
State election officials across the country 
routinely remove voters who have died, 
moved to another state, or become otherwise 
ineligible to vote. In 1994, Ohio added what’s 
known as the “supplemental process” to its 
standard removal procedure: The Ohio 
secretary of state’s office compiles a list of 
registered voters who have gone two years 
without any “voter activity”—which covers 
acts ranging from updating one’s voter 
information to casting an absentee, 
provisional, or Election Day ballot—and 
sends them a confirmation notice. If the 
notice isn’t returned and the registered voter 
doesn’t participate over the following four 
years, he or she is automatically struck from 
the rolls. 
A group of civil-rights organizations, 
including the A. Philip Randolph Institute, 
the think tank Demos, and the ACLU of 
Ohio, filed a lawsuit against Ohio Secretary 
of State Jon Husted challenging the 
supplemental process’s legality in early 
2016. They pointed to two federal laws, the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and 
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, that 
forbid states from removing registered voters 
from the rolls for simply not voting. Husted 
countered that the federal provision doesn’t 
apply because the supplemental process 
doesn’t force voters from the rolls unless 
they’ve also failed to respond to the mailed 
confirmation notice. By his apparent 
estimation, that intervening step means the 
state hasn’t broken either law. 
A federal district court initially dismissed the 
lawsuit. But a three-judge panel in the Sixth 
Circuit sided with the organizations, ruling 
that the prohibition against removing eligible 
Americans for not voting would be 
meaningless if states are allowed to use 
inactivity as one reason, even among many, 
to strike their names. “In more concrete 
terms, a state cannot avoid the conclusion 
that its process results in removal ‘solely by 
reason of a failure to vote,’ by providing that 
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the confirmation notice procedure is 
triggered by a registrant’s failure either to 
vote or to climb Mt. Everest or to hit a hole-
in-one,” the court wrote. 
A ruling in Ohio’s favor would broaden 
states’ powers to remove otherwise-eligible 
voters from their lists. 
Husted appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court in February and applauded the justices 
for agreeing to hear it. “Maintaining the 
integrity of the voter rolls is essential to 
conducting an election with efficiency and 
integrity,” he said in a statement. “The 
decision by the Court to hear this case is 
encouraging. I remain confident that once the 
justices review this case they will rule to 
uphold the decades-old process that both 
Republicans and Democrats have used in 
Ohio to maintain our voter rolls as consistent 
with federal law.” 
The organizations that brought the lawsuit, 
for their part, reiterated their view that the 
purge wrongly targeted disadvantaged 
Ohioans for disenfranchisement. “In 
Cuyahoga County alone, approximately 
40,000 individuals were unlawfully purged 
merely for choosing not to vote, and a 
disproportionate number of those people 
came from low-income neighborhoods and 
communities of color,” Andre Washington, 
the president of APRI’s Ohio chapter, said in 
a statement. “The Supreme Court must 
uphold the Sixth Circuit’s decision to ensure 
that all Ohio citizens have the opportunity to 
exercise their right to vote.” 
Freda Levenson, the director of the ACLU of 
Ohio, went even further, describing the 
supplemental process as “a powerful 
mechanism” of voter suppression that 
violates federal law. “We are confident that 
the Supreme Court will uphold the correct 
decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and will ultimately ensure that 
eligible Ohio voters may not be stricken from 
the rolls,” she said in a statement. 
A ruling in Ohio’s favor would broaden 
states’ powers to remove otherwise-eligible 
voters from their lists. It would also come as 
multiple states have pursued tougher 
measures to constrain voter registration and 
participation. President Trump frequently 
invokes the specter of voter fraud and has 
ordered a commission to tackle its perceived 
threat. His remarks aside, virtually all 
election experts have concluded the United 
States’ highly decentralized electoral system 
makes systemic voter fraud all but 
impossible. 
Laws purportedly targeting voter fraud often 
face uphill battles in the judiciary. Earlier this 
month, the Supreme Court declined to review 
a Fourth Circuit ruling that found North 
Carolina’s voter ID law targeted black voters 
with “surgical precision,” thus ensuring 
lower participation. Even lesser restrictions 
can have a significant effect on the electorate: 
A recent study found voter ID laws in general 
double the turnout gap between white and 
black voters in general elections. 
Whether the Supreme Court will obstruct or 
uphold those efforts remains to be seen. 
Husted v. AFRI will be the first major 
election-law case at the high court since 
Gorsuch joined it in April. He is expected to 
be a reliably conservative jurist, potentially 
giving Chief Justice John Roberts and his 
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right-leaning colleagues a fifth vote in 
upholding Ohio’s supplementary process. 
But it’s unclear if he’ll match the intensity of 
his predecessor. Antonin Scalia, who held 
Gorsuch’s seat before his death in February 
2016, generally favored more restrictive 
electoral practices. In 2013, he mused aloud 
during oral arguments in Shelby County v. 
Holder that “racial entitlements” like the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 are difficult to 
remove “through the normal political 
process.” His fifth vote to curb the VRA’s 
protections in that case helped usher in the 
restrictive era on which his successor will 
soon weigh in. 
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“Federal appeals court rules against Ohio voter-roll purges” 
 
The Washington Post 
Sean Sullivan and Sari Horwitz 
September 23, 2016 
 
A federal appeals court ruled Friday against 
Ohio’s procedure for removing voters from 
state rolls, dealing a blow to Republican 
Secretary of State Jon Husted and handing a 
victory to voting rights advocates in a key 
presidential swing state. 
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 6th Circuit overruled a U.S. 
district court judge’s decision that Husted 
was not violating any laws with the process 
he was using to take inactive voters off the 
rolls if they did not confirm their status. By a 
-2-to-1 vote, the court of appeals sent the case 
back to the district court. 
The dispute centers on Ohio’s removal of 
possibly tens of thousands of voters from 
registration lists because they did not respond 
to letters seeking to confirm their addresses 
and have not cast a ballot since 2008, in what 
is being criticized as a “use it or lose it” rule 
for voting. 
The appeals court ruled that Ohio’s practices 
could unjustifiably remove some eligible 
voters and are not in compliance with the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993. 
“A state cannot avoid the conclusion that its 
process results in removal ‘solely by reason 
of a failure to vote’ . . . by providing that the 
confirmation notice procedure is triggered by 
a registrant’s failure either to vote or to climb 
Mt. Everest or to hit a hole-in-one,” said the 
ruling. 
In a statement, Husted said the court’s 
decision “will effectively force us to put 
voters back on the voter rolls who have died 
or long since moved to another address.” He 
said that if “the final resolution requires us to 
reinstate voting eligibility to individuals who 
have died or moved out of Ohio, we will 
appeal.” 
Ohio Democratic Party Chairman David 
Pepper called Friday’s decision a “huge win 
for Ohio voters.” 
“The court’s decision reaffirms a basic 
principle: voters shouldn’t lose their right to 
vote simply because they vote infrequently,” 
he said in a statement. 
Both Democrat Hillary Clinton and 
Republican Donald Trump are heavily 
contesting Ohio. Polls show a close contest in 
the state, where 18 electoral votes are up for 
grabs. Trump campaigned in the state this 
week. 
The current policy of mandating that inactive 
voters effectively prove that they still belong 
on the voter rolls appears to be aiding 
Republicans in Ohio’s largest metropolitan 
areas, according to a recent Reuters study. 
The study found that in Cleveland, Cincinnati 
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and Columbus, voters have been taken off the 
rolls in -Democratic-leaning areas at about 
twice the rate as in GOP-heavy areas. 
The Ohio chapter of the A. Philip Randolph 
Institute and the Northeast Ohio Coalition for 
the Homeless, represented by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and Demos, 
filed suit challenging the law in federal court. 
In July, the Justice Department joined the 
court fight when it and the groups appealed 
the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
6th Circuit after the district court upheld 
Husted’s decision. 
Voting rights advocates have expressed deep 
concern about the policy. Some cite the 2000 
election in Florida, when the state incorrectly 
stated that about 12,000 registered voters 
were -ex-cons and then purged them from the 
rolls. 
Republicans have expressed concern that 
changing the policy could lead to voter fraud. 
However, documented instances of fraud are 
rare. A 2014 study by Loyola Law School 
professor Justin -Levitt found 31 incidents of 
voter impersonation out of more than a 
billion ballots cast. 
Along with the dispute over the voter rolls, 
the Supreme Court this month rejected a 
request from Democrats in Ohio to restore an 
extra week of early voting. After voters faced 
long lines in 2004, the state had added the 
additional week, known as the Golden Week, 
because the days overlapped with the period 
for voter registration. 
In 2013, a Republican-controlled legislature 
repealed the law. A federal judge found that 
action unconstitutional, but his decision was 
overturned by an appeals court, and the 
Supreme Court declined to intervene. 
Judge Eric L. Clay, who was appointed by 
President Bill Clinton, delivered the Friday 
opinion. He was joined by Judge Julia Smith 
Gibbons, an appointee of President George 
W. Bush. 
Judge Eugene E. Siler Jr. dissented in part 
and concurred in part. He was appointed by 
President George H.W. Bush.
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“Ohio Can't Purge Infrequent Voters From Its Rolls” 
 
The Atlantic 
David A. Graham 
September 23, 2016 
 
Ohio can’t summarily kick tens of thousands 
of voters off its rolls simply for not having 
voted recently and not returning a postcard, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said on 
Friday. 
The decision comes just 46 days before the 
election day, and as tens of thousands of 
Buckeye State voters have already requested 
early ballots. But the decision could still be 
appealed, as one judge noted in his partial 
dissent. 
Ohio has seen a couple high-profile fights 
over voting laws this year, disputes that have 
particular importance because the state is a 
crucial swing state in every presidential 
election. In this case, Secretary of State Jon 
Husted, a Republican, decided to remove 
voters from the state’s rolls if they had not 
voted for six years. The state sent a mailing 
to these voters asking them to reply if they 
were still living in their locations and voting, 
but the mailers neither stated that a reply was 
mandatory nor made it clear that failing to 
reply could result in removal from rolls. “If 
this is [a] really important thing to you in 
your life, voting, you probably would have 
done so within a six-year period,” Husted 
said. 
Moves such as these tend to 
disproportionately affect voters in urban 
areas, who are more likely to move 
frequently. That in turns means a 
disproportionate impact on poorer and 
blacker voters—who happen to be more 
likely to vote Democratic. Homeless 
advocates said the purges unfairly targeted 
those without a stable address. 
Voting advocates sued Husted, saying the 
purge violated the National Voting Rights 
Act and asking for either an injunction to 
block the removal or else a requirement to 
count provisional ballots from people who 
were removed. They lost in federal district 
court, but the appeals court decision today 
concluded that the lower court was mistaken. 
By a 2-1 ruling, the three-judge panel said 
that the plaintiff’s claims were not made 
irrelevant when Husted mailed out a second 
notice with more information, and it ruled 
that Ohio had to inform people moving out of 
state about how to register in their new 
residence. 
Judge Eric Clay, a Bill Clinton appointee, and 
Judge Julia Gibbons, a George W. Bush 
appointee, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Judge Eugene Siler, a George H.W. Bush 
appointee, dissented in part and concurred in 
part. 
Assuming the ruling is not overturned by a 
higher court, it’s hard to know what effect it 
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might have on the election. As a Cincinnati 
Enquirer investigation found, no one really 
knows how many voters have actually been 
purged. 
In a separate case, Husted was sued for 
eliminating “Golden Week,” a stretch in 
which Ohioans could both register to vote 
and cast an early ballot. A district court ruled 
against Husted in that case, but in August a 
different Sixth Circuit panel ruled that 
Husted was within his rights to eliminate it. 
 
